

ESCALATING THREATS ON CHINESE-MALAY INTERACTION
(Acceptance and Resistance towards Chinese in Northern Coast of West Kalimantan)



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Abstract

Title: *Escalating Threats on Chinese – Malay Interaction: Acceptance and Resistance towards Chinese in Northern Coast of West Kalimantan*

The research aims to explore the dynamics of fragile interaction between Chinese and Malay throughout Northern Coast of West Kalimantan. It covers historical, social, economic, political and theological issues which arise among the population. The curiosity lays not only on the fact that differences between the two exist in terms of race they were born with, religion they adhere, culture they practice, ways they behave, language they speak with, but also on currently developing issues involving Indonesian Chinese role in politics and the giantic emergence of People Republic of China to the world. Thus, altogether result in a common sense among many Malay which they can not avoid, their fear of being “the next Singapore.”

To achieve the above objective, qualitative approach is employed primarily. A number of key informants along Northern Coast of West Kalimantan were interviewed deeply, concepts were developed, hypotheses were dynamicly rejected and accepted. Then, when understanding came into shape, Focused Group Discussion held. Finally, to cross-check with and to satisfy the question of what lay people say of the topics, 90 questionnaires were distributed to 9 research volunteers. They questioned 90 informants of the two entities and check-listed the available options in Likert Scale.

Hopefully, the findings of this research could offer a neat socio-cultural and political engineering to solve a very near potential conflict between the two entities, Chinese and Malay in Northern Coast of West Kalimantan.

The research is also aiming to be published in an accredited journal and to be honoured by intellectual right (HAKI).

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Research Background

Chinese – Malay current interaction in Indonesia has been coming into a so-fragile construction. That is mainly due to internal and external factors. Internally, Indonesian Chinese are subject to wealth and discrimination.¹ It means, Indonesian Malay do not put their attention to poor Indonesian Chinese who presumably can not find an exit from their ancestors' type of professional jobs, mainly gold diggers and farmers.² What attract Malay's attention is the phenomena that Indonesian Chinese are so dominant economically. They are everywhere in the list of Indonesian Richest People.³ The history flashed back just to the Dutch colonial era who created Chinese above Malays. Economically and socially. This phenomenon then grew fast in Soeharto era who practiced Trickle Down Effect in capturing economic growth and thus put Chinese traders and businessmen created by Dutch colonial scheme to play the role. The economic policy which has often been blamed for creating injustice economic distribution in Indonesia ever since.

Nowadays, in the so-called era of political reformation, some Chinese took the step to the political arena and when it came to Ahok, the ex-governor of the Capitol city, Jakarta, the turbulence has been triggered. Ahok's very personal style of communication escalated the socio-political tension. Stereotypes and other ethnical prejudices came onto surface. Chinese bussines management which prefers to employ Chninese employees and discriminated Malay employees as characterized by M.D. La Ode⁴ attracts a lot of people.

Unfortunately, when ethnical prejudice has emerged, external factors came in line. The Jakarta Bay Reclamation for instance is one of many triggering factors for many controversies.⁵ The controversy is worsening when people find youtube advertisement⁶ in Mandarin Language. Hypothesis that there is a linear and positive correlation between Jakarta Bay Reclamation programme and the rise of Great China Empire has been creating situation even worse. Not only Malay natives but also the world is ambivalent, hesitating between to stand for or against the Rise of People Republic of China. Arguments for and against it can not be eagerly to choose.⁷ China's growing military

¹ <http://www.thejakartapost.com/youth/2016/08/30/why-its-important-to-talk-about-chinese-indonesians-or-chindos.html>

² Mary Sommers Heidhues, *Golddiggers, Farmers, and Traders in the "Chinese Districts" of West Kalimantan, Indonesia*. South East Asia Program Publication (SEAP). New Yirk: Ithaca, 2003.

³ <https://www.forbes.com/indonesia-billionaires/list/>

⁴ M.D. La Ode, *Politik Tiga Wajah*. Jakarta: Pustaka Obor, 2013.

⁵ <http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/giant-reclamation-project-in-jakarta-hits-wall-of-resistance>

⁶ *Kontroversi Reklamasi dan Suguhan Iklan "Pluit City" yang Mengecoh*. Selasa, 5 April 2016. <http://property.kompas.com>

⁷ <http://www.debatingeurope.eu/focus/infobox-arguments-for-and-against-fearing-the-rise-of-china/#.WewTzIRSZIU>

budget, China's habit to "Playing Dirty" and China's Dependency are scary to the world. But, the world also notes that China needs stability and consequently avoids conflict.

However, we can not count how rational the people are? We never can be sure whether Indonesian Malays, but even Indonesian Chinese, would analyze comprehensively. Jakarta Bay Reclamation, Meikarta property development, the capture of illegal workers of Chinese origins and many other issues has been heard and discussed all over the nation.

The province of West Kalimantan, to be more precisely, the regency (region) of Sambas had a long history of Chinese-Malay interaction. Long before the proliferation, Sambas who claims to be Northern Coast regency had ever named as *Cidayu* region. *Cidayu* is the acronym of Cina-Dayak-Melayu (**C**hinese, **D**ayak and **M**alay). The administrative proliferation divided the region into three: Singkawang, Bengkayang and Sambas. Although the three new regencies describe each's major population (Singkawang-Chinese, Bengkayang-Dayak and Sambas-Malays) but the proliferation itself was not in support to social division. It was only for administrative and political reasons. Neither ethnic clash nor ethnic discrimination came along with. Therefore, the later development of Singkawang to be the City with a thousand pagoda and the fact that a Chinese was elected as mayor of the city, no body put any concern. No ethnical issue came onto surface. Never ever assume that the proliferation was followed by people's migration like the history of India-Pakistan or the expulsion of Rohingnya from Myanmar. The three different ethnics exist in the three divided regencies. These all to underline that Chinese-Malay interaction in the regions did not have a threatening problem.

However, Sambas was also known as a region with ethnical conflict. Many can not forget how awfully bloody the tragedy was.⁸ Yes, it was a conflict based on the natives' hatred upon Madura who migrated from other island. What about Sambas Malay's treatment upon Chinese as they are similarly migrated to Sambas region. Chinese even migrated from other country which is far a way from Sambas. More over, Chinese have more differences than Madura. And yet, Chinese had enjoyed to certain extent a privilege in colonial era. Still, the 1970's tragedy of communist movement (Paraku) existed in mind. Last but could be the most critical obstacle of Chinese – Malay interaction of this Northern Coast of West Kalimantan is religion as Sambas population are so proud of being the terrace of Mecca.

The existence of Indonesian Chinese in Indonesia is historical. First generation of Chinese immigrants were refugees who escaped from the torture of transitional ruling dynasties, some others were brought by British and Dutch Colonialist. They all fought to survive by means of working hard and being co-opted by local rulers. This only option left for them. They lack of leisure time to comprehend, to understand and to assimilate with local culture. Unfortunately, most of them were trapped in their own culture but their own community. Their being exclusively inhabit specific districts, such as China Towns found across many countries, can be worsening the opportunity to create a firm exchange

⁸ https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerusuhan_Sambas; <https://infowagu.blogspot.co.id/2014/05/flash-back-tragedi-sambas-dan-sampit.html>

of words, behaviours and cultures. Some even maintain not only the culture but also their mother language. In the case of Pontianak Chinese, Medan Chinese and Babel Chinese, they mostly are bilingual but it would not be surprising if some are monolingual, Chinese language only. To certain extent, this phenomenon could be accepted but surely this is a major obstacle to build a communal togetherness.

Democracy is another term which examines level of acceptance towards the existence of Chinese. To the extend of Jakarta governor election, specifically of the second round on April 19, 2017 it can be seen as socio-political unreadiness of majority to accept Chinese Governor.⁹

In addition to the above economic-socio and political problems which are internal affairs, the issue of the Rise of People Republic of China can not eagerly be dismissed. “Dragon Connection” is obviously feared. That is why this research question is not only focused upon a dynamics of Chinese – Malay interaction but also trying to discover any influence of the Rise of China upon fears and hopes, arguments for and against the acceptance of ethno pluralism.

B. Research Questions

The previous discussion creates a curiosity about the threats on Chinese – Malay interaction in Northern Coast of West Kalimantan. Therefore, to have a better insight, there are several questions to be answered by this research:

1. How are the threats on Chinese-Malay interaction in Northern Coast of West Kalimantan?
2. What are influencing factors to Chinese-Malay interaction in Northern Coast of West Kalimantan?
3. Which factors are dominantly influencing Chinese-Malay interaction in Northern Coast of West Kalimantan?
4. What are preferences perceived by Chinese and Malays in Northern Coast of West Kalimantan to solve the threats?

C. Research Objectives

Based on research questions, this research would provide efforts to explore arguments, fears, hopes, habits, facts, and prejudices surrounding Chinese – Malay interaction. These all are required:

1. To have a clear description of threats upon Chinese-Malay interaction in Northern Coast of West Kalimantan.

⁹Jakarta had ever had Chindos Governor in 1964-1965 but it was not through democratic election. Henk Ngantung was appointed by President Soekarno. https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henk_Ngantung

2. To affirm what are influencing factors to Chinese-Malay interaction in Northern Coast of West Kalimantan.
3. To confirm which factors are dominantly influencing Chinese-Malay interaction in Northern Coast of West Kalimantan.
4. To grasp what solutions are preferred by Chinese and Malay of Northern Coast of West Kalimantan to solve their problems of interaction.

D. The Significance of Research

Research on Chinese – Malay interaction would be able to contribute:

1. A better understanding of how is the dynamics of threats attacking Chinese-Malay interaction in Northern Coast of West Kalimantan.
2. A confirmation of theories on influencing factors of socio-cultural and political interaction.
3. An early detection of dominant factors influencing Chinese-Malay interaction in Northern Coast of West Kalimantan.
4. To provide people's own ideas of problem solving.

E. Research Method

Four consecutive questions which are dynamics of the threats, influencing factors of the threats, primary factors, and preferences to solve the problems would be answered by mixed approach (qualitatively for the first and the fourth question whereas the second and the third would be quantitatively). Research data of the two entities would be collected mainly in the area where Chinese are concentrated (epicentrum) to be compared and cross-checked by the data collected from the peripheral where Chinese are minority. People of the two entities would be interviewed respectively by the two approaches (in-depth interview with regard to Purposive Sampling and in accordance of questionnaire by means of stratified proportional random sampling). Lay people and elites, literates and illiterates, all together would become data resources. The possibly contrastive data would be analyzed and respectively considered. CFA (*Confirmatory Factors Analysis*)¹⁰ would be employed to analyze quantitative data.

Regarding qualitative data analysis, researchers would consider either one or a combination of models offered by Miles and Huberman (*data reduction, data display, and verification*), or Spradley (*domain analysis, taxonomic analysis, componential analysis, and discovering cultural theme*). A part from these two, models offered by Geertz (thick description) or Strauss and Corbin would be in consideration. And

¹⁰ [http://www.statisticssolutions.com/confirmatory-factor-analysis/;](http://www.statisticssolutions.com/confirmatory-factor-analysis/)
<http://www2.sas.com/proceedings/sugi31/200-31.pdf>

FGD (*Focused Group Discussion*) is expectedly used to sharpen and enrich qualitative data analysis.

F. Research Time Line

Research would be run from April 2018 to November 2018. Steps and procedures are as follow:

No	Description	Bulan							
		April	Mei	Juni	Juli	Aug	Sep	Okt	Nov
1.	Research Proposal accomplishment	X	x						
2.	Library and Field Research		x	x	x				
3.	Data Analysis and FGD			x	x	x			
4.	Project report				x	x	x		
5.	Seminar						x		
6.	Revision						x	x	
7.	Publication							x	
8.	Book's version								x

CHAPTER II

DESCRIPTION OF SAMBAS REGENCY AND CHINESE PEOPLE OF THE NORTHERN COAST

A. History and Condition of the Region

Since 15 July 1999, Sambas has been revived as the new capital of Sambas Regency. Before, Sambas was merely a small subdistrict capital of the Sambas Subdistrict, while the Sambas Regency had its capital in Singkawang (1957 – 1999). Historically, Sambas was the center of Sambas Sultanate, supposedly one of the more influential kingdoms in Kalimantan particularly and Nusantara in general. Sambas Sultanate had risen to prominence ever since the reign of its first Sultan, Muhammad Syafiuddin I (1631-1668). This glory lasted until the reign of the 15th Sultan, Muhammad

Mulia Ibrahim Syafiuddin (1931-1943). After his death by the hands of the Japanese occupation forces, the fortunes of Sambas Sultanate declined.

Actually, Sambas' prominence had started even before the reign of the first Sultan, Muhammad Syafiuddin I (1631-1668), also known as Raden Sulaiman. Since the 13th century CE, there were already kings in Sambas. It all started with the arrival of Majapahit troops in Paloh. It would later moved to Kota Lama in Teluk Keramat. Later on, after several political intrigues forced him to leave Kota Lama, Raden Sulaiman and his followers moved to Kota Bangun in Sambas Besar River. They would later moved to Kota Bandir, and then to Lubuk Madung. Supposedly, Raden Sulaiman and his people stopped for a while in Tebas, clearing up the area before leaving. Thus, the area gained its name (“Tebas” means cutting down/clearing grass from the land).

It was only during the reign of the second Sultan, Raden Bima or Sultan Muhammad Tajuddin (1668-1708), that the capital of Sambas Sultanate was build in Muara Ulakan, the confluence of 3 rivers: Sambas Kecil River, Subah River and Tebarau River. Since 1668, its territories encompassed Pemangkat, Singkawang, and Sambas itself, which is rich in gold.

Since the Japanese and then NICA occupations, the Sultanate has fallen, due to the troubles of World War II. In 1950, when Sambas and West Kalimantan in general returned under the rule of Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI), and Sambas Regency was created, the people of Sambas demanded that Sambas remained as the capital of the new regency, as remembrance and continuation of the sultanate's glory. However, their wish would only be fulfilled in 1999, after around 50 years.

The historical written and archaeological record of the sultanate and its rulers can be traced clearly since the founding of Sambas Sultanate, at the start of 17th century. The main written source on Sambas Sultanate is a document written by its 13th Sultan, Muhammad Syafiuddin II, titled “Silsilah Raja-raja Sambas”, written on December 1903. Meanwhile, the main written historical source for the related Brunei Darussalam is the document “Silsilah Raja-Raja Brunei.” The historical sources concerning the relation between the 2 kingdoms has been published in 3 books by Bruneian Historical Center. Those 3 books are: (1) “Tarsilah Brunai, Sejarah Awal dan Perkembangan Islam” published in 1990; (2) “Raja Tengah, Sultan Serawak Pertama dan Terakhir” published in

1995; and (3) “Tarsilah Brunai, Zaman kegemilangan dan Kemashuran” published in 1997.

In both the chronicles of Brunei's kings and Sambas' kings, the history of Sambas Sultanate was told from the time of Raja Tengah, the King of Sarawak who stayed in Sukadana and Sambas for around 40 years (1600-1641). Raden Sulaiman was son of Raja Tengah from his marriage with Puteri Surya Kusuma, daughter of the Sultan of Matan/Sukadana, Sultan Muhammad Syafiuddin. He would later become the first Sultan of Sambas (1631-1668 CE).

Thus, the history of Sambas had started long before the reign of Raden Sulaiman. Although there were no written records about Sambas' ancient history, from the records of Majapahit Kingdom and chronicles of the Chinese Emperors, Sambas was stated to be equal with other kingdoms in Kalimantan, Java, Sumatra, Malacca and Brunei, and also the Chinese Empire in the 13th and 14th centuries. Due to the lack of data, the early history of Sambas and Kalimantan is still filled with uncertainty. However, it is known that at least from the 10th century, Western Kalimantan was well known by foreign travelers and merchants from China, India, and Arabia.

The transfer of Sambas Regency's capital from Singkawang to Sambas was the most monumental part of the entire restructuring process of Sambas Regency, officially suggested to the central government in 1997. This effort to transfer the capital had undergone a long and arduous process, starting from public demands who wanted Sambas to become the capital of Sambas Regency again, after it was transferred to Singkawang by Surat Menteri Pemerintahan Umum dan Otonomi Daerah Nomor Dbs.52/2/36-33, dated 1 April 1963.

This public demand was based on the appointment of Sambas as capital of Sambas Regency, according to Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 27 Tahun 1956, about Penetapan Undang-undang Darurat Nomor 3 Tahun 1953 about the creation of second-level administrative divisions in Kalimantan. The Governor of West Kalimantan at that time, J. C. Oevang Oeray, responded to this public demand by starting to build offices and houses in the Desa Dalam Kaum housing complex, as the first step in preparation of the transfer of capital back to Sambas.

Also concerning this matter, and according to TAP MPR Nomor II/MPR/1998 about GBHN, the Sambas Regency Regional Government, supported by West

Kalimantan Provincial Government and all supporting communities, took initiative and strived to split Sambas Regency into 3 new second-level administrative divisions through the established procedure and mechanism. The 3 planned divisions are: (1) Sambas Regency, with Sambas as capital; (2) Bengkayang Regency, with Bengkayang as capital; and (3) Singkawang City, with Singkawang as capital.

This plan was suggested to the central government in 1997, based on the agreement of the people of Sambas Regency, as stated in Keputusan DPRD Kabupaten Sambas Nomor 12 Tahun 1997, dated 29 March 1997 about Approval of the Suggested Plan of Second-Level Administrative Division Creation for Development of the Second-Level Administrative Division Sambas. Then, with Surat Nomor 135/460/Tapem, dated 31 May 1997, the Regent of Sambas relayed this suggestion to the Governor of West Kalimantan, to be passed on to the central government. Later, the Governor of West Kalimantan, with Surat Nomor 118/2113/Pem-C, dated 5 June 1997, delivered this suggestion to the central government, through the Internal Affairs Minister. kepada Pemerintah Pusat melalui Menteri Dalam Negeri Republik Indonesia.

After a long discussion with both Second Commission of DPR-RI and the Department of Internal Affairs, it was finally decided with Undang-undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 10 Tahun 1999 about Creation of Second-Level Administrative Division Bengkayang, legalized on 20 April 1999. In this law, specifically Pasal 4 ayat (2), it is mentioned that with the creation of Bengkayang Regency, the capital of Sambas Regency was transferred from Singkawang to Sambas.

Through various considerations and based on public demands in response to the new law, 15 July 1999 was set as the suitable date for the formal transfer of capital from Singkawang to Sambas. With Keputusan Bupati Kepala Daerah Tingkat II Sambas Nomor 320. A Tahun 1999 and the preparations involving the people, the capital of Sambas Regency was formally transferred on 15 July 1999 in an elaborate procession.

Geographically, Sambas Regency is the northernmost part of West Kalimantan Province, spanning from 2°08' to 0°33' N, and 108°39' to 110°04' E, bordered by: (1) Natuna Sea and Sarawak (East Malaysia) in the north; (2) Singkawang City and Bengkayang Regency in the south; (3) Natuna Sea in the west; dan (4) Sarawak (East Malaysia) and Bengkayang Regency in the east. Sambas Regency consists of 19 subdistricts, 193 villages, 594 dusun, 1.147 Rukun Warga (RW) and 2.929 Rukun

Tetangga (RT). Its total area is 6.395,70 Km², or around 4,36% of West Kalimantan's total area; its coasts are ±198,76 km long; its national borders ± 97 km long; and its bodies of water has total area of 1.467,84 Km². The largest subdivision in this regency is Sajingan Besar Subdistrict, with total area of 1.391,20 Km² or 21,75%, while the smallest is Salatiga Subdistrict, with total area of 82,75 Km² or 1,29% of Sambas Regency's total area.

Most of Sambas Regency's area are relatively flat (0 % - 15 % rise to run) with area of 468.196 hectares or 67,59%, and the area of the regions with 15 % - 40 % rise to run slope is 160.396 hectare or 25,08%, while the > 40% rise to run grade has area of 46.832 hectare or 7,3%. The height of each subdistricts in the regency are: 1. 0 – 7 m above sea level areas are present in: Sejangkung, Sambas, Tebas, Selakau, Jawai, Paloh and Teluk Keramat Regencies. 2. 8-25 m above sea level areas are present in: Sejangkung, Sambas, Tebas, Selakau, Pemangkat and Teluk Keramat Regencies. 3. 26-100 m above sea level are present in: Sejangkung, Sambas, Tebas, Selakau, Pemangkat, Teluk Keramat and Paloh Subdistricts.

The land usage pattern in Sambas Regency is mostly for agriculture, which consists of paddy field agricultural lands and non-paddy field agricultural lands. Until 2014, there are 564.998 hectares of agricultural lands, consisting of 68.644 hectares of paddy fields and 496.354 hectares of non-paddy field agricultural lands, with 74.572 hectares of non-agricultural lands.. The largest paddy fields is in Teluk Keramat Subdistrict, as large as 6.911 hectares, followed by Tebas Subdistrict with 6.110 hectares, Jawai Subdistrict with 5.524 hectares, Selakau Subdistrict with 4.643 hectares, and the smallest is in Sajad Subdistrict with 1.454 hectares. The largest non-agricultura land is in Sajingan Besar Subdistrict, with 135.899 hectares, followed by Paloh Subdistrict with 107.802 hectares, Subah Subdistrict witj 47.506 hectares, Teluk Keramat Subdistricts with 38.802 hectares, and the smallest is Semparuk Subdistrict with 2.051 hectares.

According to the results of Interim Population Projection of West Kalimantan Province, in 2015 the population of Sambas Regency is 523.115 people, with population density around 82 people/km², or 2.710 people per villages. The population of Sambas Regency was not spread evenly among its subdistricts, with Pemangkat Subdistrict being the densest with 417 people per km², while Sajingan Besar Subdistrict was the sparsest

with only 8 people per km². Its male population was estimated to be around 258.475 people, while the female population was around 264.640 people.

Divided by age groups, the 0 – 4 year group was the most numerous with 60.326 people, followed by the 5 – 9 year group with 53.387 people, and then the 10-14 year group with 49.296 people. The population growth rate of Sambas Regency in 2015 was 1,05%, with Sajingan Besar Subdistrict having the fastest growth rate compared to the other subdistricts, 2,41% growth rate. Meanwhile, Jawai Selatan Subdistrict had the slowest growth rate in Sambas regency, only 0,28%.

According to data from the Office of Demographics and Civil Registration of Sambas Regency (from the Ministry of Internal Affairs), in 2015 there were 627.837 people in Sambas Regency, and according to data from Sambas Regency Central Bureau of Statistics, the workforce population aged 15 and above was 265.304 people, with 252.439 people working and 12.865 people in open unemployment, while the non-workforce population aged 15 and above was 95.440 people.

The majority of Sambas Regency's population are Islam adherents. In 2015, there were 549.100 Muslims (87,46%), 11.284 Protestants (1,80%), 17.429 Catholics (2,78%), 272 Hindus (0,04%), 46.928 Buddhists (7,47%) and the remaining 2.824 orang (0,45%) adhered to other beliefs.

The economic structure of Sambas is still dominated by agriculture, fishery, and forestry, with 34,21%. However, their contribution to Sambas' economy had decreased continuously from 2011 to 2015. Besides agriculture, forestry, and fishery, the biggest contributor to the Regional Gross Domestic Product based on constant prices in 2015 was retail and bulk trades at 32,94%, followed by motorcycle and car reparation at 17,94%, and then processing industry at 12,74%. Meanwhile, the other work fields only contribute less than 10% of the Regional Gross Domestic Product.

Human development placed humans as the end goal of economic development, rather than a mere tool of the development. Human development is defined as a process of expanding the life choices available to the populace. The main objective of the development is to create an environment that enables people to live long, healthy, and productive (United Nation Development Programme – UNDP). The Human Development Index (HDI) explains how the people can make use of the fruits of development for work,

health, education, etc. HDI was introduced by UNDP in 1990 and periodically published in the yearly Human Development Report (HDR).

HDI is formed by 3 (three) basic dimensions: (1) Long and healthy life; (2) Knowledge; and (3) Decent standard of living. HDI is an important indicator to measure the success of improving the life quality of the citizens, and it can decide the development rank of a region or country. For Indonesia, HDI is a strategic data as both a measure of government performance and to determine allocation of the Public Allocated Funds (DAU).

Based on HDI calculation in 2015, Jakarta Special Capital Territory Province had the highest HDI at 78,99, followed by Yogyakarta Special Region Province in second place at 77,59, and then East Kalimantan at 74,17 in third place. Meanwhile, West Kalimantan Province had HDI of 65,59, or the 29th from 34 provinces in Indonesia. In general, the HDI of Sambas Regency constantly improves, although when compared with other regencies and cities in West Kalimantan, its rank hasn't change, still the 6th from 14 regencies and cities in West Kalimantan. For context, the highest HDI in West Kalimantan Province is in Pontianak City at 77,52, followed by Singkawang City at 70,03 and Kubu Raya Regency at 65,02.

B. Typology of the Locals

The Malay ethnicity is the native ethnicity in Sambas Regency. The emergence of various ethnic issues in Sambas Regency is marked by the amount of violence involving Sambas Malays, including with immigrant groups such as Chinese and Madurese. However, along the way, even the ethnic Chinese has been considered as also part of the local population. This condition strengthens the assumption that conflicts can serve as a trigger for the creation of social balance.

Conflict is a normal part of social dynamics that can happen in every social interaction in the daily life. Effendi stated that social conflict would only become abnormal and triggered tragedies and national collapse when accompanied by violence

and brutality.¹¹ The social conflicts in Sambas Regency cannot be separated from the presence of social prejudice between each ethnic groups, whether between Malays and Chinese, or Malays and Madurese.

These social prejudices, especially towards the Chinese (for example the prejudice that Chinese people were part of the anti-NKRI Pasukan Rakyat Kalimantan Barat (Paraku) and/or Pasukan Gerilya Rakyat Sarawak (PGRS)), ultimately developed into wariness of interaction with them. This wariness became a norm, and this norm is then used as a basis for actions towards the prejudiced group. When these norms are forced, social conflict would then become inevitable. One of the examples of social conflict between Sambas Malays and Chinese are the presence of areas in Sambas that rejects the presence of Chinese people in them. These social conflicts between Sambas Malays and Chinese started with negative social prejudices of Sambas Malays towards Sambas Chinese, as they rejected Chinese characteristics, behavior, culture, and customs.

In all of their interactions, Sambas Malays are very influenced by their Islamic beliefs. The Islamic concept of *ummah* (Harmonious people) as understood by them had been the basis of Sambas Malays' social behavior, to the extent that Sambas Malays and Islam are difficult to separate. Islam spread to Sambas Regency around 1620 CE¹², carried by Raden Sulaiman (Sultan Muhammad Syafiudin I, son of Prince Raja Tengah, the son of Sultan Muhammad Hasan who ruled Brunei Sarussalam during 1582-1598 CE (Fahmi, 2002).

The Islamic concept of *ummah*, which stressed the importance of honesty, politeness, compassion, cleanliness, and law-abiding, has a big impact on forming the personality of Sambas Malays. According to the concept, a Muslim's personality has no room for aggressivity and conquest of either nature or other people, but it is based on harmony and balance, as prescribed by the Sharia, which has set the basic principles of a harmonious and balanced community. Duarte Barbosa said that Sambas people welcomed everyone who visited with open arms,¹³ as reflected by one of their proverbs; “*kecil telapak tangan, nyiru kami tadahkan*” which means showing a very sincere behavior.

The Sambas people are very well known by their crafts, and among the local crafts that is still widely known is kain songket or *kaing lunggi*. The kain songket craft is

¹¹Surata A dan Adrianto, T. T. 2001. *Atasi Konflik Etnis*. Yogyakarta: Global Pustaka Utama.

¹²Bakar, Abu, A. L. 2001. *Adat Melayu Surumpun*. Kuala Lumpur: Universiti Malaya.

¹³Saad, M. M. 2003. *Sejarah Konflik Antar Suku di Kabupaten Sambas*. Pontianak: Kalimantan Persada Press.

the signature craft of Sambas Malays, as can be seen in Semberang Village, for example. There are several possible types and motifs of kain songket, such as; padang tebakar, padang tebakar daging, pucuk rebung, berkala, pelangi and cual.

There are also traditional dances of Sambas Malays, such as; jepin raddat, tandak sambas and allo' galling, many of which are often performed in celebrations of harvests, weddings, or royal ceremonies, or even in the Sambas Malays' daily lives. This condition shows that there are many traditions or customs that enriches their life cycles, like wedding customs for example.

The wedding customs are, for example; *cikram*, a sign of engagement between 2 people and *Antar pinang*. *Antar pinang* is one of the wedding customs that must be performed. After the time and date has been decided, the bridegroom's family has to present the bride's family with things such as *sirih* container and *mahar* (dower) (in form of money, jewelry, bedroom supplies, clothes, cosmetics, etc.). They also have to explain their visit with *pantun san sajak*.

A few days before the wedding ceremony, families living far away would have arrived. They, along with the neighbors, would help to create the “tarub”, the place where the wedding ceremony will be held, and “emper-emper”, the place for the food. The food are presented in “saprah-saprah” (One saprah containing the portions for 5 – 6 people). The wedding ceremony is split into 3 days: “mumbu” or spices preparation day, “motong”, and “pokok.” “Motong” and “pokok” days are usually enlivened by *tanjidor* music. In “pokok” day, the bridegroom and his family are paraded to the bride's home.

“Pulang memulangkan” or “saling menyerahkan” is a statement by the bridegroom's parents to leave their son to the parents and families of the bride, to be accepted and guided rightly in his life, and vice versa. After that, “mandi berulus” is done to pray to God for easing the way of the bride and groom in their new life. Alongside that, there is also a procession called “balik tikar”, that is cleaning the newlywed's beds, stripping the netting of its decorations, and flipping over the carpets and mattresses.¹⁴

In Sambas Regency, there is a palace of the Sambas Sultanate, named *Alwatzikhubillah*, which means believing solidly in Allah. The Sambas Sultanate's symbol is the sea eagle, indicating that their main power is naval power. Inside the palace, there are several historical artifacts, like 2 ancient jars from China's Ming Dynasty of 7th

¹⁴*Selayang Pandang Sejarah dan Kebudayaan Sambas*. 2002. Sambas: Mata Angin Production Bekerjasama dengan Pemda Kabupaten Sambas.

century(?), the Sultan's royal robes, swords, 7 small cannons, gongs, etc. These historical artifacts are still considered as sacred artifacts by most of Sambas people. The names of each cannons are: Raden Mas, Raden Samber, Ratu Kilat, Ratu Pajajaran, Ratu Putri, Raden Pajang, and Panglima Guntur. Most of the other artifacts had been seized by Japanese occupiers and their whereabouts are unknown.¹⁵

A community of people cannot be separated from its typology. Based on its typology, Sambas Malays are not free from various defects, both in character or behavior. Generally, Sambas Malays are are closed off – not liking/willing/used to being open to others, often staying silent even when they disagree with other's opinion or currently having troubles. This is due to their desire to be viewed as wealthy in material wealth and prominent in social status. This desire is reflected in their characteristically festive wedding, *khitan*, and *aqiqah* celebrations. It is also reflected by their preference for seemingly more formal work in government offices or private companies as opposed to starting their own independent business.¹⁶

C. Chinese in the Northern Coast

The history of Chinese settlements in West Kalimantan's northern coast began with the kongsi activities in goldmining, trading, and farming. During the kongsi era, settlements containing houses for both the kongsi miners and traders were built, along with the accompanying religious shrine (*thai pak kung*). These settlements were followed with newer settlements which also contain grocery stores, blacksmiths doubling as pawnbrokers, traditional healers, goldsmiths, gambling houses, opium dens, etc.

At first, not all Chinese in the north coast of West Kalimantan were part of the middle class. As the Chinese migrated to Indonesia as groups, it is not surprising that some of them were merely farmers and small traders, thus part of the lower class. Compared to Java and Sumatra, where the majority of Chinese are part of the Cantonese and Hokkien language groups, in West Kalimantan these 2 groups only form a small minority of West Kalimantan's Chinese, with the majority of West Kalimantan's Chinese being part of the Hakka language group, followed by Teochew group.¹⁷

¹⁵Rahman, A, dkk. 2001. *Sejarah Kesultanan san Pemerintahan Daerah Sambas*. Sambas: Dinas Pariwisata Pemda Kabupaten Sambas.

¹⁶Bakar. 2001. *Op Cit*.

¹⁷Almost all of these migrating Chinese groups came from southern China, but they couldn't communicate easily with each other due to their wildly differing languages. The Netherlands Indies colonial government referred to Hakkas as “Kheks” and Teochews as “Hok-Los.” The Hague: M. Nijhoff.

Most of the migrating Hakka people came from the hilly Guangdong interior, particularly the Kai Ying (Meizhou) region. Some of the Hakka also came from northern Ting Chou (Tingzhou) and Loeng Yen (Longyan) in southwestern Fukkien (Fujian). Hakka people spoke the Hakka/Khek language, part of the Sino-Tibetan family.¹⁸ Meanwhile, the Teochew came from the northeastern coast of Guangdong—Hai Fung (Haifeng) and Luh Fung (Lufeng). As these areas are close to the port of Shantou, Teochew people are also known as Shantou Chinese.¹⁹

Hakka Chinese gained their name due to their habit of practicing shifting mining and farming, known as “*kejia/hakka*” or “guest” in Mandarin. These Hakkas mostly lived in the northern West Kalimantan, while Teochews mostly lived in the southern West Kalimantan, such as Pontianak and its surroundings.²⁰ Thus, several records²¹ used the term *pansanhok*—half – mountain—to refer to this group.

The Chinese arrived at West Kalimantan's northern coast by a boat fleet.²² Various discoveries, such as a Han Dynasty era green-glazed ceramic spoon with a dragon image strengthens the assumption that there was a strong link between Kalimantan's coastal kingdoms with the Chinese Empire, particularly during the Song and Ming dynasties. The Chinese might have visited Kalimantan as early as the 4th century CE, but didn't make a permanent settlement right away; and by the 16th century, there were already Chinese settlements in the western and northern coasts of Kalimantan—including Brunei—mainly settled by Chinese farmers and traders.²³ Their presence in Kalimantan can be seen clearly after the Malay rulers in Sambas and Mempawah invited Chinese people to come there

Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch. 1927. Leiden: Brill. Groenevelt.

¹⁸These languages include languages mostly used in the Himalayas, Indochina Peninsula, and China proper. Taniputera. Ivan. 2007. *History of Cina*. Jogyakarta: Ar-Ruzz Media. Page 23.

¹⁹Heidhues, Mary Somers. 2008. *Penambang Emas, petani dan Pedagang di “Distrik Tionghoa” Kalimantan Barat*. Jakarta: Yayasan Nabil. Page 17.

²⁰Heidhues, *Ibid*. It has a slightly different explanation, asserting that the interaction between Hakkas and Teochews—especially in Singkawang and its surroundings—created a new group that is half – Teochew and half – Hakka.

²¹Van Meeteren Brouwer, P.M. 1926. *De Geschiedenis der Chineesche Districten der Wester-Afdeeling van Borneo van 1740-1926*. De Indische Gids, Tijdschrift van Nederlandsch Indie. Page 481.

²²*Jung* or *Wangkang Cun*—a type of boat—that can only carry around 20 people, one *taopekong* (village totem), also known as *Pak Kung* by Singkawang Chinese, and a cannon. *Pak Kung* is believed to bestow spiritual power to the Chinese travelers, while the lit cannon was believed to be able to destroy the demons obstructing their voyage. Liem, Thian Joe. 2004. *Riwayat Semarang*. Second Edition. Jakarta: Hasta Wahana. Page 4.

²³Van Sandick, J.C.F and Lt. Kolonel V. J. van Marle. 1919. *Economische Geographie Van Borneo's Wester-Afdeeling*. Tijdschrift Economische Geographie. Batavia: Albercht & Co. Page 50.

from China. These Chinese came and followed the course of the small rivers from the coast to the mining areas inland.

The Chinese settlements in West Kalimantan began from Singkawang, whose name supposedly was given by Chinese sailors and immigrants. Supposedly, the name was given due to Singkawang's position on a river mouth and between 2 mountains—*San Kew Jong*, or a mountain in the river mouth. Compared to other areas in West Kalimantan, the western coast areas are viewed as the most fertile and beautiful areas.²⁴

Earl, in his travel notes,²⁵ mentioned that in 1834, Singkawang was settled by Chinese—referred to as “Tionghoa” in his book, ed—15 miles along the coast from “*Songry Ryah*” or Raya River, and it can be entered through the river mouth. When entering the Singkawang River, there was a gosong (Sand deposits in the river mouth or sea side) around 10 – 12 feet long, preventing ships from entering during high tide. The coast of Singkawang experiences the western winds from January to March, while the following months are dominated by the southern winds all day. This strengthens Veth's previous explanation that Chinese miners typically arrived around January and February.

The agricultural harvests of this region is dominated by rice. The men typically worked the paddy fields during the day, while their wives and daughters managed their stores. In those days, Singkawang was an entrepôt for Monterado great kongsi's trades. This commercial development was supported by the emergence of trading bodies in the Singkawang river mouth.²⁶ Fish were also caught en masse there. Like other western coast areas, Singkawang was a combined settlement of farmers, traders, and fishers. While the Chinese were responsible for most of the northern coast West Kalimantan's development, Singkawang and its surroundings were also settled by Dayaks living alongside the Chinese.

Singkawang's importance as a port increased after Selaku—to the north of Singkawang—was destroyed by pirates at the start of 19th century.²⁷ Seeing Singkawang's

²⁴The “west coast” refers to an area spanning from north to south: Sebangkau River, Selaku River, Singkawang River, Pajintan River, and Sedau River—all north of Batu Belat Peninsula, now known as Gundul Peninsula, Raya River to Duri River. Veth, P. J. 1854. *Borneo's Wester-Afdeeling: Geographisch, Statistisch, Historisch*. Eerste. Deel. Het Platen: Zaltbommel.

²⁵As told by Rahmayani, Any. 2014. *Pemukiman Tionghoa di Singkawang. Dari Masa Kongsi Hingga Masa Kolonial*. Yogyakarta: Ombak Publisher. Pages 22-25.

²⁶Like what also happened in Raya and Duri rivers—Veth., *loc cit.* 1854. Page 101.

²⁷The arrival of George Wisdor from Singapore to trade with the Chinese from Monterado—after given permission by the colonial government in Sambas—seemed to be the start of Singkawang's development as a port. During that time, the colonial government had also placed an office for controlling trade in Kalimantan's west coast there. Rahmayani, Any. 2014. *Op Cit.*

strategic position—located midway between Pontianak and Sambas, and well-situated to keep watch on the Chinese kongsi's activities—prompted the Dutch to build a base in Singkawang. Meanwhile, after the destruction of the kongsis, the colonial government's governing district was moved from Monterado to Singkawang, where the customs office and barracks had been constructed previously.

1. Chinese Northern Coast Communities

The earliest date of the establishment of Chinese communities in West Kalimantan's coasts is around the 18th century, as estimated by Earl, who stated that the Chinese arrived through Singapore.²⁸ Singkawang was an important settlement area as an entryway to the mines around Monterado. Chinese farmers increased in West Kalimantan's northern coasts during the 19th century, after conflicts between kongsis and Dutch military actions—where the colonial government did a massive purge of the Chinese kongsis.

At the beginning of the Chinese kongsis, most of the miners were still unmarried, except their leaders, who brought their families along. Since there were very few Chinese women, and the very high dowers needed to marry them, most of the Chinese miners ended up marrying Dayak women. They also chose to marry Dayak women due to similarities in habits and debt payments.²⁹

This proved that assimilation happened between Chinese and Dayaks. Thus, Chinese communities in West Kalimantan's west coast have different traits compared to Chinese in other regions—especially those in Java. Their kinship system, religion,

²⁸Every year, it is estimated that around 5000-8000 people came from China to Singapore. Meanwhile, the rest continued their journey to the tin mines in Bangka, pepper plantations in Bintan, and the gold mines in Malacca, Pahang, and Borneo's west coast. Bastin, John. 2011. *Singapura Tempo Doeloe 1819-1942*. Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu. Heidhues, Marry Somers. 2008 in a book titled: *Penambang Emas, petani dan Pedagang di "Distrik Tionghoa" Kalimantan Barat*. Jakarta: Yayasan Nabil., divide the Chinese communities into 3 (three) groups, based on their residence and occupation: *First*, the miners living in gold mining areas. *Second*, those living around the mining areas to support the kongsi – managed mining activities, as farmers and small traders. *Third*, traders, artisans, and laborers in the cities. This third group is the group that would end up settling in West Kalimantan's northern coast—particularly Singkawang.

²⁹Heidhues., *Loc Cit.* The government actually intervened by forbidding Chinese men from marrying Dayak women as debt payments. Van Basel, W. H. Seen. 1874. *Een Chineseche Nederzetting op Borneo's Westkust*. Tijdschrift van Nederland Indie. Page 30, stated that Chinese men would marry Dayak women because there were very few Chinese women or they could not pay the dowry, but this is viewed as less prestigious. The gold mining kongsi's territories were originally traditional lands owned by Dayak tribes. Many Dayak women married Chinese men. Their children were referred to as *pan thong pan*, and the male ones were usually recruited as soldiers to defend the kongsi.

and residences are still very close to the homeland *prototype*, but some aspects have acculturated with local culture.³⁰

Observing their interactions with other ethnic groups living in West Kalimantan, it can be seen that the Chinese has closer relations with Dayaks and acculture themselves with Dayak culture in particular, such as replacing several Hakka-style farming tools, such as plows and sickles with mixed tools such as Dayak digging stick.

In those days, the northern coast West Kalimantan area that focused on agriculture was Pemangkat. Some were already farming before the creation of gold mining kongsis. There were 2 (two) large farmer's association already existing around the 1770s³¹: (a) Thien-thi-Foi³², led by Lioe Sam Pak, which had authority in Rantau, Pakoetjing, Wong-littoeng and Kulor; and (b) Lan-fong-Foei, led by Lo Thai Pak, founded in 1772 or 1774 and based in Thai Sjoe Hill.

In the middle of 19th century, the amount of areas pursuing agriculture increased. People pursued agriculture in most hill foots and river sides, such as: Kulor, Patengahan, Pak Mion Theo, Sibeles, Sirukem and Betung River and Selakau River. Rice cultivation became the main solution for their daily needs. Sinam and Lakum River people, who lived south and southwest of Mount Pemangkat, turned the mountain into a protector of their rice fields from the northern and northwestern winds. Although rice was the main crop, there were also quite a lot vegetables and fruits planted.

The conflicts that afflicted the kongsis, both between the kongsis themselves and against other factions—Malay rulers and colonial government—brought a pretty large change to the farmers, shifting their agricultural efforts from horticulture to coconut and other industrial plants plantations, such as: rubber, pepper, sago, gambir, and areca. These commodities became important trade commodities for the Chinese. The Chinese controlled most of the trade, whether large or small in scale, or exports and imports, with the remainder controlled by European commercial ventures. The presence of these companies, such as Borneo Sumatra Handel Maatshappij (since

³⁰Tan, Mely G. ed. 1979. *Golongan Etnis Tionghoa di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Gramedia Publisher.

³¹*Singkawang Agrarische Zaken* dalam *Binnenlandsch Bestur*. No. 2569 as cited by Rahmayani, Any. 2014. *Op Cit*. Pages 43-44.

³²*Foei* means agreement or following.

1901) and Geo Wehry&Co (since 1925)³³ ended up improving the trade situation in the north coast.

2. Typology of Chinese Settlements in the Northern Coast

The arrival of the Chinese in 1740, and the second wave in 1760, was the first step of the creation of Chinese settlements in West Kalimantan. In this context, there are 2 different settlement areas. *First*, the Seminis area, the first settlement founded by Chinese arriving from Brunei in 1760, later continued by settlements founded in gold-bearing Larih and Monterado. The Chinese groups founded in 12 communities in Larih and 24 communities in Monterado. Most of the members in this communities were generally referred to as *pan sak hok*.³⁴ *Second*, Chinese arriving straight from China who emigrated in search of better life. They entered following the river flow and settled along the river banks, such as along the banks of Duri River until Moei Tsak, along the banks of Raya River until Pangkalan Batu, along Sebangkau until Pangkalan Kongsu, along the Buduk River tributary until Pangkalan Haji, along Selaku until Bakuwan and Pakuching and also along Singkawang River. The settlements also spread inland, such as: Ledo, Sibebe, Capkala and Sangking.

As invited laborers, initially the first wave of Chinese immigrants were given equipments and food supplies by the Sultan of Sambas. Then, they built settlements in the mining areas by also pursuing farming and husbandry to fulfill their daily needs. Jackson, as cited by Purwanto³⁵ stated that there were several types of Chinese settlements during the early periods of their arrival.

First, mining settlements where most of the people worked in the gold mining companies, and a minority of them pursued farming and husbandry for fulfilling local food demand. *Second*, mining areas surrounded by a small colony, which is further divided into 2 types, one is a colony with villages located along the way encircling the city, and the other is a city surrounded by gardens and ranches. The two types of settlements can be seen in *Fosjoen* kongsi's settlement in Monterado, which is a combination of the 2 types. Monterado City itself is classified as the first type, but

³³Vleming Jr. J. L. 1926. *Het Chineesche Zakenleven in Nederlandsch-Indie*. Door den Belasting-Accountantsdienst in Nederlandsch-Indie. Uitgave Volkslectuur.

³⁴*Pan sak hok* by Van Meeteren. 1926 in Rahmayani, Any. 2014. *Op Cit.* is generally translated as “people or citizens from the mountains.”

³⁵Poerwanto, Hari. 2005. *Orang Cina Khek dari Singkawang*. Depok: Komunitas Bambu. Page 124.

there are Dayak colonies around the city whose citizens worked and supplied food for them.

As seen in Singkawang, the traditional trait of Chinese settlements is the presence of a fort, although the fort does not dominate its structure. During the 1832 Kongsu War, the Chinese built some kind of fortifications encircling their settlement in Singkawang and blocked Singkawang's rivers with *menutup sungai di Singkawang dengan ironwood stakes planted on the riverbed*, although they ended up fleeing once the situation became too disadvantageous.³⁶ In the Chinese settlement's traditional structure design, fortifications are typically built from wood, soil, and rocks, in order to protect their political, military, and economic interests.³⁷

The Chinese settlement traits can be seen from an image found in a market in Pemangkat. The market was built by Chinese who also founded an agricultural kongsu around 1770s—part of the Samtiaokiu Kongsu. The settlement was located separate from Malay and Bugis fishing villages, as well as royal officer's residences around Pemangkat River and Mount Pemangkat. It can be seen that Chinese settlements include markets and religious shrines (*thai pak kung*). This Chinese settlement in Pemangkat is located on a land irrigated by a tributary of Sambas River. This market was burned down in 1871, but it was rebuilt on the eastern base of Mount Pemangkat.

The market was filled with merchants selling groceries, such as spices, sugar, *belacan*—shrimp paste—along with fruits and vegetables. Silk and cotton merchants can be found next to the spices merchants, and not far from the place, fish and pork market can be found.³⁸ This market was located on one side of the main road, while the gambling house, a “mandatory” part of every market, was on the other side. In those days, gambling houses were always filled to the brim with visitors. Blacksmiths and medicine men were also present, as always in markets. Besides selling medicines, the medicine men also served as seers. The main road itself led to the settlement in Mount Pemangkat. In its slopes, the Chinese planted vegetables, while the base was used for rice planting.

³⁶Heindhues, Mary Somers. 2008. *Penambang Emas, Petani dan Pedagang di “Distrik Tionghoa” Kalimantan Barat*. Jakarta: Nabil Foundation.

³⁷Heddy Srhi Ahimsa Putra: *Arsitektur Permukiman Tradisional Cina di Kawasan Pecinan Semarang*. <http://planologiku.wordpress.com>.

³⁸Pork is only traded in certain times, because Chinese people only eats pork during important days and commemorations. Otherwise, they would choose fish if it is abundant.

3. Philosophy of Klenteng and its Interpretations

The religious shrine of Chinese people, as adherents of the traditional Chinese beliefs—Confucianism and Taoism is klenteng. The Confucian teachings focused on the good in humans. The worship can be done either at home or in a special shrine, called *li thang*³⁹ by Confucians. This name called back to the function of *Thang* in kongsi's center which served not only as center of economics, but also had a religious function.

The newly appointed members of kongsi were sworn in *thang*, which is viewed by Confucians as having dual function, related with both worldly and heavenly matters. *Li thang* is typically part of a klenteng, which also has both social and religious functions. Klenteng can also be shared with Taoists and Mahayana Buddhists.

Klenteng/*thang* was the center of kongsi settlements. Thus, quite a lot klenteng were founded as protector of a kongsi. Beside that, one type of klenteng is a klenteng built by professional guilds, such as a medicine men's klenteng or a blacksmith's klenteng. As klenteng served as both a social and religious facility in Chinese life, every Chinese settlement has their own klenteng.

Almost every Chinese settlement has their own *thai pak kung*. As seen in Monterado City's structure, Heidhues⁴⁰ explained that *thang* has a religious function as the main klenteng for kongsi members. This *Thang* was burned in 1823 during the conflict between *Samtiokiou* and *Thaikong* kongsis. Meanwhile, *habok* and *sjongbok* are additional halls which are considered to only have commercial functions, with no political and legal powers like *thang*. These 2 buildings also have religious functions, with *sjongbok* housing seers connected with *Sam Bok Jak*—the 3 main gods worshiped by Monterado people—and *habok* seers are connected with Moa Njong god.

The religious concepts in Chinese architecture can also be seen from the *Lanfang* kongsi house in Mandor. The first room encountered in the building is the meeting hall, followed by *thai pak kung* altar, the 2 rooms only separated by a pond. This shows that the religious function is very important for the economic kongsi. Beside as a worshipping shrine, *taopekong* also served as the place where the miners

³⁹*Li* berarti kesusilaan dan *Thang* berarti aula.

⁴⁰Heidhues, Mary Somers. 2008. *Op Cit.*

and kongsis members swore their loyalty. *Thao pak kung* as a landmark of Chinese settlements can also be seen on the road near the base of Mount Pemangkat which lead to the market. Besides, *thai pak kung* is also used as sacrificial and ritual location for the sacred mountain.

Chinese communities in other northern coast areas, like Singkawang, also used another term for their religious shrines—*klenteng*—which *thai pak kung*.⁴¹ *Pak* in Hakka means father's older brother, *kung* means grandfather, and *thai* means big. Thus, *thai pak kung* means exalted ancestor. This fits the Confucian concept which teaches veneration of ancestors. The Chinese actually brought their venerated wooden Earth god statue along with them in their *jung/wangkang*⁴² when coming to Kalimantan.

This very strong belief in *pak kung* made prayers and fireworks a routine event for these migrants.⁴³ *Pak kung* was then placed in a special building in the settlement which was built right after they arrived. Thus, each Chinese settlement have one or more *klentengs* which would be known as *thai pak kung*. *Klentengs* are often found in the base of mountain as veneration of the mountain which gave them water, blocking bad “flows”, and protecting their crops. This is quite similar to the concept of “*pantang*”, like how Dayaks refrained from replanting a field for some time, which can also be found among Chinese people east of Bukit Pasi in a *thai pak kung*.

⁴¹In Teochew and Hokkien, *Tao Pe Kong*. Barus, Frino Bariarcianur. 2005. *Demi Waktu, Potret Tionghoa Singkawang*. Jakarta: RAH & Partnert Law Film.

⁴²Another term for it is *jong son*.

⁴³Lim Thian Joe. 2004. *Riwayat Semarang*. Second Edition. Jakarta: Hasta Wahana. Page 10.

Along with his imperial mission, Zheng He's arrival to Nanyang is also believed for the purpose of spreading his Islam beliefs to the region. Actually, the connection between Kalimantan and China had existed for quite a long time, since around the start of 3rd century BCE, according to Irwin, and the link might have become more intense between 600 – 1500 CE. It is believed that Chinese neighborhoods in Kalimantan could trace its roots from that era, for example the area around Kinabatangan River.

The existence of the Hanafi Muslim Chinese community and the growth of Islam among the people of Paloh become important, in order to verify that Islam had become the religion of locals. Islam spread to Sambas around 1580 CE — a century later, through Malaka dan Johor.⁴⁶ Based on this, the religion of Islam—Muslims—have arrived in Sambas at the start of 15th century CE, while Islam became the religion of Sambas people starting from the middle of the century.

The Chinese immigration to Sambas in the 17th century CE passed through 2 routes, which is Indochina – Malaya – West Kalimantan (in this context, particularly Sambas). In 1745, Chinese people were invited en masse as workers, as the Sultan of Sambas needed their labor to work in the existing gold mines. These Chinese arrivals to Monterado would later go on to form the Taikong (Big Trench) and Samto Kiaw (Three Bridges) kongsis.

In 1770, these Chinese kongsis centered on Monterado and Bodok went to war with Dayak people. These wars would end up killing many Dayak chiefs, both in Monterado and Bodok. The Sultan of Sambas would later decree that Chinese people in both regions would only answer to him, and they were obliged to pay tribute every month, as opposed to every year like before. However, they were given full sovereignty on governing, justice, defense, etc. Since then, the area around Monterado became a little Chinese republic, and Dayaks moved to areas that were safe from Chinese.

In 1795, war erupted between the Tai Kong kongsi, centered on Monterado and the Sam Tiu Kiun kongsi centered on Sambas. The war happened due to Sam Tiu Kiun's

⁴⁶Examining some of the toponyms in northern Sambas, it is possible that Islam had spread there earlier, since many of the names seem closer to Arabic words. For example: *Paloh*, *Galing*, *Jawai*. The Sambas word *Paloh*/*palloh* (sweat) might be a cognate of the Arabic word *falah* (glory, victory, luck, or farming). Meanwhile, the word *galling* might be a cognate of the Arabic word *ghalin* (valuable, important, expensive), although some connected it with the word *galingga* instead. And, the word *jawai* seems to be a cognate of the Arabic word *jawi* (Javanese). This is also true for the term 'orang kebenaran' which is identical with "wali Allah." Azra, Azyumardi. 1995. *Jaringan Ulama Timur Tengah dan Kepulauan Nusantara Abad XVII dan XIII*. Bandung: Mizan. Page 35.

attempt to mine gold in Singkawang River, which was part of Tai Kong's territory. In 1796, with the help of Sambas Sultanate, Sam Tiu Kiu kongsi managed to occupy Monterado, although one of the Sultan's generals, named Tengku Sambo, was slain during an assault on Tai Kong's last fort—causing the war to be remembered among Sambas people as the Tengku Sambo War.

The Dutch arrived in Sambas Sultanate at 6 September 1818. A few days later—23 September 1818—Muller was appointed as resident of Sambas and declared Monterado to be under Dutch government's control the next day. This prompted the kongsi and Chinese leaders in Sambas to hold a meeting on 28 November 1818. In 1819, the Chinese in Sambas started a rebellion, refusing to acknowledge Dutch rule.

After various conflicts and attacks, the Dutch faction proposed a “three-sided” negotiation, involving the Sultan of Pontianak alongside the Dutch government and leaders of the Chinese kongsi, whose results were announced on 22 September 1822. In 1823, after seizing the region of Lara, Sin Ta Kiu (Sam Tiu Kiu), Sambas, the Tai Kong kongsi rebelled against the Dutch, due to dissatisfaction over the results of the negotiation, which they feel disadvantaged them. With the help of Sam Tiu Kiu and Sambas Chinese, the Tai Kong kongsi were driven back to Monterado.

After another failure in their second attack on 28 February 1823, the rebelling Chinese surrendered on 5 March 1823. On 11 May 1823, the Dutch commissar released a list of rules and obligations for the kongsis. In 1850, as the Sambas Sultanate, led by Sultan Abubakar Tadjudin II, almost fell to an alliance of Tai Kong, Sam Tiu Kiu and Mang Kit Tiu kongsis, they asked for help to the Dutch. The Dutch would arrive in 1851 under the command of Overste Zorg, who would later fall during an assault to the Sam Tiu Kiu stronghold in Seminis Pemangkat—he would be later buried in Penibungan Hill, Pemangkat.

After the 18th century CE, specifically in 1854, the rebellion spread and garnered support from Chinese people outside the kongsis. This forced the Dutch to send additional troops to Sambas under direct command of Resident Anderson. In the end, on 1856 the 100-year-old Monterado Republic was defeated. On 4 January 1857, the Dutch took over the Chinese power in Mempawah Sultanate, and in 1884 all Chinese kongsi in West Kalimantan Barat were dissolved by the Dutch.

In 1921-1929 a civil war erupted in China, causing massive emigration of Chinese people. The destination of the exodus includes the Malay Peninsula, Sarawak and West Kalimantan. Unfortunately, until now there is no official data concerning the number of Chinese in Sambas, however it is certain that the Chinese people in Sambas hailed from Southeast China. These migrating Chinese included some of the various Chinese tribes in Nusantara, such as: Hakka, Hainan, Hokkien, Cantonese, Hokchia dan Teochiu (Teochew), especially in Sambas, Hakka and Teochiu of the surnames Lim, Tan, Lie, Tio, Can, Ng, Kang, Iap, Heng, Huang, Jie, Lai, Teng, Io, Cua, Kho, Ciu and Cu.

E.

Chinese Immigrants

The various immigration waves of Chinese people over the course of thousands of years had made the Chinese part of the Indonesian people of West Kalimantan. There were several reasons for their migrations to Indonesia, particularly West Kalimantan. First, there were already trade links between China and Nusantara during the time of Song Dynasty (960-1729(1279?) CE)⁴⁷ and Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). This link became more intense when Yung Lo(Yongle?) became emperor. The new emperor would send several expeditions under Admiral Zheng He to restore the prestige of Chinese Empire in the eyes of Nanyang's Chinese people.

Most of the Chinese diaspora in Indonesia hailed from the Fukien (Fujian) and Kwangtung (Guangdong) provinces. These people would bring their own separate ethnic culture, including their own linguistic differences, along with them to Indonesia.⁴⁸ From the southern parts of Fukien – and important region for the spread of Chinese overseas – hailed the Hokkien people. Hokkiens are mostly found on the western coast of Sumatra, Central Java, East Java, and the Eastern Indonesia regions. Meanwhile, the Hakka and Teochiu people hailed from Kwangtung, with the Teochiu specifically coming from the

⁴⁷Some believe that the link started much earlier, since around the 3rd century CE. However, this link didn't undergo any significant development until 1400 CE. This is assumed to be caused by the lack of regular trade links between China and Nusantara, and the dominance of Arab and Persian traders in Nusantara. Hermansyah. 2014. *Orang Tionghoa Masuk Islam*. Pontianak: STAIN Pontianak Press. Page 41. Poerwanto, Hari. 2005. *Orang Cina Khek dari Singkawang*. Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu. Pages 40-41.

⁴⁸There are 4 Chinese languages in Indonesia: Hokkien, Teochiu, Hakka and Cantonese. These 4 languages have rather big differences, preventing the speakers of each language from understanding each other. *Ibid.* Vasanty, Puspa. 1999. *Kebudayaan Orang Tionghoa di Indonesia*. Dalam Koentjaraningrat. *Manusia dan Kebudayaan di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Djambatan. 18th edition. Pages 352-373.

outskirts of Swatow (Shantou) in the eastern part of the province. During Dutch occupation, the Hokkien constitutes the largest Chinese group, followed by Hakka⁴⁹, but now, the Hakka dominates in Indonesia, especially in ex-mining regions, such as West Kalimantan, Sumatra, Bangka, and Belitung. Since the end of 19th century, many Hakka started to migrate into West Java and Jakarta, mainly due to the opening of Priyangan market to Chinese traders and the development of Jakarta.

Like the Hakkas, the Cantonese came from Kwantung and mostly worked as miners overseas. Compared to the Hakka, the Cantonese had a better life. They came with larger capital and typically were equipped with good technical and handicraft skills. They mostly spread evenly in several regions in Indonesia.

Nanyang Chinese is a term referring to the Chinese diaspora in Nusantara.⁵⁰ During Srivijaya era there were already routine voyages between China/Guangzhou and the Malay port in Kingdom of Srivijaya. This regular voyage was also utilized by Indian and Persian traders. The passive attitude of Chinese traders made it only an indirect participant of the voyages – trading only with the Indian and Persian traders. The Chinese traders themselves would only start sailing south themselves from the 8th century onwards. Since then, both the tea plantations and porcelain industry in China developed rapidly, making these 2 commodities important export commodities overseas, including to Nusantara.

The people of the South Seas, particularly those in Kalimantan Island, have interacted with China for a very long time, even before the start of Common Era, possibly since the 3rd century BCE. The evidence of this interaction can be found in, for example, the history of China from 600 to 1500 CE, as there were several visits to China by ambassadors of *'po-lo, p'oli' poni, ye-po-ti*, etc., names that have been generally agreed to refer to places on the western coast of Kalimantan. It is believed since a long time that

⁴⁹The Hakkas were forced to emigrate due to hardships. During the migration wave of 1850-1930, the Hakkas were the poorest among the Chinese immigrants, working alongside the Teochiu in Indonesia as miners. Poerwanto, Hari. 2005. *Op. Cit.* Page 52.

⁵⁰The first mention of Nusantara by Chinese people was written by a Buddhist monk, Fa Hian, during his visits to several countries in 400 CE. During his return trip from India, he transited in Java. According to his records, there were no Chinese people in Java during that period. Meanwhile, in the 7th century, the next Chinese visitor, I Tsing reported that the Kingdom of Kalingga had been founded in Central Java. Hermansyah. *Op. Cit.* Page 45.

there were Chinese villages near the Kinabatangan River in the northern part of the island.⁵¹

The 1292 expedition of Kublai Khan's troops led by Ike Maso, Shih Pi, and Khau Sing, sent to punish Kertanegara made their bases in Karimata Islands. This expedition would later lose to the Javanese troops and failed their mission, prompting some of them to desert and settle in West Kalimantan in order to avoid Kublai Khan's wrath.⁵² It is assumed that this is the start of Chinese people in West Kalimantan.

At the start of 15th century, Admiral Zheng He, under the orders of Cheng Tsu or Yung-lo (Yongle) emperor—the third emperor of Ming Dynasty—led an expedition to Nanyang. During the expedition, he observed the involvement of Chinese traders in many of the trade transactions occurring in many of the various ports he visited. After the liberation of Palembang from Hokkien pirates in 1407, Zheng He then created the first Muslim Chinese community in Nusantara, and – during the same year – visited the Chinese that were already present in Sambas. There, he also built a Muslim Chinese community.⁵³ The “Sam Po Kong” Cave in Pasir Panjang area in Singkawang is one of the trails of his presence there.⁵⁴ During the following years, many other Muslim Chinese communities were created by Zheng He in various places in Javanese coasts, Malay Peninsula, and the Philippines.

The creation of these communities were part of China's effort in fostering commercial and political links, thus Zheng He's collaboration with Yunnan Chinese – bringing their Islam beliefs with them. Mosques were build in those communities for the purpose of prayers, in which the *khutbah*, *fardhu* and *kifayah* were conducted in Chinese rather than Arabic, in accordance to the Hanafi madhhab of these communities.⁵⁵ These communities turned out to be short-lived, causing many of those Chinese Muslims abandoned Islam, and converted the built mosques into shrines.⁵⁶

⁵¹Irwin, Graham. 1986. *Op. Cit.* Purcel, Victor. 1981. *The Chinese in Southeast Asia*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. Brandell, Sir Roland. 1949. *A Note on Sambas and Borneo*. Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society. 22 (4): 1-5. Groeneveldt, W. P. 1887. *Note on the Malay Archipelago and Malacca*. In: *Miscellaneous Papers Relating to Indo-China and the Indian Archipelago*. Second series. Volume I. London: Truber. Hughes-Hallet, H. R. 1940. *A Sketch of the History of Brunei*. Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society. 13 (2) : 23-42.

⁵²Wati, Arena. 1989. *Syair Pangeran Syarif*. Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.

⁵³Muljana, Slamet. 2009. *Runtuhnya Kerajaan Hindu-Jawa dan Timbulnya Negara-negara Islam Nusantara*. Yogyakarta: LkiS. Page 82.

⁵⁴Asali, X. F. 2008. *Aneka Budaya Tionghoa Kalimantan Barat*. Pontianak: Muare Public.

⁵⁵Muljana, Slamet. 2009. *Op. Cit.* Page 171.

⁵⁶*Ibid.* Page 188.

The mass migration of Chinese people to West Kalimantan in 1740-1745—probably from Brunei—was invited for the gold mining project of Panembahan Mempawah.⁵⁷ Then, the mining spread to several regions, such as: Minwang, Sinman and Mandor.⁵⁸ Shortly after, Chinese miners arrived to Sambas, as the Sultan of Sambas gave the Chinese license to mine in his territory. This Chinese miner's colony grew rapidly around the Monterado region, due to its rich gold deposits.⁵⁹

It turned out that the massive arrival of Chinese were not balanced by the number of people returning home to China,⁶⁰ as the first miners around Mandor continued to try finding new gold deposits. With Dutch permission and financial support, the Chinese moved to the eastern areas of Mandor – the Landak region – in 1823. A rather large group of Chinese would also later departed from Mandor to Bonan and other places around the source of Kapuas River in 1851. These miners had moved from Tayan to Sanggau before 1800, then at the start of 19th century, they already arrived in Sekadau and Sintang. Then in 1850 they went further upstream to the area of Silat,⁶¹ and Chinese miners had also probably reached Selimbau and Jongkong around this time.

In 1834, the Chinese in Singkawang were still living under the protection of kongsis and lived by gardening – cultivating vegetables – and opening grocery shops. Meanwhile, Pontianak had become a Chinese resupplying center – trades with China and Singapore were conducted through the city. Pontianak were often visited by *junks* from China, carrying various things. On their return, the *junks* would carry gold, bird's nests, sea slugs, camphors, waxes, wood for furnitures, coffins, etc. During that time, Pontianak was not more than a Chinese colony whose prosperity depended on trade.⁶²

The civil war afflicting China in 1921-1929 prompted the Chinese to immigrate en masse to several destinations, such as: Malay Peninsula, Sarawak, and West Kalimantan. These immigrants increased the number of Chinese in West Kalimantan even more. Thus, it is not surprising that West Kalimantan is one of the regions with relatively large

⁵⁷Irwin, Graham. 1986. *Op. Cit.* Page 27.

⁵⁸Poerwanto, Hari. 2005. *Op. Cit.* Page 118.

⁵⁹The mining efforts of this first colony brought a promising result. The news of this success would later spread along the junk routes, rapidly increasing the amount of colonists arriving in the mining region during the 1760s and 1770s. The mining regions also expanded to include mines in Larah, Buduk and Seminis. Jackson, James C. 1970. *Chinese in the West Borneo Goldfields: A Study in Cultural Geography*. Hull: University of Hull. p. 20-22.

⁶⁰At the start of 19th century, the total population of Chinese in West Kalimantan include more than 40000 Hakka Chinese. In Pontianak, there was already a Chinese neighborhood. *Ibid.* Pages 24 and 50.

⁶¹*Ibid.* Page 26.

⁶²Poerwanto, Hari. 2005. *Op. Cit.* Page 120.

Chinese population – compared to other regions in Indonesia. The presence of Chinese in West Kalimantan is certainly followed with cultural developments, including the religion followed. This would lead to the building of worshiping places, known as Pekongs. Until now, there are still a lot of Pekongs in various Chinese communities in West Kalimantan.

There are 3 types of Chinese communities in West Kalimantan then.⁶³ They are: (1) Mining communities; (2) Farming communities; and (3) Fishing communities. These settlement patterns have gradually shifted, as the glory days of traditional mining passed. Until now, the traditional mining efforts are still done by Malays and Dayaks, while the Chinese moved to other professions, although some of them are still living in the villages or the city margins.

As time passed, the Chinese have seized control of the big cities in West Kalimantan, whether by controlling the trading routes and elite housing in Pontianak, or political positions in Singkawang. The Chinese's cultural expression has also become more open since the start of Reformation era. Several religious and cultural events, supported by local government, has become public festivals, especially for several important events, such as: Imlek (Chinese New Year), Cap Go Meh, and Sembahyang Kubur.⁶⁴

F.

The Scars of Paraku

The September 30 Movement in 1965 had caused a great humanitarian tragedy all over Indonesia, including in Kalimantan. The later parts of 1967 and the following few months were a horrifying time for the ethnic Chinese population of western and northern Kalimantan. This was a far cry of the atmosphere before all of these political nonsense, where Dayaks and Chinese lived together in harmony, bound by a strong tie of friendship and brotherhood.

At the beginning of the 1960s decade, President Soekarno started and fanned the flames of “Ganyang Malaysia” movement opposing the creation of the Federation of Malaya, due to his beliefs that the federation was only a puppet of British neo-colonial

⁶³In mining communities, there were around 100 people living there. The leader of the community was elected from among themselves. A small minority of them did vegetable gardening and pig raising to fulfill the community's needs. There were many small colonies whose populations were almost completely involved in vegetable and fruit production – occasionally rice. The harvests would later be sent to the markets of larger communities. Fishing communities include many Chinese miners importing fishes from Malays, and there were also Chinese people who became fishers and build communities, like in Pemangkat – which is still ongoing until now. Jackson, James C. 1970. *Op. Cit.* Pages 39-40.

⁶⁴Hermansyah. 2014. *Op. Cit.* Page 54.

ambitions. During this time, the movement was whole-heartedly supported by most people of northern Kalimantan – at the time still considered part of West Kalimantan – including the ethnic Chinese parts of the population, who also vehemently refused the plans of Federation of Malaya.

President Soekarno then sent one of his Dwikora Cabinet's State Ministers, Oei Tjoe Tat to the northern border of Kalimantan to organize the forces for the “Ganyang Malaysia” campaign.⁶⁵ Oei Tjoe Tat, as a fellow ethnic Chinese, was warmly welcomed by the locals. There, he created a popular militia force, which counted among its members not only local northern Kalimantan volunteers, but also volunteers from Singapore, Brunei, and even those from Malay Peninsula who did not agree with the Federation of Malaya's creation.⁶⁶

Among the created militia forces was Pasukan Rakyat Kalimantan Barat (Utara?) (Paraku), later merged with Pasukan Gerilya Rakyat Sarawak (PGRS) in 1964. This force would then be known as PGRS/Paraku, and its membership was dominated by ethnic Chinese people living in these areas. In preparation for the confrontation against Malaya, this force built their main military bases in West Kalimantan, particularly in areas such as Sambas, Bengkayang, Ledo, Sanggau Ledo, Putussibau and other border towns. These areas would be used as the assembly point of the volunteers.

It seems that PGRS/Paraku had been specially prepared for war against Malaya, to the extent that its members were trained by Indonesia's military instructors, and they were settled in training camps near the borders of West Kalimantan and northern Kalimantan.⁶⁷ However, this campaign against Malaya didn't go any further, as the worsening domestic situation in Indonesia following the September 30 Movement weakened Soekarno's political standings and crippled the movements of the communist faction and all factions associated with them. The communist faction who initially had free reign to act was crippled and suffered their darkest times.

Soeharto, who managed to seize power in the wake of the events, directed all the state apparatuses to destroy PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) until its roots. This also ended up affecting PGRS/Paraku, connected to them by the Chinese association. The

⁶⁵Raditya, N. Iswara, 19 Februari 2018—Tragedi Berdarah Pembantaian Mangkuk Merah—<https://www.google.com>.

⁶⁶As written by Oei Tjoe Tat in *Memoar Oei Tjoe Tat, Pembantu Presiden Seokarno* (1995:144)—<https://www.google.com>.

⁶⁷Benny G. Setiono in *Tionghoa dalam Pusaran Politik* (2008:836)—<https://www.google.com>.

military, most of whom had abandoned Soekarno for Soeharto, seized the moment and mobilized Dayak masses to wipe out PGRS/Paraku, even including the thousands of ethnic Chinese who were not actually involved or even knew about PGRS/Paraku or the communists.

Constantly accused of being pro-communists, PGRS/Paraku then retaliated against the Indonesian military. In the middle of July 1967, the militias attacked TNI-AU airbases in Singkawang and Sanggau Ledo, West Kalimantan. These attacks killed 4 military members and seized 154 weapons and ammo from the TNI.⁶⁸

The military efforts to retaliate against the militias faced serious difficulties due to the limited manpower and weaponry of local forces.⁶⁹ Meanwhile, the PGRS/Paraku militias received assistance from merchants in the interior, who became logistic and groceries supplier for the militias, even though it was sometimes done more out of fear than sympathy.

The Soeharto-controlled central government eventually made their move, as the PGRS/Paraku threat, suspected to be in league with the communists, was deemed too dangerous to let alone. Thus, additional forces were immediately sent to help. At least 9 military units were sent to help wipe out PGRS/Paraku in the Sapu Bersih Operations.⁷⁰

This condition started to head into sectarian conflicts. A string of murders of Dayak people with unknown perpetrator happened in Ledo, Seluas and Pahauman, Bengkayang, and almost all areas with sizable ethnic Chinese communities. This situation was used by the military to scapegoat PGRS/Paraku as perpetrators of the murders.⁷¹

There was a very strong politicization of the conflict brewing in West and northern Kalimantan during that time. The already enraged Dayak communities then resolved to retaliate, with full support of TNI, who also wanted to wipe out PGRS/Paraku militias, leading to the bloody Mangkuk Merah tragedy.

This worsening relations between Dayak and Chinese in West Kalimantan and northern Kalimantan were completely manipulated by the military. They also asked for support from the ex-Governor of West Kalimantan and most respected public figure

⁶⁸According to Indonesia Merdeka's notes, published by Sekretariat Negara (Volume 14, 1995:641)—<https://www.google.com>.

⁶⁹Superman through his writing “Peristiwa Mangkuk Merah di Kalimantan Barat Tahun 1967” (Jurnal Historia, Februari 2017:6)—<https://www.google.com>.

⁷⁰M. D. La Ode in Politik Tiga wajah (2013:121)—<https://www.google.com>.

⁷¹Superman *Op Cit*—<https://www.geogle.com>.

among the Dayaks, Johannes Chrisostomus Oevaang Oeray. The Dayak people were encouraged to help the soldiers in wiping out PGRS/Paraku.⁷² The military also spread propaganda, accusing the communists for disliking the Dayak's customs. Dayak war chiefs were recruited supposedly to prevent PGRS/Paraku from conquering West Kalimantan.

Dayak figures were provoked and fooled into believing that PGRS/Paraku were atheistic communists, and Dayaks wouldn't be able to live alongside them. PGRS/Paraku were also accused as Sarawak Chinese people who wanted to disturb the security of Indonesia's territory. Through a Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI) Pontianak broadcast on 21 September 1967, Johannes Chrisostomus Oevaang Oeray threatened ethnic Chinese people to leave their areas and move to the nearest district town. On 11 October 1967, it was announced to all village chiefs to attend a big meeting and prepare for what was called a "Gerakan Demonstrasi".

It was not known whether those announcements really came from Johannes Chrisostomus Oevaang Oeray or not. However, R. Masri Sareb Putra is certain that those announcements merely stole Oevaang Oeray's name, and those provocative broadcasts actually originated from the Pelaksana Penguasa Perang Daerah (Peperalda) and Kodam XII/Tanjungpura.⁷³ Even ignoring the political intrigues of the time, the Dayak populace had been enraged. The Mangkok Merah tradition, the traditional symbol of starting a war, was prepared.

Mangkok merah was used to unite the Dayak tribes if they felt their sovereignty was in great danger. The tribal war chiefs usually sent a red bowl (mangkok merah) filled with charcoal, chicken feather, pig blood, and juang leaves, to be passed around from one village to another quickly.⁷⁴ A Dayak figure explained that Mangkok Merah was used to call for people, as a communication symbol used in emergencies. When someone brought it from one tribe to the other, it means: Come and help us.⁷⁵ Mary Somers Heidhues revealed that a hunt of ethnic Chinese people happened in West Kalimantan and northern

⁷²Superman *Op Cit*—<https://www.geogle.com>.

⁷³R. Masri Sareb Putra (2017:114) in his book, 101 Tokoh Dayak yang Mengukir Sejarah 2—<https://www.google.com>.

⁷⁴Jemmy Setiawan and Winston Neil Rondo in Merah Putih Tergadai di Perbatasan (2014:202)—<https://www.google.com>.

⁷⁵One of the sources in the book *The Time of madness: Indonesia on the Edge of Chaos* or *Zaman Edan* by Richard Liord Parry (2008:66) —<https://www.google.com>.

Kalimantan. Dayak armies combed ethnic Chinese residential areas one by one, like what happened at the end of October 1967 to Anjungan, Mandor, and Menjalin areas.⁷⁶

The Mangkok Merah movement turned to racial sentiments, identifying all ethnic Chinese as PGRS/Paraku members.⁷⁷ Ethnic Chinese populace all fell victim to the “gerakan demonstrasi”, without exceptions. Even the authorities were overwhelmed in stopping the spreading movement. On 14 November 1967, several more Dayak tribes from the interior joined the movement, worsening the violences. Herman Josef van Hulten related that the movement went out of control, killing and even reported consuming their victims' body parts.⁷⁸

During the following weeks, a string of massacres happened, claiming numerous casualties. Van Hulten revealed that the peak of the violence happened in November 1967. The assaulters, armed with hunting weapons, started to murder ethnic Chinese people and burn their belongings. Chinese shops were burned and the victims' corpses were lined up on the streets.

Superman's research results on the Mangkok Merah incident revealed that it claimed around 2000 or 3000 direct casualties,⁷⁹ with even larger knock-on effects. This knock-on effect is a wave of ethnic Chinese refugees, leaving the interior of Kalimantan to the coastal regions, namely Pontianak and Singkawang. Initially, the men resolved to stay, but ultimately they were forced to also evacuate. Meanwhile, the women and children fled and hid from the attacks in various places.

It was estimated that around 50.000 to 80.000 ethnic Chinese people moved to the coastal West Kalimantan, namely Pontianak and Singkawang. More than 5000 refugees died due to the lack of health and hygiene facilities, as well as shortage of food, either during the journey or in the refugee camps, according to Tony Wong, a living witness who is also a Chinese figure in West Kalimantan.⁸⁰ Even the ones who survived endure intense physical and mental trauma until now.

⁷⁶Mary Somers Heidhues, in *Golddiggers, Farmers, and Traders in the Chinese Districts of West Kalimantan* (2008:271) —<https://www.google.com>.

⁷⁷Written in the book, *Tandjungpura Berdjung* published by Semdam XII/Tanjungpura (1970:270)—<https://www.google.com>.

⁷⁸Herman Josef van Hulten in *Catatan Seorang Misionaris: Hidupku di Antara Suku Dayak* (1992:285) —<https://www.google.com>.

⁷⁹Superman *Op Cit*—<https://www.google.com>.

⁸⁰As reported in *Suarapemredkalbar.com*, 7 March 2016.

CHAPTER IV

THE FRAGILE CHINESE – MALAY RELATIONSHIP IN SAMBAS REGENCY

Chinese and Malays are 2 ethnic groups that comprise the majority of people in the West Kalimantan North Coast region. This North Coast region encompasses the coastal areas of Bengkayang and Sambas Regencies, along with Singkawang City. The interaction between these 2 ethnic groups are not free of various identity issues.⁸¹ This crucial identity issue now resurfaces and becomes an interesting discourse, especially concerning the existence of each group as natives and immigrants.

The term, “Malay” was first used around the year 100 – 150 CE in Ptolemy's work, *Geographia*, in the form of ‘*maleu-kolon*.’ G. E. Gerini assumed that the term comes from the Sanskrit word, ‘*malayakom*’ or ‘*malaikurram*’ which refers to Tanjung Kuantan in Malay Peninsula, while Ronald Brandell thinks it refers to Tanjung Penyabung. Meanwhile, the term ‘*Malayadwipa*’ might refer to either Malay Peninsula or Sumatra Island. The term ‘*Mo-lo-yu*’ was also noted in the travel notes of a Chinese adventurer, Yijing, who visited Southeast Asia around 688 – 695 CE, during the Tang Dynasty. He noted that ‘*Mo-lo-yu*’ was located 15 days of sailing away from Sriwijaya's capital, Palembang.⁸² According to Valentijn (1712M), the Malay people are actually very clever, smart, and they are the most

⁸¹The identity issue tainting the Chinese existence – particularly in the West Kalimantan North Coast region – is the fact that they used to be associated with communism. During the Indonesia – Malaysia confrontation of “Dwikora” era, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), especially the West Kalimantan branch led by A. Sofyan, Kemek, Saadi Abdullah, Bambang Sumitro, M. Tahak, Peng Zen Nen, The Bu Kiat and Tan Bu Hiap, were the ones supporting the confrontation policy, up to providing Dwikora volunteers from various regions. Thus, when the September 30 movement failed in Jakarta, many members of PKI joined the PGRS-Paraku guerrilla fighters in Kalimantan. This and the renormalization of Indonesia – Malaysia relations led to the outlawing of PGRS/Paraku. It was only in 12 January 1974 that PGRS-Paraku/PKI was ended, after the Kala Hitam Army shot down SA. Sofyan and his henchmen. In Sambas Regency, PKI's position was quite strong, due to the support of pro-communist Chinese people, particularly in Singkawang and Pemangkat areas. When the September 30 movement failed in their coup, many of Sambas' people joined the purges against PKI. *Sejarah Kesultanan dan Pemerintahan Daerah Sambas*. 2001. Sambas: Dinas Pariwisata Pemda Kabupaten Sambas. <https://singbebas.info>.

⁸²The various theories proposed by archaeologists and socio-anthropologists about the origins of Malay people often differs in various aspects. One important thing is people have lived in the Malay peninsula for years, and some of them are the ancestors of the modern-day Malays, at least partly. The Neolithic group living there is often referred to as Proto-Malays. Putra, Benny Agusti. 2016. *Islam dalam Sejarah dan Kebudayaan Melayu*. Humanika, Journal. Vol. 1, No. 2, July-December. Jambi: Universitas Jambi. *Ipi508810.pdf*.

polite people in all of Asia.⁸³ They are also very kind, cleaner in their ways of life and generally so beautiful, such as no other groups of people can match them.⁸⁴

This view of Malays have their basis, because the Malay people are relatively flexible and receptive to accommodating superior aspects of foreign cultures, thus 'Malay-ness' is not only defined by physical characteristics (facial features, skin color, etc.), but also by behavioral characters as described by Valentijn.⁸⁵ This accommodation of superior cultures is caused by the constant trials faced by the Malays in their interactions and relations with the peoples in Nusantara. This condition was what brought them to come and settle in the West Kalimantan North Coast region, and even build the Sambas Sultanate, according to Mujahidin, a public figure and scholar in Sambas Regency.

Besides the West Kalimantan North Coast region, the Malays have also spread to faraway regions, particularly to India, Arabia, and Persia. In the context of this research, the Malays are considered as natives to the West Kalimantan North Coast region, according to Adnan, a public figure and scholar in Sambas Regency. Both the Malays and the Dayaks, who had settled the area earlier, claim to be natives of the West Kalimantan North Coast region. It was only after their arrival that Chinese people started to arrive in the region in several waves.

Bong Wei Khong, as Head of Chinese Customary and Cultural Society (MABT) of Singkawang City, viewed that all three ethnic groups, Dayak, Malay, and Chinese, are 'immigrants' in the West Kalimantan North Coast region. Thus, the Chinese often refers to Malays as '*Fan Nyin*', or newcomer. This claim is vehemently refuted by Bambang Prayogi (M. Bilal), as Head of FPI in Singkawang City, who stressed that the numerous Malay sultanates established in West Kalimantan, particularly Sambas Sultanate, proves that the Malays are natives to the region. These different perspectives, coming from figures of each ethnicity, do have their respective arguments. In this discourse between the Malay and Chinese ethnicities, this research takes a "middle road" and refers to both ethnicities as locals.

The main reason of this terminology is solely to maintain the objectivity of the logical categorization, and respecting the arguments of both sides concerning their identification.

⁸³Putra, Benny Agusti. *Ibid.*

⁸⁴Isjoni. 2007. *Orang Melayu di Zaman yang Berubah*. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar. Page 29.

⁸⁵In this matter, Sunandar stated that etymologically, Malay/"Melayu" comes from the word '*laju*', which means fast, smart, and skilled. Thus, those traits form an important part of the Malay trait, character, and identity as a people. Sunandar. 2013. *Peran Muharaja Imam Muhammad Basuni Imran dalam Kehidupan Sosial Keagamaan Masyarakat Kerajaan Al-Watzikhoebillah Sambas 1913-1976*. Thesis. Not Published. Yogyakarta: Program Pasca Sarjana UIN Sunan Kali Jaga. Pages 27-28.

Another reason is to maintain neutrality concerning the existence of the long-established social interaction between the 2 ethnicities, as fellow citizens of Indonesia. Thus, it can be said that the locals, whether Malay or Chinese, have settled the West Kalimantan North Coast region for a long time.

The attempt to logically justify the idea that both the Malays and Chinese are local of the West Kalimantan North Coast region can actually starts from a historical perspective. Malay people had succeeded in founding a sultanate in Sambas, named *Alwatzikhubillah* Sambas. This fact, along with several records recording the Sambas Sultanate's historicity, proves that Malays are natives of the region, according to Adnan.⁸⁶ Meanwhile, the Head of MABT of Singkawang City cagily argued in the interview that while the Chinese were immigrants from China, they have settled and interbred for a long tie in the West Kalimantan North Coast area, so they can also be considered as locals. They also showed evidences of assimilation and acculturation between Chinese and both Dayaks and Malays, along with the Chinese' success in revitalizing the cultural values of their ancestral culture, that shows the Chinese have become part of the locals, amidst the heterogeneity of migrant culture.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ The Sambas Sultanate is a sultanate located in the West Kalimantan North Coast region, or the northwestern part of Borneo Island, centered on the modern-day Sambas City. This sultanate is the successor state of the previous kingdoms of Sambas. A kingdom named "Sambas" in this region had existed and flourished at least since before the 14th century CE, as noted in *Negarakertagama* by Mpu Prapanca. In that era, the kings of Sambas were titled "Nek," such as Nek Rihuh. After Nek Rihuh's era, around the 15th century, a notoriously cruel king named Tan Unggal reign. Their cruelty led to Tan Unggal being deposed by the people of Sambas, and the people in Sambas River region refused to crown another king for years. It was during this power vacuum, at the start of 16th century (1530) that a large contingent of people (around more than 500) from Java came to the region. These immigrants were nobles of Majapahit Kingdom who still professed Hinduism, descendants of King Wikramawardhana of Majapahit. In that time, the coastal and central areas of Sambas River region has been settled by coastal Dayak people for centuries. Since they have no king during that time (after King Tan Unggal's reign), the arrival of Majapahit refugees did not lead to any conflict. These refugees then settled the upstream areas of Sambas River, in the area now known as "Kota Lama." After more than 10 years settling in "Kota Lama", the relatively safe conditions in the Sambas River region motivated the Majapahit refugees to found a Hindu kingdom there, one that was later known as "Panembahan Sambas." The kings of Panembahan Sambas were titled "Ratu". The name of the kingdom's first Ratu were not known. After their death, they were succeeded by their child, titled Ratu Timbang Paseban, who was later succeeded by their sibling, titled Ratu Sepudak. It was during Ratu Sepudak's reign that trade between Panembahan Sambas and VOC started, in 1609 to be exact. It was also during their reign that the retinue of Sultan Tengah (1st Sultan of Sarawak) bin Sultan Muhammad Hasan (9th Sultan of Brunei) came from Sukadana Sultanate to the Sambas River region and then settled in the area (in Kembayat Sri Negara area). Sultan Tengah's oldest son, Sulaiman was then married to Ratu Sepudak's youngest child, named Ratu Mas Ayu Bungsu, and Sulaiman was from then on known as Raden Sulaiman. This Raden Sulaiman was the one who, after the fall of Panembahan Sambas in Kota Lama, founded a new kingdom, the Sambas Sultanate, and reigned as its first king with the title Sultan Muhammad Shafiuddin I in 1671. *Kesultanan Sambas*. <https://id.m.wikipedia.org>.

⁸⁷ Gold was what drew the ancestors of these Chinese people to the region. They first arrived as gold miners more than 2,5 centuries ago. Since 1740, they came and was employed in the gold mines by the Sultan of Sambas. The largest wave of immigration happened in 1760. Initially, the mines were worked by Malay and Dayak people, but the superiority of Chinese mining technology led to the increase of their numbers. Ultimately, they were able to found the mining companies ("kongsi"). Singkawang in West Kalimantan is really the "City of 1000 *kelenteng*". The city is settled by many Chinese and *Vihara* or *Kelenteng*, as well as smaller praying

The controversy around the claims of “nativeness” between the Malay and Chinese ethnicities inspires this investigation of Malay and Chinese diaspora identities, which supposedly were rooted and grew in the northern coastal area of Sambas Regency. The cultural fluidity caused by assimilation and acculturation have also colored the interaction between the 2 ethnicities. This fluidity enriched the collective experiences of the 2 ethnicities in all of their interactions, both situationally and strategically, as seen in the interactions of the Chinese, who always tries to position their ancestral culture as part of local cultural landscape. This struggle then earned them recognition as part of the local community, particularly from the Dayaks. This struggle is still ongoing, as the Chinese faced real challenge from the Malays, in their efforts to achieve hegemony and control over the other, economically, spiritually, culturally, and politically.

The interaction between Malays and Chinese since the Chinese' first arrival to Sambas Sultanate is considered full of strategy and capital. Full of strategy, because according to Adnan, they were brought to the Sultanate to be employed in the gold mines, such as Monterado. Full of capital, because according to Head of Singkawang City MABT, the Dutch colonial government used the Chinese, considered skilled traders, to approach the interior people and collect their agricultural produces. Through the Chinese *kongsi* and their capital, the Dutch colonial government can combat Sambas Sultanate's trade monopoly politics.

The interaction condition between Chinese and Malays, with or without Dutch colonial intervention, cannot be separated from systems and patterns formulated or even reconstructed long ago, happening through a long process. They the compete against each other, using their strategies and capitals in achieving and defending their existences in interaction, for their own dignity. This “battle” provides a context that makes each and every interaction and actions of Chinese and Malay people in the West Kalimantan North Coast region filled with meanings. Every action of Chinese people are connected with the Malays' reaction, and vice versa; both affected each other. The Malays' confidence as locals grow, as they managed to establish their identity as “owners” of the region, through Sambas Sultanate. Meanwhile, the Chinese gradually strengthened their existence as locals amid the heterogeneity of other people, although they are still subconsciously considered by people,

places, *Cetiya*, can be found anywhere. Antara noted that until 2014 there are 704 *Vihara* dan *Cetiya* buildings. Petrik Matanasi. 2016. *Orang-orang Tionghoa di Singkawang*. Tirto.id-pet/msh.

particularly by Malays, as immigrants—as can be seen in their language, tradition and behaviors.⁸⁸

Representing Chinese and/or Malay identities in the West Kalimantan North Coast region is a challenge amidst the heterogeneity of life, filled with various interests. The Chinese have up to now under constant pressure, from the era of Sambas Sultanate, Dutch colonial government, the Old Order, and the New Order, in a racially-charged political context. This pressure is understood to stem from the fact that the Chinese originated from outside Nusantara, who constantly tries to legitimates itself, even when challenged socially, economically, and spiritually by the Malays. Rather than eroding their identity, all this pressure and marginalization they suffered since a long time⁸⁹ actually build up their collective consciousness and eagerness to revitalize their ancestral culture.

The revitalization of Chinese culture in order to strengthen the cultural diversity in the West Kalimantan North Coast region, along with the existence of Chinese people in inter-ethnic interaction, are not a cause of worry, according to the Chinese, as they have declared and felt that Indonesia is their homeland, not *Chungkuo* (*Zhongguo*/China), the land of their ancestors. Thus, it is not surprising that the various festivals celebrating Chinese beliefs and cultures, such as *Cap Go Meh* always charmed various people, particularly in Singkawang City. In Singkawang, the identity and existence of Chinese becomes more and more “charming”. “Charming” here is used to articulate the various interconnected dimensions, such as: power relations and acknowledgment of the existence of Chinese, the similarities

⁸⁸One of the Chinese' problem are closely related to their self identification concerning their country of residence. This self identification then lead to another problem, such as the fact that even though the Chinese people in Indonesia have left their identity as “China” and identify themselves as Chinese diaspora, they are still considered as people of China. Among Indonesians, they cannot be fully accepted as fellow citizens yet. Suryadinata, Leo. 1986. *Pribumi Indonesians: The Chinese Minority and China*. Singapore: Hernemann Asia. Pages 191-193. The Chinese feel that they are discriminated against. If they don't want to be treated “discriminatively”, there is one thing that must be noticed, that is they have to realize that their citizenship has to be accompanied by efforts to make the native Indonesians accept them. Until now, the native Indonesians often think that even if they have citizenship status, “once Chinese, always Chinese”. This view is related to the view that many Chinese seem to use their citizenship to profit in trade, which profits are often used to held various Chinese-only events, or even squirreled away overseas. Thus, the Chinese have to prove themselves and fulfill their duties to their current country of residence, Indonesia. One of the ways to do this is by willing to assimilate with the local community and their country of residence. The current modernization era in Indonesia can be used to provide the momentum needed to cooperate and minimize the psychological, social, economical, and other distances between the 2 groups. Heidhures-somers, Mary. 1974. *Southeast Asia's Chinese Minorities*. Australia: Longman.

⁸⁹The marginalization experienced by the Chinese are solely caused by their minority status, with no racial aspect, as both Chinese and Malays are counted as part of the “Mongoloid” race. The differences between the Chinese and local Malays are more related to their culture and daily lives. This discrimination stems from the fact that the Chinese people don't interact enough with the Malays, or they don't build enough social participation in various public activities with the local populace.

between them and other ethnicities, and a feeling of mutual fellowship in spite of the differences.

The Chinese in the West Kalimantan North Coast region do not limit themselves to retaining and revitalizing their traditions, but also rebuilding long-abandoned traditions to achieve their expectations, such as the growth and development of their ancestral culture, achieving equality or even dominance in every aspect of social interactions, economic competitions, and political struggles to occupy strategic government posts. The producer-consumer pattern as in the economic metaphor is the Chinese strategy to maintain their existence, even in the context of social, economic, and political contests against the Malays. The revitalization of the Chinese cultural values is the foundation of Chinese victory in their contests in this culturally heterogeneous arena, particularly against the Malays: Work as subtle and as hard as possible, to the point that nobody realized that they are trying to achieve a hegemony.

G. Chinese Perspective on the Identification of Relationships

The dialectics of Chinese – Malay relations can be clearly seen at a glance, particularly in specific dimensions, such as: physical, dialectal, cultural attributes, and beliefs. The fact that the differences between the Chinese and Malays can be seen “at a glance” in each of their interactions, strengthens the view that the Chinese are clearly different than Malays. Pragmatically, it means that there is a 'clear dividing line' between Chinese and Malays. When a Chinese man is present in a Malay community, their 'Chinese-ness' would be more pronounced, and when they decide to become a member of the Malay community, they would have to leave all those attributes of 'Chinese-ness'. This is what can be understood as the true meaning of Chinese dialectics in Chinese – Malay relations.

In this context, the 'Chinese-ness' of Chinese people are intimately attached to all of the attributes of 'Chinese-ness' (as also the case with Malays). In the matter of identity, Chinese people find 'difficult' to live apart from their Chinese communities. This condition led to a common view among the Malays in West Kalimantan North Coast region that the Chinese live exclusively. This exclusive life can be seen in several areas of Chinese settlement, such as Singkawang City, Pemangkat City, Tebas City, and Sambas City, even though there are also some Chinese people who intermingle with other ethnicities, especially Malays in other areas in northern West Kalimantan. This existence

of Chinese people starts from the history of their arrival, production and reproduction of collective institutions, personal fantasies, authorities and spread of their beliefs and/or religions.

For the Chinese, their identity is very much actual, and still maintained and developed. Singkawang's title as "City of *Amoy*", which immediately associate the city as a city with a lot of Chinese people, is a certain source of pride for them, motivating them to increase their efforts to "own" the city. All of this gradually erode the existence of the Malays in the city. This shift of dominance in Singkawang City, from Malays to Chinese, has not happened in other areas of West Kalimantan North Coast region, such as the coastal areas of Bengkayang and Sambas Regencies, which are still dominated by Dayaks and Malays.

This desire to "own" Singkawang, implying an imbalance between the Chinese and Malay positions, led to the Chinese "pressuring" the Malay's position. This condition should be a warning for the Malays concerning the growing existence of the Chinese who controls the strategic resources of the city, such as; economics, land and political power. Even if we don't want to view the Chinese existence in Singkawang City as a "threat", it has to be acknowledged that this Chinese dominance has made things difficult for the Malays in Singkawang. This dominance might lead to a unique situation, where the Malays, who previously claimed as the natives of Singkawang, would over time defers to the Chinese, using Chinese language in their interactions as a mark of their intensive and close relations. This condition strengthened the Chinese conviction, who viewed the Malays as fellow immigrants.

In contrast, in Sambas Regency, the Chinese choose to strengthened their solidarity and brotherhood with the Malays of Sambas. The Chinese adapted themselves into the dominant Malay identity, and refers to themselves as part of Sambas people. These Chinese people acknowledged that their migration to the West Kalimantan North Coast region could not be separated from the 'invitation' of Sambas Sultanate for them to be workers and managers of the gold mines in Monterado and Samalantan.

This Chinese migration contributes to the complexity of life in diversity in the West Kalimantan North Coast region. This means that the Chinese owe their existence there to the 'blessings' of Sambas Sultanate, due to their origins as gold miners. More Chinese diaspora joined them, as consequence of their economic successes. They also

continue their political struggles, even in light of previous violent conflicts they suffered. As this dialectic of Chinese – Malay relations is quite vulnerable to domination of one over the other, it is unsurprising that the Chinese always redefine their identity according to the 'situation', even if they have to grovel before the rulers for power. In other words, Chinese identity is build on the dialectic of local and global identity construction.

Based on national perspective, this development of Chinese relations which continue to develop as they achieve socio-economic, cultural, and political successes is a normal thing, as they are also citizens of Indonesia. The presence of Chinese domination over Malays is a sociological problem, as this domination have grown to a hegemony that started to marginalize the Malays, as can be seen in Singkawang City.

The formation and construction of Chinese identity never encounter setbacks, as they always manage to read the situation and respond to events until they manage to become the dominant ethnicity, particularly in Singkawang City. This Chinese domination does not come about in one giant leap, but gradually. In developing their interaction strategy, the Chinese does not only assert the uniqueness of Chinese, but sometimes also stressed that they are part of Malay life. This can be seen in action during the latest election of Singkawang Mayor, where they managed to put Tjhai Chui Mie, an ethnic Chinese woman as Mayor of Singkawang. Not only that, this Chinese success on putting one of them as Mayor, like their previous success (Hasan Karman) is due to their skill in playing up the integration strategy in politics and culture, along with using material symbols to claim themselves a part of the Malays as locals. This is in accordance with what had been illustrated by Gusti Suryansyah, a scholar, Malay figure and Pangeran Ratu of Landak Kingdom as the “three cauldrons” of life in West Kalimantan, which are: Malay, Dayak and Chinese, who should support and complete each other.

1. Identification of the Terms “Chinese” and “Tionghoa (Zhonghua)”

The terms “Chinese” and “*Tionghoa* (Zhonghua)” often become a discourse, before deeper discussion can be done.⁹⁰ *Tionghoa* is one of the ethnic groups living in

⁹⁰The advent of September 30 movement, besides leading to the termination of diplomatic ties between Indonesian and Chinese government, also led to the replacement of the terms “Tionghoa” and “Tionghoa” with “China” and “Chinese”. This change of terms was viewed as an insult, which caused unease and dismay, both in the Chinese government and among the Chinese-descended Indonesian citizens. Lie Tek Tjeng stated that the term “China” came from the name of Ch'in dynasty (the first dynasty that united China around 200 BCE) by conquering the various small states in China. However, their name is often confused with the Ch'ing Dynasty, a Manchu dynasty that is considered by many Chinese, especially the majority Han people as oppressors and tyrants. This view of Lie and Leo does not seem to reflect the views of most Chinese people in Indonesia. Ong

Indonesia, whose ancestors came from *Tionggok* (China).⁹¹ The term China has been known by Westerners even before Marco Polo's travel to China (during the Yuan Dynasty), back before the Silk Road was closed, cutting off contact between Europe and China.⁹² The word "China" itself is assumed to come from the European language's transliteration of the name "Qin (read: Ch'in)," through the Arabs, who transliterated it as, "*Shin*", latinized as, "*Sinae*", then adapted from Latin into the various European language, such as the French "*Chine*" (read: "Sin") and the English "China."⁹⁴ This discourse concerning the term "China" then gave birth to several opinions or "theories" about how the proper Indonesian term is "Cina", not "China."⁹⁵

Hok Ham, in his introduction in Suryadinata and Vasanty's book, still used the term "Chinese people". The Chinese of Singkawang, West Kalimantan, and Bangka always identify themselves as, "people of Ch'in" with no assumption that the term has any insulting and demeaning connotation. They also sometimes refer to themselves as "Tong Nyin", or people of Tang Dynasty (618-907 CE). According to Purwanto, the term "China", is used to refer to the countries officially named People's Republic of China (just "China" in popular usage) and Republic of China (Taiwan/Chinese Taipei in popular usage), while the people are called "Chinese". The Chinese people in Malaysia are also typically referred to as Chinese, and the term "Tionggok" and "Tionghoa" are rarely known there. It seems that Lie and Leo's view are mainly colored by psychological factors based on majority – minority issues. In other words, that view is an indicator of strong orientation to the ancestral lands. Suryadinata, Leo. 1978. *Chinese Minority in Indonesia: Seven Papers*. Singapore: Champmen Enterprise. Page 113. Suryadinata, Leo. 1984. *Dilema Minoritas Tionghoa*. Jakarta: Grafiti Press. Vasanty, Puspa. 1971. "*Kebudayaan Orang Tjina di Indonesia*." *Manusia dan Kebudayaan di Indonesia*. Koentjaraningrat (ed). Jakarta: Penerbit Jambatan. Pages 351-370. Lie Tek Tjeng. 1971. *Masalah WNI dan Masalah Huakiau di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Lembaga Research Kebudayaan Nasional-Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia. Poerwanto, Hari. 2014. *Cina Khek di Singkawang*. Depok: Komunitas Bambu. Pages 23-24.

⁹¹The Chinese/*Tionghoa* in Indonesia usually referred to themselves as *Tenglang* (Hokkien)/*Tengnang* (Teochew)/*Tongnyin*(Hakka)/*Tangren*(Mandarin) ("people of Tang"), or *Huaren* (Mandarin). They called themselves *Tangren* due to the fact that most of Chinese-Indonesians came from southern China, where that is common term for Chinese people, while those from northern China usually use *Hanren* (Mandarin, "people of Han") Wikipedia. *Tionghoa – Indonesia*. <https://id.m.wikipedia.org>.

⁹²At that time, the Arab and Gujarati traders had not opened the "maritime Silk Road" reconnecting Europe and China. Mike Portal. *Dibalik Kata "China."* <http://mikeportal.blogspot.com>. Sunday, 18 November 2012.

⁹³The state of Qin reunited all of China proper into one state (Qin state), one law (Qin laws), one measurements (Qin measurements), one language (Qin language), and one writing (Qin writing, the basis of modern Hanzi). It is very likely that the name "China" was absorbed from this name. *Ibid*.

⁹⁴This is because English obtained a lot of its vocabularies from French loanwords, in addition to inheritance from proto-Germanic language. Remember the Arab proverb, *Uthlubul 'ilma walaw bish shin* or "Seek knowledge, even as far as China." Here, China is written in the Arabic "*Shiin*." As Islam was revealed around 600s CE, and first entered China during the reign of Caliph Utsman ibn Affan, this means that "*Shiin*" or "China" has been known to the Arabs at least 1200 years before Japanese invasion of China. *Ibid*.

⁹⁵The first theory thought the word was a French loanword that was borrowed into Indonesian either when Napoleon Bonaparte conquered all of Europe, including the Netherlands, or it was borrowed into Dutch first and then borrowed into Indonesia as a Dutch loanword. The second theory is the word came from Portuguese "Cino", which was then adopted into Malay. And the third theory is the word came from Arabic "Shiin", brought to Nusantara and adopted as "Cina." All three theories agree that the proper Indonesian is "Cina" rather than "China.", as the Javanese script has no "Ch" letter and never pronounce "i" as "ai". Direct borrowing from English itself is only possible after the British entry to Indonesia in 1805 German, English's fellow Germanic language, only recognizes "China"—read: Cina. *Ibid*.

This discourse concerning the term “China” and “Tionghoa” continue. Moreover, as several informants in the West Kalimantan North Coast area prefer to be referred to as “Tionghoa”, we are inspired to delve deeper and understand these terms. The term “Tiongkok” came from the word “*Zhong Guo*” (read: Chung Kuo), which means “Middle Country” or “Central Lands”. “Tiongkok” is used to refer to the territory/country of China, while “Tionghoa” is the term for its people/nation.⁹⁶

The reason behind the preferences of some Chinese diaspora in Indonesia concerning the terms “China”, “Chinese”, “Tiongkok” or “Tionghoa”, is among others because the word “C(h)ina” is viewed to have negative connotations and doesn't sound good.⁹⁷ This in turn helped formulate the Indonesian government's official stance in Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY)'s era,⁹⁸ who issued the Presidential Decree No. 12 Year 2014, about the Withdrawal of Ampera Cabinet Presidium Notice No. SE-06/Pred.Kab/6/1967, issued on 28 June 1967. Through this decree, President SBY replaced the term “China” with “Tionghoa.”⁹⁹

⁹⁶ “Tiongkok” and “Tionghoa” is basically equal to the terms “Great Britain” and “British.” Thus, In Indonesian, we don't say “Negara Tionghoa” but “Negara Tiongkok,” and rather than “bahasa Tiongkok” we said “bahasa Tionghoa. *Ibid.*”

⁹⁷ According to etymologists compiling the Oxford English Dictionary, the word “China” most likely refer to the Qin Dynasty—which ruled China in the 3rd century BCE. The word roughly means, “people of Qin Dynasty.” However, Harian Kompas once noted in an article published on 23 October 2005, titled: “The Revival of the Sick Man” that the word “China” is might come from the Japanese word “Shina” which mean “sick man” (sic) [the kanji used to write the word actually means something like “branch people”, and it was merely a transliteration of Latin “Sinae”, [with the exact same path of etymology as recorded for the English word “China”], with the kanji chosen only based on its sound, disregarding the meaning totally. The word was adapted into Japanese as a general term for China regardless of ruling dynasty]. There are also some who said that the term was used by Japanese because it means “faraway region” or “marginal region”, aka “backwards people”. With such kinds of meaning, the usage of the word by Japanese fascists was obviously meant as insults and curses. This negative connotation left such a strong impression that even until now the Chinese diaspora refused to be referred to as “Cina.” *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ This is a continuation of a previous Government Decree in Kyai. H. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gusdur)'s era, which abolished the terms “Pribumi” and “Non Pribumi”, as well as acknowledging that Chinese/Tionghoa people who have settled in Indonesia for a long time have the same position as other natives as Indonesian citizens.

⁹⁹ Kompas.com. 2014. *Presiden SBY Ganti Istilah “China” Menjadi “Tionghoa.”* Wednesday, 19 March. <https://nasional.kompas.com>. See also the contents of the Ampera Cabinet Presidium Notice No. 06 Year 1967 about the Chinese Problem: (1) Nowadays, the usage of the terms “Tionghoa/Tiongkok”, rather than “Cina”, which has gradually become the common and official term, is still pretty common; (2) From ethological-political and etymological perspectives, the terms “Tionghoa/Tiongkok” bring a negative psychopolitical association for the Indonesian nation, while the term “Cina” is not only free of that association, but also reflects the name of a dynasty who once ruled over the origins of the Chinese race; (3) Historically, the term “Cina” was the one which has been used since old times, thus it is also the one that should be used by the people of Indonesia; (4) Regardless of emotional aspects and political aims, it is only expected that we also use the term “Cina”, which had been chosen by the common people of Indonesia; (5) Thus, to achieve uniformity and effectivity, as well as avoiding terminological dualism in all government bureaus, both in national and regional levels, we hope that the use of the term “Cina” is continued, while the use of the terms “Tionghoa/Tiongkok” is abandoned; (6) That is all, to be noticed. Secretary of Ampera Cabinet Presidium,

The reason behind the replacement of the term “China” with “Tionghoa”, as cited by Kompas from the Cabinet Secretariat site, the use of the term “Tjina” as mentioned by the Ampera Cabinet Presidium Notice as a replacement for the terms “Tionghoa/Tionggok” had caused a discriminative psycho-social effect on the social relations of Indonesian citizens of Chinese/Tionghoa descent. Thus, in the decree signed on 14 March 2014, Presiden SBY stated that discriminative views and actions towards a certain person, group, community, and/or race are violations of the values and principles of human rights protection. Thus, with the Presidential Decree issued by the then President SBY, all governmental use of the terms “Tjina/China/Cina” is replaced with the term “Tionghoa”, while the term “Republik Rakyat China” is replaced with “Republik Rakyat Tionggok.”

In the West Kalimantan North Coast area, where the research is conducted, the Chinese-descended people prefer the term “Tionghoa” over “Cina”, while the Malays feel closer and more familiar with term “Cina”, which is already popular both nationally and globally. Although it is hard to deny that a lot of “Tionghoa” organizations use “Tionghoa” rather than “Cina” in every formal Indonesian language context, there are still several terms that familiarize the term “Cina” to the Malays, such as the terms: Pondok Cina and Petai Cina, which sound weird and foreign when changed to Pondok Tionghoa or Petai Tionghoa.

2. Characteristics of Chinese Culture and Tradition

“Budaya” or “kebudayaan”(culture), is derived from the Sanskrit word *buddhayah*, a plural of the word *buddhi* (mind or intellect), interpreted as the things concerning human mind and intellect. Meanwhile, tradition or custom (Latin *Traditio*, “delivered”) is something that has been done since a long time and has become a part of life of a communal group, typically among those who share the same country, culture, time, or religion.¹⁰⁰

The Chinese culture, or “*wenhua*” is supposed to originate from Chinese documents dating from as far back as 2000 years ago. *Wenhua* is often interpreted as “by observing astronomical events (*tianxian*), a ruler can understand the changes of

Sudharmono. Wikisource. <https://id.wikisource.org>.

¹⁰⁰The most basic thing of a tradition is the presence of information passed from one generation to the next, both in oral and written form, because without this, the tradition will go extinct. Wikipedia. 2017. *Tradisi*. <https://id.wikipedia.org>.

the seasons, and by observing the various conditions of mankind, a ruler can rule the state(world) by teaching and educating.¹⁰¹

This view of “*wenhua*”, which has been “patented” since the old times, from the Ming and Qing era had been focused more on all kinds of behavior and attitude of someone to themselves and all the systems of a state, all part of a culture's scope. It can be seen that the concept of culture or “*wenhua*” in ancient China referred to a narrower meaning, about a “spiritual dimension.”¹⁰² No matter the definition, the Chinese culture is the magnum opus of Chinese people, the greatest product of their long history of development, and a crystallization of their own intellect and creativity.

Inspecting the Chinese culture, it has be admitted that for thousands of years, the Chines culture had shined bright and had a great influence, especially to all Chinese people in the past and present. With the opening of “Silk Road” during the Han dynasty, Chinese culture had also played a role in the history and culture of Europe. In this modern era, where global communication can be done regularly without any significant barrier, the spread of Chinese culture becomes very fast, thus extending its influence even further to all corners of the world.

As a majority Chinese city in the West Kalimantan North Coast area, Singkawang seems to charm the world more with its ancestral cultural festivals, particularly their celebrations of Imlek and Cap Go Meh. People of all ethnic backgrounds has also become attracted to learn Mandarin, so that more and more Mandarin school, courses, and classes have been opened, not only in Singkawang, but also in other cities of West Kalimantan, particularly Pontianak City. Furthermore, the Chinese cuisine, performances, and literatures (such as Sun Zi/Sunzi Bingfa's Art of War or the Three Kingdoms (*san guo yanyi*) are loved by various people.

The ethnic characteristics of the Chinese culture can be investigated from either external or internal viewpoints. Viewed from the outside, the characteristics include: (1) Unity; (2) Continuity; (3) Very accepting and tolerating; and (4) Diversity.¹⁰³ *First*, the meaning of unity in Chinese culture includes the study of its thousands of years of history, which gradually formed the culture that placed China at the center of the worldview, and at the same time gathered the cultures of other

¹⁰¹Liu Wei Lin. 2012. *Pengertian Budaya: Budaya Tionghoa*. Web.budaya-tionghoa.net.

¹⁰²*Ibid.*

¹⁰³*Ibid.*

nations to be integrated and become a part of Chinese cultures. This unification plays an important role in assimilation, preserving the Chinese culture even in the face of frequent outside threats, political chaos, and fracturing of the state. This durability is quite unique to China and hard to find in the cultures of other nations of the world.

Second, continuity here means *wenhua gailun*—the broad outline of Chinese culture. Historically, the Chinese culture has never been ended/broken/replaced, but continues to grow and develop under various dynasties, unlike other ancient cultures such as the Egyptian, Babylonian, or Greek cultures. *Third*, Chinese culture is very accepting, tolerating, and welcoming of other cultures, and in some cases, they did not hesitate to assimilate them, such as the Buddhist faith, originally an Indian faith that would later be assimilated and became an important part of Chinese culture. *Fourth*, diversity refers to the fact that although the Chinese culture is a unified whole, it also reflects the various ethnic and sub-ethnic groups in it, giving it a very diverse makeup.

Meanwhile, viewed from the inside, the characteristics of Chinese culture includes: (1) Philosophical characteristics; (2) Religious characteristics; (3) Aesthetic characteristics; and (4) Ethical characteristics.¹⁰⁴ *First*, philosophically, the Chinese culture contains a dominant Confucian element, which plays an important role in shaping the morality and psychology of Chinese people. *Second*, religiously the Chinese culture is formed by the syncretism of three religions/faiths/way of life: Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. *Third*, aesthetically the Chinese culture contains a Chinese tradition built of a collection of sociopolitical and philosophical aspects. *Fourth*, ethically, the Chinese culture is founded on the basis of interpersonal relationship, where parents must love their children, children have to respect and treat their parents rightly, etc.

In the West Kalimantan North Coast area, the performance of Chinese traditions is still done frequently, as an actualization of Chinese culture. The traditions that are still performed often are, among others: (1) The presence of “*Hauw Ciang Kong*” (Harimau) altars in their shrines; (2) Horse statues in a special *pay*—Kwan Kong; (3) Prayers to Shen/Shien with meat sacrifices—the *Sam Ceng* prayer; (4) Prayers using large candles, which is believed to bring equally big blessings; (5) Prayers using *hio* with length over 1 meter, and diameter around 10-15 cm, or using 1

¹⁰⁴*Ibid.*

pack of incense—containing hundreds of incenses—so they would obtain a lot of blessings.

Other traditions that are still done frequently includes: (1) Tapping the Hiolo/Altar/pounding the ground with their feet before prayers; (2) Burning a pack of *Kim Coa* papers after prayers, as a form of sacrifice; (3) Smoking their faces with the incense smoke; (4) Asking for lottery numbers in front of the altar of *Shen/Shien*, using the “*Ciamsi*” wooden panels; (5) Presence of altar for the ancestors, for *pay*; (6) Burning fake money, suitcases, houses, etc. made of paper to be “sent” to the ancestors; (7) “*Rebutan*”/“*Raja Setan*”/“*Hantu Kelaparan*” prayers.

Discussing Chinese culture in is not only focused on the aspects of the Chinese tradition developed and brought from their ancestral lands—Tiongkok/China—or the internal strengths of the culture itself, along with its various forms and configurations. The most important thing to discuss is its incorporation of various cultural elements of other cultures, both Malays or other ethnic groups which interacts with the Chinese in either local or wider social relationship network, in the form of institutions, conceptual ideas, and structure.

In an article they wrote, Ahmad Sirojuddin¹⁰⁵ explained that Pawai Tatung can be considered an example of cultural assimilation in Singkawang City, particularly between Chinese and Dayak people. Pawai Tatung can be viewed as a parade showing off the supernatural power of Dayak-Tiongkok (Cina) in celebrating Cap Go Meh, a festival done after the day of Imlek (Chinese New Year), which can only be seen in Singkawang City, West Kalimantan. Tatung in *Hakka* means “people possessed by spirits, gods, ancestors, or supernatural powers.”

Before Cap Go Meh is held, the Singkawang Chinese people take turns praying in their Viharas, one by one. This is done around 13-15 day after Imlek. They prayed in these days, referred to as “white tiger”, hoping that bad, unwanted things don't happen. Before the evening, many hermits or priests come out and pray in the Viharas in order to ask permission to the gods, so that the Tatung ritual goes well and no bad things happen during the festival.

¹⁰⁵The Cap Go Meh celebration festival in Singkawang, is a more-than-250-year-old festival from China that had been brought and celebrated in Sambas by Singkawang Chinese. Then, the festival adapted and assimilated with the culture, traditions, and rituals of the local traditional animism. Cap Go Meh Festival is the largest popular festival in the world based on local wisdom, which gives it its own charm for national tourism, especially in Singkawang City. Sirojuddin, Ahmad. *Pawai Tatung, Asimilasi 3 Budaya Magnet Kota Singkawang*. <https://www.indonesiakaya.com>.

The Singkawang Chinese believed that the priest-led Tatung calling ritual is done in order to call the spirits of dead people to enter the Tatung. The summoned spirits are believed to be good spirits that can neutralize evil spirits that want to disturb the harmony of people's lives. These good spirits consist of spirits of the heroes of Chinese legends, such as: war commanders, judges, poets, princes, repentant prostitutes, and other saints.

In these Tatung attractions coloring the Cap Go Meh festival of Singkawang City, it is said that the summoned spirits can possess anyone, depending on whether the Tatung players fulfill the requirements explained and set by the priests. The Tatung players are obligated to fast for 3 day before the festival, in order to purify them before the festival. Tatung are believed to have supernatural powers, able to heal and exorcise evil spirits—“tolak bala”.

Another tradition is the festival is preceded by lantern parades, *barongsai* and dragon parade, then 2 days later the Cap Go Meh festival is held in Singkawang. This Cap Go Meh festival also features Tatung parades, from the Vihara. This parade is only done after receiving the blessings of the Kelenteng or Vihara. The parade begins from the Vihara's altar, where the priests make a sacrifice to the god To Pe Kong. After praying for safety, they then summon the spirits, the Tatung's bodies are possessed by spirits which make them invulnerable to harm, and then they are paraded around the city, dressed in clothes representing both the Chinese and Dayak communities.

Accompanied by drums, the participants of the parade wear glamorous ethnic Dayak and Chinese costumes of the past. The Tatung attraction itself is filled with mystical and exciting things. For example, one of the Tatung stands on the carriage, stepping on the blade of a sword or knife. There is also one of them piercing their right cheek with sharp iron wires until it also pierce the left cheek.

These Tatung then demonstrate their invulnerability, by stepping on glass shards, blades of swords, etc. Interestingly, the Tatung are completely unharmed and without any scratches. Occasionally, they take breaks from the demonstrations to drink *arak* or even chicken blood specially prepared for the ritual. While demonstrating their invulnerabilities, the Tatung are paraded around the city. Some of

the Tatung are paraded on foot, and some others are carried standing on a sedan throne lifted by 4 people, like Chinese officials of the old age.

The typical route of the parade is: the parade starts in Kridasana Field to Pelita Street, then heading to Yohana Godan Street and GM Situt Street. Then, the parade continues to Pasar Ikan Bridge, heading to Saad Street and to Setia Budi Street, to Toko Obat 1001 Street and to Budi Utomo Street and passing through Rusen Bridge. From Rusen Bridge, the parade heads to Tri Dharma Bumi Raya Vihara and to Sejahtera Street. After that, the parade heads to Kepol Mahmud Street and finally ends in Muka Altar Lelang. Finally, they gather to pray together to *Thian* (God) in the altar of the Cap Go Meh celebration center in Singkawang.

As previously illustrated by “tiga tungku” (three cauldrons), Malays, Dayak, and Chinese complete and support each other. However, in delineating the limits of an ethnic group, like the Chinese, social borders are not the only thing that has to be noticed, but also the territorial borders. In the usage of its identity symbols, such as: dragon statues, lanterns, performances, and attractions of Tatung often shown in *Cap Go Meh* festivals in Singkawang City, the Chinese depends on the recognition and its methods of obtainment manifested in their social interactions. This condition is of course closely related with how long the Chinese have engaged in social relations.

This is proven by the fact that the presence of Tatung in great numbers is a cultural phenomenon unique to Singkawang City during the Cap Go Meh festival. As a cultural festival, the Tatung Parade also has a quite strong religious ritual side that reflects the mixture of ancient Taoist beliefs with local animism. Singkawang itself has its own locals, the Dayaks and Malays who already mixed with the Chinese who had settled there since a long time. The area of Singkawang was originally part of the region of Sambas, which includes Singkawang City, Sambas Regency and Bengkayang Regency.

There are several possible etymologies of Singkawang,¹⁰⁶ one of them is the name came from the plant “Tengkawang”, found in tropical forest areas. Another version, according to the Khak/Hakka Chinese people, Singkawang came from the phrase *Sau Kaw Jong*, which means a city located between the sea (Sea of Natuna to the west), mountains (Mount Roban, Pasi Raya, and Mount Poteng to the east and

¹⁰⁶Ministry of Religious Affairs. 2016. *Profil Raudatul Athfal Al-Ikhlās*. Singkawang City.

south), estuary, and river (the river at the middle of the city, flowing to Sea of Natuna).

Meanwhile, Sambas is said to mean *sam* (three) *bas* (ethnic groups)¹⁰⁷ which means that its population consists of Muslim Sambas Malays (an agglomeration of people of various ethnic backgrounds, such as Malays, Muslim Chinese and Dayaks, Bugis, Javanese, etc., united by Islam and self-identify as Malays); Chinese people, professing various beliefs such as *Samkaw* (Taoism, Buddhism and Confucianism), Catholicism, Protestantism, and consisting of descendants of migrant Chinese and Chinese-Dayak mixed descendants who self-identify as Indonesian Chinese/Tinghoa and finally Dayak people, who professes various beliefs such as Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam, and for a small minority, animism, who self-identify as Dayaks—the locals of Kalimantan.

The Cap Go Meh celebration in Singkawang City, identity-wise is quite successful in placing itself as a mystical thing. The Chinese has not only succeed culturally to place sacred buildings in strategic locations, but also intensively continues to build philosophical and psychological room to achieve cultural hegemony over the Malays, thus the Chinese existence tends to be exclusive, based on prestige and social classes, as a manifestation of Chinese skills in building their identity as a social capital.

The Chinese implementation of their identity strategy is closely connected of the foundational basis of their group identity. The facilities of the Chinese identity strategy includes: (1) Legitimization of their identity by forming dominant institutions in the community to strengthen their position; (2) Resistance of identity through identity struggle every time they are in a stigmatized position; and (3) Trying to redefine their identity, which has become completely different from their ancestral identity. Based on this, the Chinese cultural attitude concerning identification is fluid and multidimensional. In this identity—cultural attitude—there are several dimensions, such as power relation, ascription of self and other people, especially concerning Malays, who they feel they have some similarities and a “sense of belonging” together, along with differences.

¹⁰⁷According to a statement by Head of MABT of Singkawang City.

Over the course of the Chinese – Malay social relations in the context of time and space, a dialectic of abstract knowledge and concrete actions is born. In this position, there should be rules that has to be agreed on and obeyed by everyone, requiring integrative attitude concerning the Malay – Chinese interaction. A strong element that preserves this integration is the strategy of kinship. Kinship is one of the mechanism that preserves the wholeness of Chinese – Malay relations in achieving a balanced structure. The formation of this balance is through prevention of conflict, and when conflict happens, it is only in the name of achieving order in the structure of communities—Chinese and Malay—that support and complete each other.

3. **Chinese Kinship Culture**

The Chinese in West Kalimantan North Coast actually have close kinship ties with the other ethnic groups there, particularly Dayak. These kinship ties undergo a quite long rise and fall process as an aspect of the social life that helps legitimize Chinese as part of the locals. The solidarity of the Chinese in the process of their social journey with the Dayaks has become closer, while their ties the Malays start to shift ue to political, economical and religious factors.

Bong Wei Khong stated that the inter-ethnic kinship, particularly between the Chinese and Malays has to based on sincerity of soul, as there is always some people who don't want Indonesia to develop. He then continued:

This country can establish relations with any other country, as long as it is for the country's progress. What's the harm in learning? Sometimes, we are hypocritical. As one of the Hadith said, to seek knowledge, even if you have to go to China. Because our politics is not reluctant to learn. No need to travel that far; (learning) with Chinese people is enough. Why do the Chinese succeed, why are we still behind. This is not fate, because God is fair to all; (this is) because we keep bringing past politics. Every time we see Chinese, we already (over)react. Why is Singkawang not like that. (Because)Singkawang had learned from past government policies. During *Orde Lama*, Chinese businessmen cannot trade in the villages, because they used to work with the colonists, earning the envy of the natives, leading to the (Order Lama's) policy then.

The kinship patterns used by the Chinese are quite assimilative, especially with Dayak and possibly also with Malays. Meanwhile, when a Chinese or Dayak married a Malay, they would immediately become a Malay, just like how Dayaks who converted to Islam are claimed as among the Malays, or what is called the *Sanganan*.

This is in contrast with the Chinese – Dayak marriage, where the marriage doesn't automatically strip either of them of their existence as a Chinese/Dayak. This is one of the factors that brings the Chinese and Dayak closer in kinship, along with other historical factors.

According to Bong Wei Khong, there was a Dutch colonial government strategy to use Chinese merchants from Guangdong and Hokkien as intermediaries with the natives, a decision strengthened with the information that the Sultanate of Sambas had given them permission to work in the gold mines. He then stressed:

At the beginning of the 12th century, the Chinese came to the coasts as farmers and fishers, while in the 18th century they came as gold miners, starting in 1772 until the colonial era around the start of 19th century, when they mostly migrated as traders. *dimana orang Cina bermigrasi sebagai pedagang.* Due to their diligence as mine workers, they succeed and start building the *kongsi*. Due to their conditions, they have no choice but marry the locals, as the migrants are mostly men. So, we need to reveal, who we, the Chinese are. Even though all of us are actually immigrants. Were close to the South China Sea. There's a lot of rather big rivers, like Singkawang, Sebangkau, and Sungai Raya rivers, from where we entered on the way to the mining sites.

Kinship in the perspective of ethnic identity is a social power that can result in the strengthening of their existence in the political, economic, and social landscape, because these kinship ties can strengthen the solidarity in social relations. It is realized that kinship is a terminology that arises from the process of human sexual reproduction. Thus, kinship in the Chinese environment is strengthened by the results of their social interpretation concerning the Dayaks.

Meanwhile, according to Kazim, a public figure in Sungai Raya, Bengkayang Regency, the close kinship ties between the Chinese and Malays there, particularly around the Pantai Gosong area, can be seen in the fact that most Chinese there prefer communicating in Sambas Malay, even though they can still use the Chinese language(s). He stated that:

If we heard the Chinese having conversation with Malays here, if we don't see the people, we might think that the speaker is not a Chinese. This is because they already assimilated with the natives, as Sambas Malays. In Sungai Raya Village, there are 25 RT, and 3 of them are majority Chinese, and the RT Head is a Chinese, and Karimunting even once placed Chi Jung Lie of PDIP as an ethnic Chinese representative in Bengkayang Regency Regional House of Representatives, and we viewed the as a Chinese who has assimilated and fluent in Malay.

The Chinese life in the West Kalimantan North Coast region continues to grow and develop to be equal with the Malays, whether through defense strategies, revitalization of traditions sourced from cultural values which become a strength of their Chinese identity. The Chinese existence is completely unaffected by the strength of the Malays, Dayaks or other immigrant ethnicities, and their existence is even improving alongside the Malays' existence in several fields, particularly economics, and now they are following it up with advances to obtain political powers.

In the past—the New Order era—Chinese existence was suppressed and unappreciated, their resources being intentionally minimized compared to the Malays. This led them to really only be active in one economic sector, commerce/trade, which is (un)fortunately the most strategic sector in gaining power over the other sectors, and they knew it. The Chinese migration and their contact with the Malays in the West Kalimantan North Coast region had taken place for a long time, leading to an adjustment in their cultural values, in order to fit those relations.

The marginalization suffered by the Chinese before the era of Kyai H. Abdurahman Wahid (Gus Dur)'s government, who opened the “gates” of freedom for them, has spurred the awakening of Chinese ethnic consciousness to revitalize and (re)produce their identity as a model of their coexistence with the Malays in the social relation constellation in Indonesia. On the other hand, practically this process has also lowered the Malay's resistance against the growing Chinese domination, who begins to control the social structures in the West Kalimantan North Coast region.

On one hand, China has obtained an opportunity to reposition itself. On the other hand, China has tried to play its new roles outside of trade/economy to be more active in social, cultural, and political spheres. These 2 processes happen dialectically, and the Chinese understand that the most important thing is their ethnic tradition—Chinese cultural attributes, *kelenteng*, dragon statues, lanterns, and Chinese cultural performances such as Tatung and other attractions—in the context of relations between Chinese as the internal structure and Malays as the external structure. It must be understood that the Chinese really want a respected position, equal with the Malays and Dayak, which has been rather successfully built on. Thus, their ultimate goal is not to steal the West Kalimantan North Coast region, but to integrate themselves into the dominant Malay structure there.

4. Chinese Cultural Revitalization for Existence and Endurance

Revitalization means, a process or method and actions to revive something that was previously dormant, thus revitalization is making something vital (very important and/or needed for life). In the context of both their social and cultural lives, the Chinese has always struggles with revitalization. This is why, after experiencing dark times due to accusations of communist connections in the wake of September 30 Movement and involvement in PGRS/Paraku in West Kalimantan, they try to improve their image by revitalization to ensure their culture's endurance and avoid social and cultural clashes with others.

Everyone, whether Chinese, Malay, or Dayak understand that diversity is beautiful. However, each of them needs cultural endurance in order to deal with the side effects of diversity. This is why in several areas of Sambas Regency, such as Tangaran, Sajad and Galing, try to protect themselves from Chinese entry. Even though the Chinese always state that diversity does not need to be viewed as differences, this diversity can still lead to a cultural domination, which in turn sparks a social and cultural clash.

The Chinese cultural revitalization in the West Kalimantan North Coast Region, amidst the Malay cultural landscape, attempts with all of it powers to revive something previously unimportant and make it important. It attempts to show the character and endurance of Chinese culture by trying to exist together equally with Malay culture. The strength of Chinese culture amidst Malay culture becomes the main focus, channeling the euphoria of cultural revival to improve tolerance between Chinese and Malay, and avoid open conflict between them.

The Chinese tradition is an legacy of their ancestors. It is based on continuously actualized elements such as honesty, normality, egalitarianism, tolerance, and generosity. It is also the basis of Chinese cultural and social institutions, encompassing common values concerning norms and sanctions, and also strengthening social networks, such as: participation, solidarity, teamwork, and justice. The Chinese really adheres strongly to their tradition as a moral basis that must be continuously strengthened and constructed in their social life.

For the Chinese, tradition is something that always exists, even if it needs to be reconstructed and reestablished. This process of cultural rediscovery results in a

reemergence of Chinese culture in a simpler and clearer form, which origins and development can be easily understood by all. This awareness of traditional values reconstruction is a reaction to their “identity crisis” during the “New Order” and the assault of outside stereotypes of their existence.

The Chinese effort to revive their ancestral traditions in modern context reflects their local wisdom, cultural identity and cultural strategy to preserve their existence in the West Kalimantan North Coast region. One of the manifestation of their strategy is the creation of clan-based associations as a unifier. The most important thing in recreation of traditions is its process, the formalization, ritualization, and characterization based on the past. The old social traditions will give birth to new ones, as other processes transform traditions and institutions over time without the intervention of traditional figures.

One thing that must be stressed is the fact that the emergence of Chinese tradition as the centerpiece of their identity does not emerge in the context of a conflict. Unlike other ethnic groups—such as Dayak, Madura, or even the Malays, the Chinese redefined their identity as an attempt to avoid conflicts by emphasizing tolerance with Malays, Dayaks, and other immigrant ethnic groups, reviving old traditions as an identity strategy and cultural basis of their cultural life in the West Kalimantan North Coast region.

H. Malay Perspective of Life in the North Coast Region

One thing that cannot be ignored concerning the need to reexamine Chinese – Malay relations in West Kalimantan North Coast region, whether in the past or the present, in the context of social life and civilization is the natural attractions of the region. This is important to consider, because it will answer who are the people of West Kalimantan North Coast region and how is their interaction and correlation with the immigrants coming there, particularly the Chinese, in both diachronic and synchronic contexts.

The form of the culture followed by either the Malay or Chinese communities in the region is not a variable of this investigation, however it is a relation produced and renewed, that functions as a space where every individual in either ethnic groups is held responsible socially, institutionally, and ethically. Thus, both the Malay and Chinese

ethnic groups are meant to always forge a dialectic relationship, carving their interrelations to the ir social and cultural structures.

1. Natural Typology of North Coast area and Sambas Sultanate

Investigating the West Kalimantan North Coast region, which includes the coastal parts of Bengkayang Regency, Singkawang City, and Sambas Regency's administrative areas, from the past until the present times, cannot be divorced from time and the actions of the people of the past. Here, the social, economic, political, cultural, and religious spaces played by Malays and Chinese were described as a manifestation of diversity in its civilization structure. This region, the northernmost part of West Kalimantan, is strategically located as the maritime gateway of the pronice, due to its position facing the Natuna Islands and South China Sea. This natural condition plays an important role in facilitating the heterogeneity-inducing immigrations, particularly by the Chinese.

The heterogeneity and Chinese immigrant domination in the North Coast region cannot be divorced from the history of the region. Various literature mention that, long before Dutch colonialism, the Malays had settled the area and maintain relationships with the Chinese. Besides their wealth of spices and natural resources, particularly gold from the mines, this region has always maintains trade relations with the outside world. Their trade partners are not limited to the Chinese, but also include the Arabs, Bugis, and Bruneian and Malaysian Malays.

The West Kalimantan North Coast region was *de facto* controlled by the Sambas Sultanate. Sambas Sultanate was a Malay sultanate in West Kalimantan, centered on the coastal areas along the Sambas Kecil River.¹⁰⁸ Its classification as a Malay sultanate is more focused on its political meaning, as the sultanate was part of the “Malay World” culturally. At the start of the 19th century, Malay sultanates like

¹⁰⁸The natural condition of Sambas Sultanate, or even West Kalimantan in general, were still largely unknown by outsiders until the beginning of 19th century. They were only exposed to the outside world since the research on natural conditions by George Muller—a major-ranked military man, who served as the first resident in Sambas (1818). This was the first reasearch on the area's natural conditions done by Europeans. Although it contained numerous errors, particularly in its map of Kalimantan's interior, its information concerning the coastal areas are still rather useful. All of the results of this research is now stored as a collection of *Algemeen Rijksarchief* in Den Haag/The Hague. One of its reports containing natural data is the *Bijdragen tot Vroegere Rapporten en Memorien over Sambas: 1818*. ARA., Min van Kol. No. 9191. See also M.D. Teenstra. 1852. *Beknopte Beschrijving van de Nederlandsche Overzeesche Bezittingen*. Groningen: J. Omkens en Zoon. Page 1852.

Sambas could be found dotting the Malay Peninsula, the northern coasts of Sumatra and the western coasts of Kalimantan.¹⁰⁹

Generally, life in these various sultanates were colored by Malay culture. Some elements of the Malay culture included; language, literature, art, customs, laws (originating from the Malay Peninsula, that is, Malacca), farming and fishing for livelihood, characteristic Malay settlement pattern in separated villages, etc.¹¹⁰ These elements cannot be ignored, and they all influenced each other, in the general pattern of Malay culture.

The natural conditions of the West Kalimantan North Coast region, *nota bene* under Sambas Sultanate's control, can be classified as an “estuary sultanate”, as most of its territory was located either on a river valley or between several rivers. This location had a great impact on the socio-economic activities of its people.

There are a lot of rivers in the territory of Sambas Sultanate. Sambas (Besar) River is the largest, and it is counted among the large rivers in West Kalimantan. Around 20 kms from its mouth upstream, it has a tributary called Sambas Kecil River. It was along the streams of this river that the center of Sambas Sultanate was built by its founders.¹¹¹ Both the Sambas Besar and Sambas Kecil rivers, as well as several other rivers, originated far from the interior, thus these rivers could be used to reach those interior regions.

Several other rivers that can be considered “large rivers”, includes, from south to north: Duri, Pangkalan, Raja, Sedau, Selakau and Sebangkau rivers, and there are also numerous uncountable small rivers. While the largest river was the center of the Sultanate, the other large rivers south of it became the sites of several Chinese *kongsi*, which thus could access the interior regions directly without passing the Sultanate.

Almost all of its coasts are swamps, where mangrove forests grow. Moreover, some parts of the coasts are mountains which slopes directly to the sea, without any

¹⁰⁹Milner, Antony Crothers. 1977. *The Malays Raja: A Study of Malay Political Culture in East Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula in Early Nineteenth Century*. Cornell University. Ph.D thesis. Page 1.

¹¹⁰Ibid., Pages 3-13. See also other writings about the Malay kingdoms on the west coast of Malay Peninsula. Gullick, J.M. 1970. *Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya*. Translated and published by Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka. Kuala Lumpur.

¹¹¹It is rather difficult to determine exactly when the sultanate was founded. It can only be said that Malays first entered the area since the 14th century. Blink, H. 1921. *Economische Geographie van de Borneo Westerafdeeling*. TEG., XII. Page 41. Several noble families and their vassals from Malay Peninsula or Sumatra first settled the river mouth areas as traders and/or pirates. Later, these settlements become the centers of Malay sultanates in West Kalimantan. Logan, J.R. 1848. *Traces of the Malay Kingdom of Borneo Proper*. JIAES, II. Pages 513-514.

beach whatsoever. Its interior is a mountainous highland, overgrown with thick forests. This means that rivers are the only way connecting the coasts with the vast interior.

The central location of the Sultanate on a river stream flowing to the sea, with a vast interior territory, allowed its rulers to control the trade between the coastal and interior regions through the river stream. This trade monopoly was very important for the Sultanate, as it was the only way to ensure a steady stream of income for it, as “estuary sultanates” like Sambas Sultanate cannot generate enough income from agriculture.

The territory of Sambas Sultanate was around 12.320 Km², with the following boundaries: On the west and southwest, it bordered the South China Sea. This coastal area spans from Tanjung Datuk in the north to the mouth of Duri River in the south. On the north, the Sultanate bordered Sarawak—Malaysia, on the south, Mempawah Sultanate, and on the east and southeast, Landak Sultanate.

2. Ethnic Typology of “Malay World” in Sambas Sultanate

The people of Sambas Sultanate seemed diverse, consisting of various ethnic groups with various origins. This typology of people in the Sambas Sultanate era is needed, because the sultanates in the West Kalimantan North Coast region was quite diverse. The Dayak is considered the first people who lived and settled the interior—before converting to Islam.¹¹² Since the era of Sambas Sultanate until now, some of them are still living following their old customs, living in longhouses built on top of pillars.

The Dayak people in Kalimantan can be divided into 6 main groups, as proposed by Raymond Kennedy¹¹³, as well as Frank M. Lebar, and the Dayaks in Sambas Sultanate's territory are part of the “land Dayaks” group. They are still divided into smaller groups, such as: Manyukei, Ayou, Desa, Sidin and Mualang.¹¹⁴ This needs to be stressed,¹¹⁵ because each of these groups have their differences from

¹¹²Veth, P.J. 1881. *De Oorsprong van den Naam Dajaks*. TAG., V. Page 182. See also Roorda, P.P van Eysinga. 1838. *Aardrijksbeschrijving van Nederlandsch Indie*. Breda: Broese & Comp. Page 77.

¹¹³Kennedy, Raymond. 1962. *Bibliography of Indonesian Peoples and Cultures. Revised and Edited by Thomas W. Maretzki*. Southeast Asia Studies: Yale University.

¹¹⁴Lebar, M. Frank (ed). 1972. *Ethnic Group of Insular Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Andaman Islands and Madagascar*. Chapter I. New Haven: Human Relations Files Press. Page 194.

¹¹⁵Ismail, Muhammad Gade. 1985. *Politik Perdagangan Melayu di Kesultanan Sambas Kalimantan Barat: Masa Masa Akhir Kesultanan—1808-1818*. Thesis. Jakarta: Fakultas Pascasarjana, Universitas

other Dayak groups. These Dayak—during that time—had not known a wider social organization beyond their villages, and they lived scattered in the interior, with one village located far away from other villages.¹¹⁶

Fitting the natural condition where they lived, the Dayak people's main livelihood is gathering forest products, such as: resin, rattan, bird's nest, etc.; farming rice and corn with the shifting cultivation system. Some of the Dayaks also worked in the gold mines with simple methods, before the Chinese arrived.¹¹⁷

The other people present during the era of Sambas Sultanate were the Malays. These Malays counted as immigrants, coming from various areas: Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, and Java. In Sambas Sultanate, they all referred to themselves as Malays. They are the people living on the coasts, with their main characteristic being Islam.¹¹⁸

The definition of Malay is closely connected with Islam, and the two is hard to separate. Dayaks who converted to Islam is said to have 'masuk Melayu (converted to Malay)'¹¹⁹ and usually have interacted extensively with the Malays and lived on the coasts. The Malay's main livelihood was trading, piracy, and farming on the banks of the rivers.

The Bugis was another ethnic group present in Sambas Sultanate. From racial, religious, cultural, and customary perspectives, the Bugis are not that different from the Malays. They were also coastal residents whose main livelihood was trading. However, they always differentiate themselves from other groups by referring to themselves as Bugis. During the time of Sambas Sultanate, they lived in a special village for Bugis people, led by one of their own.¹²⁰ The Bugis sailed and traded from Sambas to Sulawesi, Java and the areas of Malacca Strait.

Another ethnic group present during that time were the Chinese immigrants, coming from 2 provinces of China: Fukien/Fujian and Kwangtung (Guangdong). They were brought in by Sultan Umar Akamuddin around mid-18th century, in order

Indonesia.

¹¹⁶Dajakkers: Oorsprong, Levenswijze, Zeden, Gewoonten, Gotsdiest, Nijverheid en Beschavingen. De Westersche Handschriften van het KITLV Leiden. Page 490.

¹¹⁷Memoir on Residency of North-west Coast of Borneo in Moor, J.H (ed). 1837. *Notices of the Indian Archipelago and Adjacent Countries*. Chapter I. Singapore. Page 5.

¹¹⁸Verslag over de Westkust van Borneo door den Heer Commisaris Tobias op den 8 Mei 1822. ARA. Min van Kol. 1814-1849. No 3081.

¹¹⁹De Dajakkers: Oorsprong. *Loc Cit*. See also Rademacher, J.C.M. 1780. *Beschrijving van het Eiland Borneo*. VBG. II. Page 108.

¹²⁰Memorien van den Heer Read van Indie Muntinghe over Borneo. 31 August 1821. ARA. Collection of G.J.C. Schneither. No 125.

to work on the Sultan's gold mines.¹²¹ the Chinese live in the interior, as gold miners who would later formed alliances called ‘*kongsi*.’ These alliances were created based on social organization, customs, and traditions of their homeland (China) for economic, political, and social purposes.¹²² As their gold mining business grew, their population also grew, increasing the population concentration of their settlements upstream of the Sebangkau, Selakau, Raya and Duri rivers.¹²³

The Malay community during the Sambas Sultanate era controlled and ruled over the other ethnic groups, monopolizing trade. The years 1808–1818 was the twilight of the Sultanate, from the creation of the Chinese *Kongsi* Federation in 1808 to the entry of Dutch power to Sambas in 1818. Since then, the Malay authority—Sambas Sultanate—was eroded and replaced with Dutch colonial authority.

I. Acceptance, Rejection, and “Threat” of Chinese Ethnicity in Northern West Kalimantan

The Chinese community in the West Kalimantan North Coast area originated from the Chinese Mainland. They were estimated to first establish contact with Nusantara around 3rd century CE. The Chinese traders used a trade route along the coasts of East Asia, then passed West Kalimantan and Philippines for the return voyage. In the 7th century, China – West Kalimantan had become frequent, although the Chinese had not settled in West Kalimantan yet. The Chinese immigrants started to arrive en masse in West Kalimantan, particularly in Sambas Sultanate, in the 18th century, 1745 to be exact. This was because they were invited by the Sultan of Sambas to work in his gold mines, as socio-political *kongsis* centered in Monterado and Bodok. In Monterado, for example, the Chinesen formed the Taikong (Great Ditch) *Kongsi* and the Samto Kiaw (Three Bridges) *Kongsi*.

These Chinese mine workers' life then became the basis of the Chinese migrants' social, economic, and political hierarchy. The relations between Sambas Sultanate, the Malays, Dayaks, and Chinese can be seen as an asymmetric power relationship. Initially,

¹²¹Ritter, W.L. *Nota Betrekkelijk der Staat der Chineesche Zaken voor de Commissaris ter Westkust van Borneo*. De Westersche Handschriften van het KITLV Leiden. Page 247. See also Brouwer, van Meeteren, P.M. 1927. *De Geschiedenis der Chineesche Districten der Westerafdeeling van Borneo van 1740-1926*. IG. II. Page 1057.

¹²²Groot, de, J.J.M. 1885. *Het Kongsiewesen van Borneo: Eene Verhandeling over den Grondslag en den Aard der Chineesche Politieke Vereenigingen in the Kolonien met Eene Chineesche Geschiedenis van de Kongsi Lan Fong*. ‘s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff. Page 116.

¹²³Lijnden, van. *De Chinezen en Daijaks op de Westkust van Borneo*. ARNAS RI: B.W.K. 18.02.

the Chinese, who worked as miners and viewed as of a lower status, assimilated with the Dayaks, who at that time mainly worked as rain-fed farmers. They mainly grew in civilization centers, which later become cities, such as: Pemangkat, Tebas and Singkawang, alongside Sambas, the center of the Sambas Sultanate. This is in part because of the various security actions post-September 30 Movement, and the accusations of Chinese involvement in it and the PGRS/Paraku.

1. **Acceptance of Chinese Ethnic Group**

In essence, the existence of the Chinese in northern West Kalimantan and their relations with the internal ethnic groups of Sambas Sultanate, Malays and Dayaks, were not steady and sterile in the external structure. This distinction of internal and external structures refer to the status of Malays (and Dayaks) as natives and Chinese as migrants, not an assumption of either one's "purity". The structure of Malay ethnicity's existence is continuously formed and influenced by the social relations, both inside the Malay community itself and between them and the Chinese community outside. This continually developing relations between the internal and external structures is a form of Malay acceptance of Chinese, which become the basic characteristic of social spaces in West Kalimantan North Coast region.¹²⁴

The 'contests' of interactions in economics, particularly bilateral trade between Malays and Chinese is an old narrative, intensively linked with the internal social structure contests of the Malays themselves. As stated by Kazim:

The business relations based on the traditional economic system built by the Chinese can be said to be rather humane. There is an implicit consensus that when a Chinese *tauke* employing Malay workers can no longer provide them funds, the workers' debts are considered null. And, for the Chinese, this is not a problematic business risk, since for them, familial and business relations are based on *hokki* in work relationships. Thus, they believe that *hokki* is closely related with solidarity and unity in business.

¹²⁴For communication in public spaces, such as Singkawang City Market and several marketplaces in Sambas Regency area, including Selakau, Pemangkat, and Sekura markets, as well as Sambas Market, several languages are used by both the sellers and buyers. They either use Sambas Malay language, Indonesian language, or a Chinese language. However, almost all of local residents use Sambas Malay, because the majority of buyers are Malays, and the sellers include both Chinese and Malays. The factors influencing the language variation in the market can be seen in its location. The usage of language by each people is not consistent, and they often use 2 or more language levels, depending on their regular language use. Observation results, September 2018.

At the same time, the increasing openness of social spaces for the Chinese also gives everyone access to build a wide social network. The openness of the Malays in turn creates a condition that allows the expansion of contest arena into the field of power (politics). The relationship ‘politics’ in the economic field, particularly trade performed by the Chinese, is implied as a reason of the end of Sambas Sultanate's “power” of trade monopoly, as several trade transactions switched to the Chinese *kongsis*.

The Malay's openness in the social arena, alongside deep-rooted trade relations, widening habituation environment, and external pressure (the abolition of “Pribumi” and “Non-Pribumi”, along with legitimation of Chinese as Indonesian citizens), eases the Chinese's legitimacy to claim that they are also “natives”, or to be more precise, “locals” of the West Kalimantan North Coast region, equal to the Malays—amidst the domination of other immigrant ethnic groups.

The endurance of Malay identity and existence in the West Kalimantan North Coast area is, in fact, starting to erode due to interactions between them and the Chinese. The Chinese gradually seizes control of the strategic sectors in Malay social space, while the Malay culture then responds to it through the “inheritance” system, giving birth to various negative stereotypes. Statistically, the Malay population is shrinking, their settlements are also shrinking and pushed to the marginal areas, even their “settlement pockets” are also shrinking. All of this create an inequality in the social space in West Kalimantan North Coast region.

The current symbolic opposition of Malays towards the existence and domination of Chinese can be understood from this social space context. The awareness to rise up and reinterpret the glory days of Sambas Sultanate as an “elite” ethnic group is a historical consciousness bound to a time and space context that is rather difficult to recreate. This realization becomes a long and increasingly difficult struggle, as the Chinese continue to revitalize their culture and political power, after gaining support and legitimacy in political and governmental sectors.

In essence, the Malay's resistance towards Chinese domination does not only occur in social space, but also in the economic space, and now expanding to the political and governmental spaces, and even the cultural space. This resistance is not just a single narrative, it is also a process of redefinition and revitalization of the

Malays's openness and acceptance. These efforts are undertaken, both individually and supported by the power of government institutions.

The boundary between external and internal structures of the resistance is becoming blurred, because every Malay response to the external structure (Chinese) is now influenced by that external structure itself, because now the Chinese have gradually controlled the government and secure a political position as public representatives. This makes them feel that now, they are no longer on the same group as the Chinese of mainland China, but now they are exactly the same as the Malays of West Kalimantan North Coast region.

The situation in the Malay's social structure has changed, as the complex and open social space allows everyone (whether Malay or Chinese) to access the external structure, supporting the Chinese who also are free to develop their agency, particularly in government and politics. The Chinese grew more powerful, with wealth and capital that are, on average, higher than what the Malays have. Meanwhile, the Malays, who on average has better social capital (relations, partnership, and familial), are becoming increasingly divided, allowing the Chinese to achieve success, as in politics.

The granting of “regional autonomy” is a chance to alter the relations between social structures and agents. The Chinese, who have succeeded in the economic sectors, particularly trade, can easily “stroll in” and reach a “new” status through success in government and politics. This is where the “opposition space” between Chinese and Malay occurs, where the Malays ultimately lost their domination due to badly organized cultural revitalization. At the same time, there is a change in the meaning of Malay existence, from a dominant to a marginalized ethnic group in several cities in the “tanah Melayu” in West Kalimantan North Coast area.

Logically, the Malays should have remained dominant and not marginalized, whether culturally, economically, or population-wise. But in reality, this counterproductive situation has occurred. This reality of marginalization then spurs a realization among several Malay groups to reestablish their identity and defend the Malay dignity in the West Kalimantan North Coast region. These phenomena are strengthened by the support of government elites, public figures, Malay religious and cultural elites, and even academics among the Malays.

As a social space, the West Kalimantan North Coast area is not a monolithic and homogeneous space. The habitus emerging from this social space cannot be said to be formed from a single, linear source, the Malays from the past until the present, which has developed into plural and dynamic forms, crossing ethnic boundaries, affecting the formation of the habitus itself. Thus, the inner working of the Malay ethnicity is, in fact, not a steady thing free from Chinese structural influence.

One of the arguments supporting this is, for example, the variation in language usage in public spaces, where the Malay's communication dialectic—an indication of its acceptance of Chinese existence—is always based on differences in age and social status, as well as ethnic orientation, as a basis of 'respect.' The age difference context can be seen in the usage of the words *ko*, *nyah*, *moy* and *buk* that can be observed in communications between Malays and Chinese. These words are used as a pronoun for either elders or youths, with *ko*, *nyah* as a term that indicates the one addressed as older than the addressing them.

Another meaning can be seen in the usage of language reflecting social status differences. Sellers are often considered “lower” in status, as in a transaction, the buyers are “kings” whose wishes should be served, as seen in phrases like: *Yo.. baju terus eee, daster ken ye urang eee..*, or : *Ade buk, bentar i, aku ambeknye dolok*. This choice of language used between the buyer (a Malay) and the seller (a Chinese), is related to the fact that ethnicity is also a factor in language choice. The Chinese use Chinese language(s) to show their identity, like: *Kalau bise dah di kasik buk, modal dak sampai, 50 lah buk*. Or the phrase: *Udah lah, ngai kasik nyi 40 lah*. This choice of vocabulary also shows that inter-ethnic orientation is also a reason behind the choice of language variation, even if the Malays are majority.

This Malay acceptance of Chinese existence in social and economic fields, is also gradually spreading to the political field. This can be seen in the Chinese success in putting some of them in the parliament of Sambas Regency and Singkawang City, which cannot happen without support among the Malays. In fact, factually the Chinese has successfully become the ruling elite, proving an equality of opportunity and reproducing the public social spaces. In this context, the Malays have to either willingly or unwillingly converts their social and cultural capital into political capital, if they don't want to continue to be eroded from power struggle in public spaces.

Understanding and interpreting the Malay ethnicity's endurance and its elements is important as part of a strategy of preservation amidst the “assaults” of the Chinese. Logically, it has to be acknowledged that in several areas, such as Pemangkat and Singkawang, the symbols of Chinese “dignity” has been cleverly etched into the creation of cultural and power symbols, a manifestation of Malay acceptance and tolerance. Meanwhile, the Chinese continues to recreate their identity from their ancestral culture to show their position in public spaces, as seen in the sparkles of lanterns during Imlek celebration and Tatum shows during Cap Go Meh rituals.

In principle, all actions taken by Malays towards Chinese people are based on openness and friendliness. This Malay friendliness is a part of their collective identity, even though its implementations might vary. A change in identity will also cause a change in ethnic identity, thus the bond between Malays and Chinese is also based on mutual needs, due to their differences. This change of identity might happen when the Malays are faced with a majority Chinese position (as in Singkawang City). The Malays would reproduce the Chinese behavior, so that they can be equal to them, for example by being able to speak Chinese, and understanding their customs and culture.

The Chinese actualizes both the habitus and praxis as an articulation to seize the social space from Malay openness and friendliness. The praxis is produced through dialectic interaction between the Chinese and Malays. The movement of Chinese habitus is determined by the openness of Malays, and this is not a new thing for the Chinese, who practiced it to achieve dominance in social, cultural, economic, and even political fields, who has been looking for an opportunity for that from the time they were invited to Sambas Sultanate until the Dutch colonial government made them the the “2nd class ethnicity” in Dutch East Indies.

As a group slowly being dominated, labeled as an open and polite society, the Malays creatively use their cultural assets as political capital to face the Chinese, as well resist them in order to show their existence in the contest arena. This is what Mabnag Proyagi (M. Bilal), a Malay figure in Singkawang City Kota Singkawang, means when he said the Chinese living among the Malays are “lucky”, especially if the Malays are Muslims who are always urged by customs and ethics to live in tolerance.

This awareness about the importance of a clear identity and a desire to be valued properly in the field of politics, spurs the creation of several independent associations, either based on ethnicity or religion. For example, FPI in Singkawang aims to accommodate the demands of Malays/Muslims in their various cultural activities. The creation of these associations is—possibly—as a strategy to wind the contest in the field of politics. According to this FPI figure, the Malay resistance towards Chinese is an effort to restore their dignity and image that are continuously defended in Sambas Regency, but “rises and falls” in Singkawang City.

Once again, the Malays in West Kalimantan North Coast region are facing a difficult challenge in restoring their glory days during Sambas Sultanate's era. The habitus in the arena of struggle becomes the deciding factor in the Malay society's structure in facing the formerly-considered migrants Chinese, who are now becoming increasingly dominant and controls strategic resources. It can be seen that the Malays are trying to restore their dignity and prestige, which had been until now internalized into their daily life, as a basic structure for their behaviors. The religious elements, particularly Islam which is associated with Malay, has given them a special color and image in the rules of their cultural structure.

With the strengthening consciousness concerning the importance of dignity in a structured social structure, the Malays in Sambas Regency are still rather powerful in the power relations, although the same cannot be said for their brothers in Singkawang. There, the Malays become a slowly marginalized ethnicity, leaving the Chinese majority as the dominant group, the “decider” of harmony and/or integration between the various groups in society. There, the dominant Singkawang Chinese is always trying to create and maintain an equilibrium to avoid conflict, and ensure that even if a conflict happens, it will only lead to greater order in the social structure that it has dominated.

One of the attempts done by the dominant Chinese to avoid conflicts with the Malays, is based on their understanding of the Malays' character. Facing the relatively hardline Pemangkat Malays, they hope for an appearance of a “bilateral” or neutral leader, who is impartial and wise. They would keep supporting the leadership of these kinds of figure, such as Kasful Anwar, the Village Chief of Pemangkat. He stated that:

There is a good openness between the Malays and Chinese in Pemangkat. The ethnic and religious tolerance here is very good, they both protect and even intermingle and discuss with one another, and converse in the coffee shops without discrimination. However, there is one rather sad thing that I observed, lately the Chinese existence here is declining, particularly in the economic aspect. People's decreasing income, which leads to weakening purchasing power, means that Chinese businesses now is only enough for minimum sustenance. Many of them prefer, and some have actually moved to Jakarta, because the economic situation there is better, and they already have business relations—friends and families—that allow them to succeed in Jakarta. Thus, lately Pemangkat is becoming depopulated. So, it's hard to imagine the Chinese trying to dominate Pemangkat, particularly right now.

What the Pemangkat village chief said here indicates that in several areas of the West Kalimantan North Coast region, such as Singkawang and Pemangkat, there is a legacy of acceptance, a consequence of Malays' openness towards the Chinese with whom they have been forging social interactions dynamically for a long time. There is a perceived difference in this dynamization of relations in social interactions, based on the information obtained from Andre, a Singkawang City resident who is known to have been a campaign team member that helped Tjhai Chui Mie became the Mayor of Singkawang. He stressed that in principle, there is a culture of exclusivity among the Chinese towards the Malays' openness towards them. This Chinese exclusivity continues to widen the gap of social interactions between the 2 ethnic groups. Furthermore, the Chinese have been prejudiced against the Malays, who they viewed as “rude/rough” and always cause them losses when they, the Chinese, are positioned lower or equal to the Malays. This is why the Chinese always try to be superior over the Malays, in order to soften their “roughness” until they accept wholeheartedly the Chinese existence through economic, political, and even cultural superiority, particularly in Singkawang City.

2. Rejection of Chinese Ethnicity

The Malay life in the West Kalimantan North Coast region, which is always in contact with the social sphere, particularly in relation to the Chinese, which is always dynamic. The “rise and fall” of social interactions between the 2 ethnic groups have been based on economic and political interests since the beginning, because both their cultural and religious types show a clear difference. The Malays place Islam as the

basic philosophy of their life, symbolized by the rule of Sambas Sultanate, interacting and contesting with the Chinese, who hold their ancestral traditions and beliefs in high regards, making the structural dialectic between the 2 groups more interesting to be studied from the behavioral aspects.

The Chinese-Malay relations cannot be separated from Malay stereotypes of the Chinese, even those that they dislike, such as, the Chinese preference for settling among themselves, separate from the rest of the community, as seen in the case of most of the Chinese in West Kalimantan North Coast area, specifically in Bengkayang Regency's area, such as in Teluk Suak. Kazim stated that:

Here in Teluk Suak, they (Chinese) are deeply immersed in Chinese language(s). Since the old times, Dutch era, they're rather "fierce". Pirates, champions. Perhaps because it's the coast. Even teachers here complains about how the students are very "Chinese", because their Indonesian is bad. Di Teluk Suak itu mereka berbahasa Cinanya cukup kental. The same is true for Batu Payung area, also dominated by Chinese. In the past, our parents thought they (the Chinese) were not nationalistic enough.

What is stated by this informant is pretty reasonable, as Apa yang dikemukakan informan tersebut kiranya beralasan, as doubts about the Chinese loyalty to Indonesia was a common sentiment in the past, and some even thought that these Chinese actually really hated Indonesia.¹²⁵ Concerning these Chinese, it seems that the Malays understand the reality and the social, economic, cultural, and religious practices according to objective structures. For example, they are always trying to put their dignity, already internalized into their lives as a habitus that becomes their basic structure for behavior. Their culture, infused with Islamic teachings and values that respect the immigrants as guests, make them hope that the Chinese could respect their (the Malays) position as the ruling group, following the principle, "dimana bumi dipijak, disitu langit dijunjung."

This internal principles of the Malays must be respected by the Chinese, who were in that time considered as immigrants, specifically invited by the Sambas

¹²⁵These Chinese did not really identify themselves as Indonesians wholeheartedly. They're just pretending, because their actions shown an opportunistic attitude, particularly in identifying with the nation and state of Indonesia. This characteristic opportunistic attitude towards the nation and state is mainly connected with money and their businesses. They're not like other Indonesians who are dedicated. In the colonial era, they were given a good position, so that they could dominate Indonesia's economy, mainly by oppressing the natives and preventing the growth of native entrepreneurs. They don't like the majority natives and tend to commit economic subversions; thus they are masters of bribery and smuggling. Coppel, Charles. 1983. *Indonesian Chinese in Crisis*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Pres. Page 5.

Sultanate as miners. The proverb, “tamudalah istimewa” (the guest is special) must be appreciated as a value, and the immigrants must also realize their position as outsiders. This principle opens a room for the Chinese to “maneuver politically”, using the disguised-as-economic vehicle-only Chinese *kongsis*.¹²⁶

The dialectic and flexibility of the Chinese, who were starting to restructure their lives to better fulfill their interests, interacting and intermingling with anyone, including Dayaks and the Dutch colonials, placed them as the “main” competitor of the Malays, particularly in the economic/trade sector. According to Nasrullah, Chinese traders in Tebas Subregency have attempted to ruin their Malay counterparts, by setting their prices extremely low, in order to drive buyers to the Chinese and away from the Malays. After the Malay traders suffered losses, declines, and even bankruptcies due to lack of capital, the Chinese traders would restore the prices to its more stable position.

This typical trade politics of the Chinese traders is relatively effective in killing the entrepreneurship spirit of the Malay traders, preventing them from growing into large traders. This trade politics, based on the Chinese competitiveness—due to larger capital and control of distribution lines—in the economic/trade sectors, ended up becoming an “overadapted adaptation”, creating an “exclusive trade culture” wrapped in capital hegemony in order to strengthen their “self pride” of their trading prowess, aggrandizing themselves as economic rulers of every city center in West Kalimantan North Coast area, amidst the local Malay society and power.

The creation of trading *kongsis* by successful Chinese migrants in the West Kalimantan North Coast region in the past, not only drew the Dayaks away from Malays, but 2nd level citizens in the Dutch colonial administration, below the Europeans and above the 3rd-level citizen Malays. They obtained glory through the

¹²⁶The Hakka, known for their resilience and independent-mindedness, could release themselves from traditions and accept new ideas for life more easily. Thus, it's not surprising that the Hakka were relatively faster in adopting Western ideas and combining them into Hakka culture, compared to other Chinese. The bitterness of life they experienced made it easier for them to be revolutionary, more progressive, and more eager to come forward and demand reforms; many of the pioneers of reformations in modern China are Hakka. This Hakka flexibility in absorbing new ideas, makes them a unique ethnic group in modern Chinese history. It's not a coincidence that the largest Chinese rebellion in the 19th century, the Taiping Rebellion, the bloodiest rebellion in human history, was masterminded by a Hakka. This historical tendency was then continued by Hakkas in West Kalimantan, who founded the Lanfang “Republic” in 1777-1884. This “republic” went to war against the Dutch colonial power twice, in 1854-1856 and 1914-1916, these wars are called “Perang Kenceng/Kenceng War” by the people of West Kalimantan. Supriyadi, Yohanes. 2008. *Akademi Dayak. Cina dalam Dayak: Potret Inkulturasinya di kalangan Dayak Mempawah-kalimantan Barat*. Delivered in Kongres Kebudayaan Kalimantan Barat (25-27/8-2018). <http://yohanespriyadi.blogspot.com>.

kongsis in dominating the trading sector, resisting the Malay power through Sambas Sultanate.

What the Chinese is currently doing with their current trade politics, is basically the same thing as reconstructing the trading dominance of the *kongsis* against the trade monopoly attempts of Sambas Sultanate. Their assimilation and acculturation with the Dayaks made it safe for the Chinese to “seek shelter” in the customs and traditions of the Dayaks as a strategy, by adopting the principles of brotherhood in their daily lives.¹²⁷ In this matter, they were and currently are reflecting on their identity behind the rituals built. Through their cultural contests, the Chinese hope that a new mechanism would emerge to be used as an internal revision tool, not only of their own culture, but also an antidote for their enduring interactions “against” Malay existence.

The common customs and rituals of the Chinese and Dayaks in the celebration of Chinese holidays, such as Imlek and Cap Go Meh through Tatum performance can be seen as an identity strategy, as well as improving the ties between them, which is almost like they have fused completely. Through the metaphor of “brotherhood” applied to the Dayaks, a cultural construction was created where the term is not only interpreted literally, but can also interpreted as, “a common desire to compete” against the social, economic, and political power entity that is the Malays.¹²⁸

Here, we see the Malays and Chinese/Dayaks competing against one another for power, with the Malays on one side with their authorities, and the Chinese supported by their Dayak “brothers” on the other side. This shows that the Chinese have managed to be equal to and demonstrate their existence to the Malays, at least to

¹²⁷The Dayaks refers to the Chinese as “sobat” (best friend), while the Chinese refers to the Dayaks as “darat” (land) and occasionally *Laci*, which means “descendants”; *La* means “child”, and *Ci* means “person” or “descendants”. The result of intermarriage of Dayak (men) with Chinese (women) are called *Pantokng*, while the result of Chinese (men) – Dayak (women) intermarriage are called *Pantongla*. Supriyadi, Yohanes. 2008. *Ibid*.

¹²⁸The Hakka are known for their strong trading culture. They have also experienced life as a migrant, so the solidarity among the Chinese miners are really strong—One of the factors explaining the power of Chinese *kongsis* in the past. Furthermore, this migrant wave of tens of thousands of people from China was the largest wave since the entry of Chinese into West Kalimantan in the 13th century. After the *kongsis* became stronger, some of the Chinese intermarried with locals, particularly Dayaks, and they were the ones who pioneered the culture of farming and agriculture in most of the West Kalimantan area. Since the era of the *kongsis*, the Chinese started to spread to various parts of West Kalimantan. Head Lecturer of Faculty of Social and Political Sciences in Untan Pontianak, Syarif Ibrahim Alqadrie, stated that there are several Chinese communities that are very strong economically, because they are very solid. Kompas.com. 2011. *News: Monterado Awal Mula China di Kalbar*. (1/2-2011). <https://nasional.kompas.com>.

the point that they are acknowledged in the Malays' internal structure in West Kalimantan North Coast region, so the image of Chinese as newcomers is slowly erased and replaced by a new image as locals.

The Chinese struggle in achieving equality is not easy, because rejection after rejection keeps happening. This rejection can still be felt even now, such as the Malays' refusal to allow Chinese to settle among them, because of their trauma about the Chinese involvements in PGRS/Paraku activities. This refusal also occurs in several regions, in order to protect them from the “power” of the Chinese. This refusal is not only based on economic reasons, but also a fallout of the September 30 Movement, which caused “security troubles” in the villages, causing a “migration wave” of Chinese people.

In that time, the occurrence of “security troubles”, besides triggering a wave of refugee to the cities, also caused a limitation of the Chinese's mobility. Several of the subregencies in Sambas Regency was declared closed for the Chinese, and the Chinese were observed, particularly those who came from outside the subregencies. Meanwhile, the authorities issued 3 new rules to control the migration waves: (1) Moving all Chinese families, especially those who showed indications of involvement in PGRS, from the northern and western areas of Sambas River to Sambas City and the western area of Sambas Besar River; (2) Moving all Chinese, particularly those who lived in the northern areas of Serali and Pimpinan rivers from Telok Keramat to Sekura City; and (3) The Chinese living in Pemangkat surveillance area, particularly those living in Kampung Bersih, Sekaduk and Serindung, were to be moved to be near the large roads, in order to simplify surveillance.

During this entire moving process, all their houses were taken apart and moved to the determined locations. However, they were still allowed to work on their fields, but they must return from the fields to their houses by 19.00 WIB everyday. People who wanted to enter or lived temporarily there must obtain a special permit, which was typically only given for 3 x 24 hours period, and each of the permits must be shown to the authorities.¹²⁹

¹²⁹Until 3 February 1973, it was recorded that 9.154 Chinese people, or 1.384 families have been moved to the determined locations. Until the issuing of the Decree (SK) of Special Execution of Commander of Security Restoration Command West Kalimantan Region, 26 November 1972 about closed surveilled territory, it was recorded that 93.273 people have been moved, excluding those considered refugees. From these 93.273 people, 50.694 (54,4%) were moved to Singkawang, 12.681 (13,6%) to Sungai Raya, 10.650 (11,4%) to Jawai, 7.280 (8,4%) to Selakau, 7.497 (8,0%) to Sambas, 2.164 (2,3%) to Teluk Keramat and 767 (1,9%) were moved

Realizing that they, as Chinese, had experienced and will experience rejections by the Malays, they always build strategies and utilize their capital to win the economic and political contests, as well as to negotiate in social and cultural matters. Concerning this, Bong Wei Khong stated:

One thing that must be understood is increasing intelligence. Why have the Chinese, for generations, avoided ethnic conflicts, because among other things, (the Chinese) still follow the will of Sultans of Sambas, still intermingling with others. We're all servants of God. If we realize that, why must we quarrel. As a Chinese proverb said, "Wait for a while, ocean waves and winds will be calm; step back half a step, the weather clears, clouds disappear." The Chinese elders understand that. Finding friends is hard, so keep them.

As Bong Wei Khong stated above, the Chinese efforts are part of a strategy to achieve a proper inter-ethnic relations, despite the fact that the Malays have realized that every interrelation with the Chinese is based on interests, whether economic or political, in order for the Chinese to be equal to or even prevail over the Malays, who are now merely "competitors, or obstacles", even if they need to start from the very bottom, to avoid and overcome Malay resistance, which can happen anytime.

This leads the Malays, such as Andre, to state that the harmony in Singkawang is fake, because every Chinese-Malay interaction is loaded with suspicions. However, for now the Malays are still the majority in Sambas Regency, and their existence is still recognized by the Chinese-majority communities in Singkawang City and Pematangkat. Nasrullah also shares Andre's worry, speculating that in the future, Malay – Chinese relations might not just be about economic competition, but also a power struggle conflict. On one hand, the Chinese, with their economic prosperity and freedom feel that they deserve to rule, while on the other hand, the Malays feel that the West Kalimantan North Coast region is their homeland, thus no one else should have authority over it without the Malays' "blessing".

All of this shows that the Chinese is a societal group whose existence cannot be ignored in Singkawang City, and even the West Kalimantan North Coast region in general, due to their values that stresses the importance of dignity, of both themselves and their ancestors—seen in their increasingly more expansive recent diaspora. They continuously devise strategies of interaction and capital allocation, to ensure that their

to Paloh. Poerwanto, Hari. 2014. *Loc Cit.* Page 181.

position continue to improve, and not pressured or marginalized by local Malay rejections.¹³⁰

3. Threats to Chinese Existence

The Malays as a native ethnic group in the West Kalimantan North Coast region should have continued to learn and interpret history, so that they can answer the current pressure of the Chinese culture, currently strengthening, even expanding in the dynamics of socio-cultural, economic, and political contests, as a result of their mobility. Revitalization of Malay culture amidst this cultural heterogeneity is still needed, especially due to the vibrant cultural life and material wealth of the Chinese. This rapid cultural advance and achievements of the Chinese is clearly a threat to the Malays.

The Malays of West Kalimantan North Coast region must demonstrate their ability to “renegotiate” their cultural position, along with reviving their collective consciousness with all their powers. Reawakening this Malay dignity, built since the era of Sambas Sultanate, a crystallization of the values governing life and social norms, include reminding the migrant ethnic groups, particularly the Chinese, to realize and understand the core of the Islam-infused Malay cultural values.

The strength of the Chinese culture, which has passed a long journey through space and time, abstracted in its cultural value orientation, is a rather resilient and durable culture, which can survive natural selection and cultural competitions through contextual modifications. The Chinese can emerge as an “identity”, in the “homeland” of Sambas Malays, as well as “Chinafy” parts of the Malay area by upholding the values of appreciation, obedience, and tolerance. This model employed by the

¹³⁰The national political developments changes situation in the local level. In West Kalimantan, the reformation era opens the door for the Chinese to more easily express their ethnic identity. This group, which prefers to be called, “Tionghoa” celebrates Imlek and various other festivals in large scale, by performing Barongsai and Liong for example. They founded the Chinese Ethnicity Communication Forum (Foket). Furthermore, it also opens the door for the Chinese to participate in politics. They allied with the Dayaks to form political parties, resulting in the election of several Chinese politicians as members of the regional parliaments, both on provincial and municipal levels. Besides that, through their high-level bargaining, they managed to place their representatives in MPR, and by taking advantage of a Dayak internal conflict, in the end of 2003 a Chinese became Sanggau's regent. In the following years, the Chinese socio-political moves became more massive. In 2006, they founded the Chinese Customs and Culture Assembly (MABT), a provincial level organization. Even with pressures and challenges from some Malays, this organization continues to thrive and proclaim its ethnic identity. They, as the Chinese, also respond and stated that the Chinese are also part of the locals, the third ethnic group of locals, spreading the concept that the Dayaks, Malays, and Chinese are “brothers”. Supriyadi, Yohanes. 2010. *Identitas Kelompok Cina, Perubahan Politik dan Dinamikanya di Kalimantan Barat*. Akademi Dayak. <http://yohanessupriyadi.blogspot.com>.

Chinese is viewed as relatively effective in avoiding conflict with the Malays, because its basic values are integration, as applied to familial values; the Dayaks are “brothers” of the Chinese, and they are both threats to the Malay existence.

This materialistic life orientation of the Chinese, combined with their obedience to ancestral customs and traditions always become a sign in building their awareness to revise its structures, as well as a gate to their cultural revival. This revitalized ancestral traditions is then used as a weapon by the Chinese culture to place the Malays into a “respected” position, according to their openness and friendliness, which unwittingly placed the Chinese into a superior, dominant position. In other words, the Chinese cultural existence and struggle against the Malays are not done “haphazardly”, but based on the individual/group interests of the Malays, in order to promote a Chinese cultural construction based on common spirit, with Malay community's support.

One implication of the Chinese immigration for the Malays is the marginalization of the Malay position culturally, economically, and politically. Gradually, the Malays in certain areas, such as Pemangkat and Singkawang slowly turn into “guests”, as their population and land ownership continue to decline, vis-a-vis the Chinese. This change is obviously a threat to the Malays, happening simultaneously with changes and shocks to the basic values on which the Malay life are based.

The Sambas Sultanate is symbolized as an exclusive right of the Sambas Malay aristocracy, who as the uppermost social class in society, should have born a large leadership responsibility. However, nowadays power is no longer exclusively in their hands, but slowly shifting economically and politically to the Chinese, as seen in several cities in the West Kalimantan North Coast region.

These political, social, and economic pressures felt by all of the Malay community, is among other things, caused by the increasing power of the Chinese life and culture, the most serious challenge to the Malays. This is because the Malays are not only facing the strength of Chinese cultural mentality and work spirit, but also the Chinese's assimilation and acculturation “brothers”, the Dayaks, who wholeheartedly support the Chinese hegemony.

This fear of a strengthening “threat” from the Chinese in the West Kalimantan North Coast region as a Malay “land”, might cause or already caused a “culture war”, where the Chinese political and economic power attempted attacks and “soft terrors” towards the principles and elements of the Malay culture, which are intimately connected to Islam as a basis of their resilience. These attacks can be felt now, as the Malays are deceived and distanced from Islamic beliefs, so that the Chinese can realize their desire to control them.

In the context of this war, the attackers depend on political authority, which the Chinese has started wresting from the Malays; using this authority to subtly impose new cultures and beliefs to displace old cultures, or even—maybe—beliefs held by the Malays. This might have already happened, because this kind of cultural war is silent, with no overt attention-grabbing actions. This is what Bong Wei Khong was attempting to do, with his opinion on gambling:

Gambling is defined by the laws as any luck-based game with real money at stake. So, not all of them are negative, as long as it's not criminal. Remember, this republic has a history of gambling. Ali Sadikin legalized gambling to build Jakarta. In Soeharto's era, (the government) opened Porkas, SDSB, etc., no problem. In China, Olympics (gambling) was no problem. Same with Malaysia in Genting. It's just the same thing with golf; people lobbied the officials, hush-hush, no difference. The Chinese view gambling as a pastime; bring a suitcase of money, spend it for fun, as long as it doesn't cause crimes. The bad thing is if we're forcing ourselves to gamble; refusing to work, hoping to earn money from gambling; that's the problem. Now in Indonesia gambling is forbidden, so our people go to Singapore to gamble. We lost, because the (gambling's) taxes go to Singapore's coffers, we can only stand and watch.

These methods of “conquest” through arguments become one of the cause of concerns by several Malay figures in Sambas Regency, such as the Head of Singkawang City FPI, because these arguments: (1) Weaken people's faith on their religion; (2) Sever them from conviction on Islamic principles; and (3) Distance them from effective thoughts that can produce a great, noble power and drive them to a state of fear and threats.

These signs of “cultural war” bring back to mind the cultural policies of the Dutch colonial government. In that time, the Dutch performed a two-pronged attack: First, they destroyed the native economy and the native political and cultural networks, so that they could be easily manipulated against each other (*divide et impera*/divide and rule). At the same time, the Dutch and their immigrant Chinese

allies spread the stigmas that the natives are lazy, dirty, wasteful, not fit for work, “*pan nyin*” (half-men), etc., which after hundreds of years have become myths.

These Dutch colonial government-fabricated myths, such as the term “*pan nyin*” as a term the Chinese used for Malays, are nowadays viewed by the communities in Sungai Raya Subregency, Bengkayang Regency as no longer a problem, because it is no longer politically-loaded or indicates a disinteraction between Chinese and Malays. Kazim stated:

During our childhood, we did quarrelled with the Chinese a lot, but it's not a big deal. Since the Malay-Chinese relations here are more fluid, insults like “*pan nyin*” is normal for us. The Chinese also refers to the Madurese as “*bu nyin*” (black men), the Dayaks as “*laci*”, and the Chinese themselves as “*tong nyin*” which means “sweet men” (sic), with “*tong*” meaning “sugar” (sic), and “*nyin*” meaning “man”.¹³¹ But these terms are not a problem, and we're still using these words as part of our daily vocabulary. Just as the Malays called a type of fish as ‘ikan buto Cine (blind Chinese fish)’, which the Chinese don't find as a problem.

As stated above, social interaction between the Chinese and Malays has already happened intensively, shown in how their daily vocabulary reflects the normality of their interaction. The Chinese's ‘creativity’ in ingratiating themselves to the Malays through this symbols of ethnic terms in their language, rather than locking both the Chinese and Malays into their own personal myths, have strengthened their familial bonds and networks with the Malays, especially in Sungai Raya, Bengkayang.

According to Bong Wei Khong, it needs to be clarified that the actual term is not “*pan nyin*”, but “*fan nyin*”, with “*fan*” meaning “immigrant”. So, the Chinese are also “*fan nyin*”, as they are also immigrants. Despite this contextualization of language terms, H. Mujahidin, a Sambas public figure stated that the Chinese often acted hegemonically in the contests over resources against other ethnic groups, particularly Malays. The Chinese existence can still be considered as capitalistic, which can be felt easily because they often occupy economically strategic positions in West Kalimantan North Coast region, the so-called *taukes*; which they had occupied since a long time. In the Dutch colonial era, who created a massively profitable and exploitative government structure, in which the Chinese also participated by aligning themselves with the Dutch, gaining them a privileged position as 2nd class citizens

¹³¹As stated before in footnote 10, “*tong*” is more likely to refer to the old Tang Dynasty.

(above the 3rd class natives), loan sharks, and even armed pressure towards the locals/natives.

This example is what makes Erwin Saputra, a Pemangkat public figure worries that in the future, the West Kalimantan North Coast region would be ruled by migrant groups, including the Chinese, as the Malays find it hard to escape their “fake” life condition to defend the Malay dignity in their own land, for their own good. This also brings to mind the thoughts of Chairil Effendi, and academic and Malay public figure in West Kalimantan, concerning his worried about the perfecting of a “grand design” of improving inter-ethnic life, which emerged in the start of 20th century, through intellectual movements such as Boedi Utomo. However, the First Youth Congress of 1926, then the Sumpah Pemuda 1928, and finally the revolution which brought us the proclamation of independence, have not succeeded in building a proper cultural strategy to fulfill it. Soekarno, who came from the cultural environment of interior Java, was too self-absorbed. He was tinkering around with big ideologies, syncretizing nationalism, Islam, and communism into “Nasakom”, to the point that he forgot the fundamental matter of the young nation. As he was absorbed in speeches filled with anti-Western jargon, his bureaucrats continued the exploitative practices left by the Dutch.

This moral decadence of Soekarno era was portrayed by Mochtar Lubis in the novel “Senja di Jakarta”, and then put under the microscope by Ki Panji Kusmin in the controversial short story “Langit Makin Mendung”, which used the 'mental facts' (mentifacts) and 'social facts' (sociofacts) as a “screen” reflecting the era's problems. Things were made worse by Soeharto, who also came from the same background. With his “Kraton Solo”-blooded “queen”, he was obsessed in turning Indonesia into a reflection of the past great Javanese kingdoms, whose territories encompass a large part of Southeast Asia, as symbolized by the launch of Palapa I satellite, where Soeharto put a kris on his forehead, then pointed it upwards, emulating Gajah Mada's Palapa Oath. Soeharto also copied the political dualism of Javanese kingdoms: *kuta mawa tata, desa mawa cara* (The capital makes the rules, the regional governments follow the capital's rules).

During his reign, Soeharto ruled like a king, receiving tributes from the “colonies/satellites”, giving instructions and blessings to his underlings, and stratified

the Indonesian language, stripping it of its original egalitarian, Malay character. As long as his throne was not threatened, he gave no attention to the actions of his henchmen, who in turn became regional petty kings. Once again, the bureaucra elits and the Chinese formed a sophisticated network of cronyism and exploitation wrapped in various laws and rules “legalizing” it.

Thus the Malays' worries concerning their status in the West Kalimantan North Coast region, where the Chinese and their capitalist-elite style of “power grab” which can easily seize control of this “comedy” of “theater state”; a comedy where the Chinese serve as puppetmasters, while the Malays are the puppets—primed to be ‘stomped on’ and the silenced spectators.

CHAPTER V

CHINESE – MALAY RELATIONSHIP: BETWEEN REJECTION AND ACCEPTANCE

A. Respondent Characteristics

The discourse of the social interaction between the acceptance and rejection “attitudes” keeps being discussed. These “attitudes” cannot be separated from the acknowledgement of the economic, social, political, cultural, and religious interests. On one hand, the Malays view—explicitly and implicitly—that “Once a Chinese, always a Chinese”, even if they have lived and settled in the West Kalimantan North Coast region for a long time, giving the sense that there is still a distance between them. On the other hand, the improving Chinese existence in various sectors gradually strengthens their belief that today the Chinese and Malays are equal, even if they are still plagued with ethnic stereotype problems and differing historical backgrounds. The need to encourage tolerant attitudes makes the struggle of interests between the two groups an interesting story of inter-ethnic interactions, filled with competition for hegemony.

The ethnic competition between the Chinese and Malays can be felt in the contextualization of their solidarity in the effort to obtain recognition in various aspects of life. What the Chinese want is obviously also what the Malays want. Identifying the wants of both ethnic groups is not easy, particularly in measuring their desires from the social interactions forged up to now, from the standards of their own wants and needs. The quality of social interaction in these various fields will be hard to identify, when the efforts to reach those interests are still oriented to ethnic primordialism. Thus, a quantitative measurement, at the very least a percentage-based measurement of the acceptance and rejection “attitudes” between Chinese and Malays of West Kalimantan North Coast region, is needed.

Efforts to investigate the interests and expectations in the Chinese-Malay life together need to be done more closely. There are several methods that can be done to know the Chinese and Malay people more closely, such as through aspects of their backgrounds and characteristics, such as:

1. Occupation
2. Age
3. Sex
4. Ethnicity

These difference in characteristics between each respondent will give them different judgements and views concerning the rejection or acceptance between the Chinese and Malays in the West Kalimantan North Coast region. A more through explanation about these respondent characteristics can be seen below.

1. Occupation

The respondents' occupations are quite varied; a lot of them are farmers, fishers, entrepreneurs, traders, private employees, laborers, politicians, and the rest are civil servants. This variance of respondent occupation in this research is in order to ensure an accurate picture of the common opinion, based on the previously agreed procedure.

The respondents' contributions in answering the survey are viewed as an investment, in the belief that it will help a better dynamization of Chinese – Malay relations. The respondents' classification based on their occupations can be seen in Table V.1 below:

Table V.1

RESPONDENTS BASED ON OCCUPATION

No	Occupation	Respondents (Amount)	Percentage (%)
1.	Farmer	18	18,00
2.	Fisher	17	17,00
3.	Entrepreneur	8	8,00
4.	Trader	17	17,00
5.	Laborer	15	15,00
6.	Private Employee	10	10,00
7.	Politician	5	5,00
8.	Civil Servant	10	10,00
Total		100	100,00

Source: Processed Data, 2018.

The research about the Chinese – Malay acceptance and rejection in the West Kalimantan North Coast region—as shown in Table V.1 with the total and percentages—involves 100 respondents, from both among the Chinese and the Malays. In principle, the ethnic and occupation differences and diversity are intrinsic parts of life. Being born as part of a particular ethnic group is the Creator's gift to an individual, while occupation is part of an individual's life choices, although some also view it as fate or a path of life that must be done for the achievement/fulfillment common good.

In this context, occupation is not related to social class or earnings at all, but only indicates the respondents' status concerning their participation in this research. Although it cannot be denied that “there might be a correlation” between ethnicity and occupation, where people of one ethnic group typically have certain occupations, like Malays being predominantly farmers and Chinese being predominantly traders, in reality, both groups have spread to all occupation sectors, thus they can no longer be distinguished through this aspect analytically.

2. Age

Age affects an individual's physical and mental conditions, and their responsibilities in life dynamics in various fields of life, whether inside their ethnic group or in inter-ethnic relations. Younger respondents are generally more physically fit, dynamic, creative, and productive, but also tend to be quickly bored, less responsible, and quick to react on things that catch their attention. Meanwhile the older respondents tend to be less physically fit, but more resilient and responsible, as well as having more insight and experience.

The respondents' classification based on age can be seen in Table V.2 below:

Table V.2

RESPONDENTS BASED ON AGE

No	Age Group	Respondents (Amount)	Percentage (%)
1.	20 – 24	2	2,00
2.	25 – 29	11	11,00
3.	30 – 34	19	19,00
4.	35 – 39	23	23,00
5.	40 – 44	15	15,00
6.	45 – 50	15	15,00
7.	51 and over	15	15,00
Total		100	100,00

Source: Processed Data, 2018.

Respondent quantification based on age—as in Table V.2 above—is rather varied. Age is a biological fact, whose characteristics impact various social interactions. Social conduct is also one of the characteristics that reflect age and differentiate one age group from another. Age difference is closely connected with differences in viewpoint in inter-ethnic interactions. This happens because: (a) Interaction needs slowly changes, forcing every new generation to adjust, based on their views; and (b) At certain points, the needs and ability of interaction are different, between the current generation and their predecessors.

These 2 facts explain that age and generational differences among each ethnic groups are factors that cause special variations in questionnaire answers, along with the traditional ties in expressing their views. It cannot be denied that age informs behavior. Whatever the reasons, the dichotomy of “modern and ancient” and “young and old” are not monolithic formations, that can be easily separated between the “now” and the “future”. A dynamic social system interaction needs an ethnic attitude and resilience. Thus, an age variation among the respondents is needed in this research, because age difference causes differences in attitude and choices, even across generations.

3. Sex

Sex is a physical trait that can help in categorizing the respondents. In general, women tend to be more thorough and careful in expressing their attitudes and choices in answering about the matter of Chinese-Malay acceptance and rejection. In this research context, men and women's positions, ideologically and philosophically, are not focused on their domestic roles, but rather on how their sex affects their public roles, particularly in social, economic, political, cultural, and religious spheres.

There's an inaccurate view nowadays that, the more dominant the domestic roles are, the more marginalized the public roles would be. Even though the cultures of both ethnic groups—the Chinese and the Malays—are more expansive in the public spheres than the domestic. The appearance of a Chinese woman as Mayor of Singkawang shows that, as a woman she is not just an accessory in domestic life, but she already gains an equal position with other elites, making wider decisions and policies in inter-ethnic public sphere.

The respondents' classification based on their sex can be seen in Table V.3 below:

Table V.3

RESPONDENTS BASED ON SEX

No	Sex	Respondents (Amount)	Percentage (%)
1.	Man	60	60,00
2.	Woman	40	40,00
Total		100	100,00

Source: Processed Data, 2018.

Gender in sociological perspective refers to a collection of traits connected to an individual's sex and oriented to inform their social roles and identity in society. Sex—as meant by Table V.3 above—is mainly limited to a "role set" and their attitudes concerning the Chinese-Malay rejection and acceptance in the West Kalimantan North Coast region, usually based on the social life constructed among their communities.

The concept of gender meant here is the role of an individual's gender in their society, to recognize the socio-cultural context of their society. The respondents'

identity in this gender context is related to the society's ideology and knowledge, both the Chinese and Malays in West Kalimantan North Coast region, along with their identities.

4. Religion

Religion-based ethnic diaspora is becoming more widespread nowadays. This increasingly widens the distribution of inter-religion limits of tolerance, due to ethnic rivalry. As a result, the claims that a certain religion belongs to a certain ethnic group become stronger, increasing the worries that intolerant attitudes would grow and develop in the West Kalimantan North Coast region. This religion-based social categorization—shrouded in the shadow of ethnic rivalry—often happens in parallel and overlaps with other categorizations.

This reinforces the limits of social solidarity and groupings. The Chinese and Malays are 2 ethnic groups in West Kalimantan North Coast region with clear differences in religion and beliefs. The Chinese community is more of a closed community, which stresses their sociocultural similarity and unity, while the Malay community is a group of Muslims who stresses their sociohistoric aspects, as the group of rulers.

The respondents' classification based on their religion can be seen in Tabel V.4 below:

Table V.4

RESPONDENTS BASED ON RELIGION

No	Religion	Respondents (Amount)	Percentage (%)
1.	Islam	60	60,00
2.	Protestantism	4	4,00
3.	Catholicism	5	5,00
4.	Hinduism	0	0,00
5.	Buddhism	12	12,00
6.	Confucianism	19	19,00
7.	Other beliefs	0	0,00
Total		100	100,00

Source: Processed Data, 2018.

The ethnic relations in West Kalimantan North Coast region, particularly between majority-Muslim Malays on one hand and Chinese with various beliefs (mostly Confucian, but also includes Protestants, Catholics, or even Hindus and Buddhists) on the other hand, are both colored with mutual respect and appreciation, but is also ambivalent and fluctuating. Table V.4 shows that Malays—here represented with Islam—are the majority, compared to the various religions held by the Chinese. There is harmony, but also disharmony and conflict sometimes, such as the "Patung Naga" incident in Singkawang City, suspected to have religious-tinged motives. However, in principle, religion is not about exploiting conflict, and clearly not about sowing the roots of communal violence in their name. This research merely views the existence of religion among the two ethnic groups. The actualization of interactions between the Chinese and Malays might tend to be antagonistic, due to their respective religions.

5. Ethnicity

Ethnicity might be interpreted as something related to social groups in social systems, or meaningful cultures, or having special positions due to descent, customs, religion, languages, etc.¹³² Ethnicity in the context of this research, referring specifically to Chinese and Malay ethnic groups, refers to a relationship between groups whose members consider themselves different from others, and these groups are ranked hierarchically in the society. Thus, these 2 groups need to be differentiated clearly, whether socially, economically, politically, culturally, and religiously.

The respondents' classification based on their ethnicity can be seen in Table V.5 below:

Table V.5

RESPONDENTS BASED ON ETHNICITY

No	Ethnicity	Respondents (Amount)	Percentage (%)
1.	Chinese	40	40,00
2.	Malays	60	60,00
Total		100	100,00

Source: Processed Data, 2018.

¹³²Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia. 1989. Jakarta: Balai Pustaka. Page 237.

Both the Chinese and the Malays in the West Kalimantan North Coast region are quite experienced in the context of social interactions, particularly the Chinese, who from the colonial era until the modern Reformation era experienced various turmoils based on horizontal conflicts motivated by "concerns" about their discrimination, which is nowadays instead experienced by the Malays, whether in their social, economic, political, even cultural and religious lives. This ethnic composition of Chinese and Malays—as shown in Table V.5 above—is constructed based on the majority and quantity of their existence. dikonstruksi berdasarkan mayoritas dan kuantitas eksistensinya. These concerns often lead to Chinese-Malay conflicts, which might still be in the "invisible stage", an effect of the lack of their respective "imaginary communities" understanding towards their subjective communal culture, which is different traditionally and customarily.

B. Percentage Analysis of the "Acceptance and Rejection Attitudes in Chinese-Malay Social Interactions

The data analyzed here are obtained from questionnaires distributed to 100 respondents, or the descriptive quantitative methods. In order to simplify analysis and conclusion, the writes use variables, or more exactly partial aspects; which are: Economic, social, political, cultural, and religious aspects. The analysis results can be seen below.

1. Rejection and Acceptance from Economic Perspective

The Chinese-Malay existence in the West Kalimantan North Coast region until now can be said to be peaceful, although it is still not free of competition—particularly economic competitions. At a glance, it seems that the Chinese are always part of the well-off, even wealthy entrepreneurs. This description can be rejected, because the Chinese in the research area includes people of various occupations and socioeconomic status, from the lowest beggars to the highest owners of transnational corporations.

This variance in Chinese and Malay economic status is reflected in their answers to the 33 questions in the questionnaire concerning economic aspects of life. Although they held varying opinions and gave different answers, in general they (both

the Chinese and Malay respondents) answered the questions, and it can be concluded that there is an economic rejection of the Chinese by the Malays in the West Kalimantan North Coast region. Cumulatively, the answers show that the respondents do not really agree with the premise that the Chinese are accepted economically, only scoring 2,39 on average in a 1 to 4 scale, where 1 is non-agreement and 4 is strong agreement.

This cumulative results from the respondents' answers concerning the economic aspect/variable of this rejection, is based on one-sample test (binomial test), where: H_0 : There is no rejection of Chinese by Malays economically in the West Kalimantan North Coast region; and H_a : There is a rejection of Chinese by Malays economically in the West Kalimantan North Coast region. The binomial test performed can be seen in Table V.5 below:

Table V.5

ACCEPTANCE AND REJECTION OF CHINESE IN WEST KALIMANTAN NORTH
COAST REGION—
BASED ON ECONOMIC ASPECT

Binomial Test

		Category	N	Observed Prop.	Test Prop.
Economic	Group 1	<= 70	33	1.00	.50
	Total		33	1.00	

a. Based on Z Approximation.

Source: Processed Data from SPSS, 2018.

From this analysis, the conclusion would be: If $\text{Sig} > 0,05$ then H_0 is accepted; and if $\text{Sig} < 0,05$ then H_0 is rejected. As the Sig in this research is 0,000 (smaller than 0,05), H_0 is rejected. Thus, it can be concluded that economically, the Chinese are rejected by the Malays in the West Kalimantan North Coast region.

In reality, this economic rejection of the Chinese are still concealed and secret in nature, not yet a frontal and open rejection. Behind this rejection, there are still elements of acceptance, as for now the Chinese and Malays live alongside each other peacefully, in all their daily activities. In all economic activities, whether a trade of goods or services, there are still economic competitions between the 2 ethnic groups, so that it is the market selection of the consumers that will determine the existence of the 2 groups and their business.

This economic rejection can be viewed as a normal thing, because both sides continue to compete in business. This economic competition can help avoid economic dominance of certain parties or ethnic groups. This economic rejection of Chinese business presence is still happening in several parts of Sambas Regency, with its own reasons—as elaborated in the previous qualitative analysis.

This economic rejection of the Chinese, does not automatically lead to a clash in communities dominated by the Chinese, such as Singkawang City. In Singkawang for example, known as “City of 1000 *Kelenteng*”, which implies that the Chinese are economic hegemons—in the mold of European and American Jews—is actually rather far from the truth. The assumption that the Chinese are far removed from poverty is disproved by the condition of some Chinese in Singkawang, because poverty exists among all ethnic groups, whether Chinese, Malay, or even Dayak.

In Singkawang, Chinese people who worked as road sweepers, trash collectors, or even beggars and other low-status jobs can be found. These jobs are also experienced by members of other ethnic groups, including Malays. The worsening economic and business condition also make the Chinese “exhausted” in fulfilling their daily needs. Thus, this poverty problem also makes Singkawang, “often associated with prostitution”.

2. Rejection and Acceptance from Social Perspective

The social interaction between the Chinese and Malays in West Kalimantan North Coast region until now can be said to be dynamic. This dynamics of social interaction fluctuates continuously. The frictions of social interests and envy, do not automatically drive the 2 ethnic groups into communal conflicts—such as what happened between Malays and Madurese back in 1998. Here, both ethnic groups make an effort to maintain the important social values and norms in their coexistence. The view of Chinese as “migrants” slowly fades, as the Chinese themselves realize that “friends and families are ways to obtain wealth,” as stated by Bong Wei Khong as Head of Chinese Society of Culture and Customs (MABT) of Singkawang City. This might be rejected anytime the Malays view that the Chinese existence has

exceeded the limits of their tolerance, as reflected in the Malay philosophy, “dimana bumi dipijak, disitu langit dijunjung” (one must follow the norms of where they are).

The social interaction between Chinese and Malays are reflected in their answers to the 60 questions of the questionnaire concerning the social variable/aspect. Although they held varying opinions and gave different answers, in general they (both the Chinese and Malay respondents) answered the questions, and it can be concluded that there is a social rejection of the Chinese by the Malays in the West Kalimantan North Coast region. Cumulatively, the answers show that the respondents do not really agree with the premise that the Chinese are accepted socially, only scoring 2,33 on average in a 1 to 4 scale, where 1 is non-agreement and 4 is strong agreement.

This cumulative results from the respondents' answers concerning the social aspect/variable of this rejection, is based on one-sample test (binomial test), where: H_0 : There is no rejection of Chinese by Malays socially in the West Kalimantan North Coast region; and H_a : There is a rejection of Chinese by Malays socially in the West Kalimantan North Coast region. The binomial test performed can be seen in Table V.6 below:

Table V.6

ACCEPTANCE AND REJECTION OF CHINESE IN WEST KALIMANTAN NORTH
COAST REGION—
BASED ON SOCIAL ASPECT

Binomial Test

		Category	N	Observed Prop.	Test Prop.
Social	Group 1	<= 70	60	1.00	.50
	Total		60	1.00	

a. Based on Z Approximation.

Source: Processed Data by SPSS, 2018.

From this analysis, the conclusion would be: If $Sig > 0,05$ then H_0 is accepted; and if $Sig < 0,05$ then H_0 is rejected. As the Sig in this research is 0,000 (smaller than 0,05), H_0 is rejected. Thus, it can be concluded that socially, the Chinese are rejected by the Malays in the West Kalimantan North Coast region.

According to the Malays in the research area, this rejection is related with the fact that the Chinese tend to live only among themselves, closing themselves from

others—which is certainly motivated by some reasons for the Chinese. The Chinese feel the need to constantly avoid problems due to their adherence to the 8-way path, as stated by Bong Wei Khong. The Chinese follow their ideology strictly and are not interested in an endless blame game. The Chinese, Malays, and Dayaks have lived alongside each other since a long time, and they have adapted and understood the characteristics of each group.

The impression of rejection obtained from the analysis results does not preclude a partial acceptance, as the inter-ethnic relations are always dynamic, as stated by one theory of society, which is Parson's Structural – Functional Theory. This theory states that society must be viewed as a system composed of interconnected parts, that influence each other and reciprocally. In a society, social integration never happened perfectly, but it is fundamentally moving to a dynamic equilibrium. All the tensions and deviations will always happen, but in the long run they would resolve themselves through adjustments and institutionalization processes. Thus, change is viewed as a process of adaptation and adjustment, growing alongside differentiations and innovations integrated by adoption of compatible values.¹³³

The matter of acceptance and rejection is also closely connected with the importance of the roles and influence of public figures in the social processes in West Kalimantan North Coast region, because the communities there still follow a patriarchal culture, with “patron-client” models of relations. Public figures, whether religious or customary figures, are those viewed to have special status, whether ascribed (achieved through birth and/or descent, without considering physical and mental faculties), or achieved (status obtained through deliberate and hard work), which positioned them as “key persons”. They become informal leaders, whose voices are heard and obeyed by the communities. The societal views of societal problems, including the “hidden” social conflict between Malays and Chinese, cannot be separated from the personal views of these figures.

3. Rejection and Acceptance from Political Perspective

The political power transformation in the region is not free; it has to sacrifice important things, including wealth, body, and soul of the people. The economic wealth and socio-cultural diaspora of the Chinese, which strengthens their identity in

¹³³Nasikun. 1992. *Sistem Sosial Indonesia*. Jakarta: Rajawaliipress. Pages 11-12.

the Reformation era nowadays, turns out to not be accompanied with democratic improvement of the political system. Ethnicity and religion are often used politically by the local elites to increase their electability in legislative and executive elections, particularly in the West Kalimantan North Coast region.

This ethnic politics does not close the door for a minority ethnicity to appear as a leader in areas where they are locally dominant, such as the Chinese in Singkawang, in respect to the Malay-dominated West Kalimantan North Coast region. This reality implies that there is already an open rivalry between the Chinese and Malays politically, as reflected by the answers to the 26 questions of the questionnaire, concerning political aspect/variable. Although they held varying opinions and gave different answers, in general they (both the Chinese and Malay respondents) answered the questions, and it can be concluded that there is a political rejection of the Chinese by the Malays in the West Kalimantan North Coast region. Cumulatively, the answers show that the respondents do not really agree with the premise that the Chinese are accepted politically, only scoring 2,42 on average in a 1 to 4 scale, where 1 is non-agreement and 4 is strong agreement.

This cumulative results from the respondents' answers concerning the political aspect/variable of this rejection, is based on one-sample test (binomial test), where: H_0 : There is no rejection of Chinese by Malays politically in the West Kalimantan North Coast region; and H_a : There is a rejection of Chinese by Malays politically in the West Kalimantan North Coast region. The binomial test performed can be seen in Table V.7 below:

Table V.7

ACCEPTANCE AND REJECTION OF CHINESE IN WEST KALIMANTAN NORTH
COAST REGION—
BASED ON POLITICAL ASPECT

Binomial Test

		Category	N	Observed Prop.	Test Prop.
Political	Group 1	<= 70	26	1.00	.50
	Total		26	1.00	

a. Based on Z Approximation.

Source: Processed Data by SPSS, 2018.

From this analysis, the conclusion would be: If $\text{Sig} > 0,05$ then H_0 is accepted; and if $\text{Sig} < 0,05$ then H_0 is rejected. As the Sig in this research is 0,000 (smaller than 0,05), H_0 is rejected. Thus, it can be concluded that politically, the Chinese are rejected by the Malays in the West Kalimantan North Coast region.

In the context of this research, this political rejection of the Chinese can be understood in the current political climate, where religion and ethnicity are often dragged in; there is a Chinese tendency to tribalism and chauvinism, in their relations with the stakeholders of power, particularly concerning their strategic position in Singkawang. The reason of this rejection is the fact that power politics are often based on ethnicity, which creates a worry among the people of Sambas Regency, compounded by the religious problems, and also connected by some people to the economic gap between the more well-off Chinese and the less well-off Malays as the main reason of this rejection.

This political rejection obviously implies a tendency of ethnic competition over power and existence in the society. Although, this does not mean that there is no acceptance by the Malays of Chinese political struggles, as proven by the Mayor of Singkawang who also owed their success to local Malay support, and also the representation of Chinese in a political party associated with Islam. This matter of ethnic politics becomes really important when ethnic sentiments are used for risky campaigns.

This political rejection of the Chinese, as seen from the analysis result, does not immediately results in a degeneration from integration to disintegration, because there is still a basic question that must be answered: How did the Chinese, who are relatively few in numbers in the West Kalimantan North Coast region, can easily enter and remain in political and governmental bureaucracies, in economic power, and local politics. This cannot be ignored, because until now we can find what is referred to as “tradition” in ethnic politics. Based on this tradition, a process of acceptance can happen, as seen in Singkawang, where do Chinese traditions typically make the (Chinese-majority) locals feel safe and comfortable.

In principle, political domination concerns the dominance of an ethnic group in an area, which depends on whether they still use ethnic politics or not as a tool of obtaining power. Now, the discourse of Chinese and Malay ethnic groups on politics

has become interesting. In essence, it is all motivated by a desire to continue the domination of certain ethnic group and religion, ideally to the point that minorities can never obtain a n opportunity in the government bureaucracies, until the tradition of ethnic politics change into a tradition of clean, professional politics.

4. Rejection and Acceptance from Cultural Perspective

Cultural perception is a viewpoint used by an individual to view others—whether part of their own group, and especially other groups. Problems often surface due to the differing views of other groups, causing difficulties in cross-culture communications and affecting interactions between various ethnic groups.

The institutionalization of ethnic culture increasingly opens the room for ethnocentric polarization of cultural elements. To maintain their ethnic identity, typically an ethnic group would found an organization based on either ethnic unity or referring to their homeland, which also applies to West Kalimantan North Coast region. Factually, fostering ethnic relation is unambiguously positive, as long as the leaders are not vulnerable to be dragged into politics. Cultural developments of a region is a dynamization of unity in diversity. However, when it is constructed into ethnocentric forms of competition, and especially if it becomes wrapped up in ethnic politics, there is a good chance that another culture or ethnicity would be either eroded or retaliate with a more serious competition, which is feared to culminate in a cultural crash or war in order to achieve domination of one culture over the others.

This competition now can be felt in Singkawang, and gradually spreads into other parts of West Kalimantan North Coast region, as reflected by the answers to the 35 questions of the questionnaire, concerning cultural variable/aspect. Although they held varying opinions and gave different answers, in general they (both the Chinese and Malay respondents) answered the questions, and it can be concluded that there is a cultural rejection of the Chinese by the Malays in the West Kalimantan North Coast region. Cumulatively, the answers show that the respondents do not really agree with the premise that the Chinese are accepted culturally, only scoring 2,48 on average in a 1 to 4 scale, where 1 is non-agreement and 4 is strong agreement.

This cumulative results from the respondents' answers concerning the political aspect/variable of this rejection, is based on one-sample test (binomial test), where: H_0 : There is no rejection of Chinese by Malays culturally in the West Kalimantan

North Coast region; and H_a : There is a rejection of Chinese by Malays culturally in the West Kalimantan North Coast region. The binomial test performed can be seen in Table V.8 below:

Table V.8

ACCEPTANCE AND REJECTION OF CHINESE IN WEST KALIMANTAN NORTH
COAST REGION—
BASED ON CULTURAL ASPECT

Binomial Test

		Category	N	Observed Prop.	Test Prop.
Cultural	Group 1	<= 70	35	1.00	.50
	Total		35	1.00	

a. Based on Z Approximation.

Source: Processed Data by SPSS, 2018.

From this analysis, the conclusion would be: If $\text{Sig} > 0,05$ then H_0 is accepted; and if $\text{Sig} < 0,05$ then H_0 is rejected. As the Sig in this research is 0,000 (smaller than 0,05), H_0 is rejected. Thus, it can be concluded that culturally, the Chinese are rejected by the Malays in the West Kalimantan North Coast region.

This cultural rejection of the Chinese can be understood in the context of increasing cultural competition, which in turn generates a strong tendency for the Chinese to retain their identity, such as by using Chinese language(s) among themselves and feeling that their ethnic group is better than others—breeding suspicions. Thus, both the Chinese and Malays tend to see their own cultural norms and values (their social organization) as an absolute, which can be used to judge and act against other cultural groups.

Alongside this rejection, there is of course also some responds which leans toward acceptance. It is acknowledged that both the Chinese and Malay views and values shifted, with the presence of cross-culture communication, which brings along different cultural backgrounds, such as: customs, social norms/values, and various rules, to create a system of coexisting, mutually adjusting life. The communal spirit between the Chinese and Malays in the West Kalimantan North Coast region is affected by internal and external factors. The internal factors are emotional bonds based on brotherhood, unity, and compassion; while the external factors are the close proximity between communities in a region. These 2 factors would lead to a good

coexistence, if the Chinese and Malays increase their active and continuing cross-culture communications, in order to build a strong social unity between them.

5. Rejection and Acceptance from Religious Perspective

The relationship dynamics between religious communities in West Kalimantan North Coast region might head to a less harmonious direction. The Chinese communities turn out to have local belief or religion which is separate from Confucianism, Hinduism, or Buddhism, with its own religious shrine, referred to as “*Pekong*”. The Singkawang Hakka Chinese differentiate between *Kelenteng* and *Pekong*, with *Kelenteng* being bigger than *Pekong*.

Some outsiders often assume that the religion of the Chinese communities is Buddhism, while others assume that it is Confucianism. However, the fact is neither are truly correct. Yes, there might be elements of several other religious traditions in it, but they (the Chinese) prefer to call it a unique religion/belief of them, as reflected in the answers to the 16 questions of the questionnaire concerning religious variable/aspect. Although they held varying opinions and gave different answers, in general they (both the Chinese and Malay respondents) answered the questions, and it can be concluded that there is a religious rejection of the Chinese by the Malays in the West Kalimantan North Coast region. Cumulatively, the answers show that the respondents do not really agree, although only weakly, with the premise that the Chinese are accepted religiously, only scoring 2,64 on average in a 1 to 4 scale, where 1 is non-agreement and 4 is strong agreement.

This cumulative results from the respondents' answers concerning the political aspect/variable of this rejection, is based on one-sample test (binomial test), where: H_0 : There is no rejection of Chinese by Malays religiously in the West Kalimantan North Coast region; and H_a : There is a rejection of Chinese by Malays religiously in the West Kalimantan North Coast region. The binomial test performed can be seen in Table V.9 below:

Tabel V.9

ACCEPTANCE AND REJECTION OF CHINESE IN WEST KALIMANTAN NORTH
COAST REGION—
BASED ON RELIGIOUS ASPECT

Binomial Test

		Category	N	Observed Prop.	Test Prop.
Religious	Group 1	<= 70	16	1.00	.50
	Total		16	1.00	

a. Based on Z Approximation.

Source: Processed Data by SPSS, 2018.

From this analysis, the conclusion would be: If Sig > 0,05 then H_0 is accepted; and if Sig < 0,05 then H_0 is rejected. As the Sig in this research is 0,000 (smaller than 0,05), H_0 is rejected. Thus, it can be concluded that religiously, the Chinese are rejected by the Malays in the West Kalimantan North Coast region.

This religious rejection of the Chinese can be understood, in the context that their spiritual traditions more closely align with mainland Chinese traditions, such as Cap Go Meh, or Tatumg and burning of fireworks. These are in essence not mere entertainment, but rituals of ancestor veneration. These actually rather common traditions, are feared to invite Malay reactions when done excessively, as they are diametrically opposed to the values and beliefs of Islam, followed by the Malays.

Besides this rejection, there is also elements leaning to an acceptance, as the Malays are naturally an open community. Thus, they could easily accept other nations to live and develop their cultures in their area, which is *nota bene* a Malay cultural region, as long as the Chinese only have pure intentions, not evil intentions such as colonization, oppression, etc. This is in line with Islam, professed by the Malays, which tensure religious freedom in West Kalimantan North Coast region. The Muslim Malays have allowed and tolerated the presence and growth of Chinese beliefs, to the point that the region become known as a region of “seribu Kelenteng.”

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I. Karakteristik Responden:

Nama :
Umur :
Jenis Kelamin :
Agama :
Pendidikan :
Pekerjaan :
Kedudukan dlm Klg :
Kedudukan dlm Masy. :
Suku/Etnis :

FAKTOR-FAKTOR PENOLAKAN DAN PENERIMAAN ETNIS CINA DI KABUPATEN SAMBAS

II. Petunjuk Pengisian:

Pilihlah salah satu jawaban yang paling sesuai menurut pendapat Bapak/Ibu/Sdr dengan memberi tanda centang (√) pada kolom yang tersedia. Ada 5 (lima) alternatif jawaban berikut maknanya yang dapat Bapak/Ibu/Sdr pilih, yaitu:

- SS = Sangat Setuju - Skor 5
- S = Setuju - Skor 4
- KS = Kurang Setuju - Skor 3
- TS = Tidak Setuju - Skor 2
- STS = Sangat Tidak Setuju - Skor 1

III. Daftar Pertanyaan

Variabel Ekonomi (X1)					
No	Pernyataan ttg Perdagangan & Jasa	SS	S	KS	TS
1.	Tempat tinggal memberikan kesempatan semua etnis untuk berusaha di sektor perdagangan.				
2.	Tempat tinggal memberikan kesempatan semua etnis untuk berusaha di sektor jasa.				

3.	Tempat tinggal meningkatkan minat masyarakat semua etnis untuk memproduksi barang.				
4.	Tempat tinggal dapat meningkatkan minat masyarakat semua etnis untuk memproduksi jasa.				
5.	Tempat tinggal meningkatkan minat masyarakat semua etnis untuk mengkonsumsi barang.				
6.	Tempat tinggal meningkatkan minat masyarakat semua etnis untuk mengkonsumsi jasa.				
7.	Tempat tinggal harusnya menyediakan akses modal usaha kepada semua etnis yang menggeluti usaha pedagang barang.				
8.	Tempat tinggal harusnya menyediakan akses modal usaha kepada semua etnis yang menggeluti usaha di bidang jasa.				
9.	Tempat tinggal harusnya menyediakan tempat khusus etnis tertentu untuk berdagang barang.				
10.	Tempat tinggal harusnya menyediakan tempat khusus bagi etnis tertentu untuk berdagang jasa.				
11.	Perdagangan barang dan jasa seharusnya memberikan rasa nyaman dalam melaksanakan aktivitas perekonomian sehari-hari.				
12.	Perdagangan barang dan jasa didominasi oleh kalangan etnis tertentu, yaitu etnis Cina.				
13.	Perdagangan barang dan jasa didominasi oleh kalangan etnis tertentu, yaitu etnis Melayu.				
14.	Perdagangan barang dan jasa didominasi oleh kalangan etnis pendatang, yaitu etnis Jawa, Batak, Sunda, dll.				
15.	Perdagangan barang dan jasa telah melibatkan semua etnis.				
16.	Tempat tinggal memberikan kesempatan bekerja di sektor perdagangan sebagai majikan.				
17.	Tempat tinggal memberikan kesempatan bekerja di sektor perdagangan sebagai karyawan.				
18.	Tempat tinggal memberikan kesempatan bekerja di sektor perdagangan sebagai mitra.				
19.	Tempat tinggal memberikan kesempatan bekerja di sektor jasa sebagai majikan.				
20.	Tempat tinggal memberikan kesempatan bekerja di sektor jasa sebagai karyawan.				
21.	Tempat tinggal memberikan kesempatan bekerja di sektor jasa sebagai mitra.				

22.	Kesempatan bekerja di sektor barang sebagai majikan terbuka bagi semua etnis.				
23.	Kesempatan bekerja di sektor jasa sebagai majikan terbuka bagi semua etnis.				
24.	Kesempatan bekerja di sektor barang sebagai karyawan terbuka bagi semua etnis.				
25.	Kesempatan bekerja di sektor jasa sebagai karyawan terbuka bagi semua etnis.				
26.	Kesempatan bekerja di sektor barang sebagai mitra terbuka bagi semua etnis.				
27.	Kesempatan bekerja di sektor jasa sebagai mitra terbuka bagi semua etnis.				
28.	Kesempatan bekerja di sektor barang sebagai majikan terbuka hanya bagi etnis tertentu.				
29.	Kesempatan bekerja di sektor jasa sebagai majikan terbuka hanya bagi etnis tertentu.				
30.	Kesempatan bekerja di sektor barang sebagai karyawan terbuka hanya bagi etnis tertentu.				
31.	Kesempatan bekerja di sektor jasa sebagai karyawan terbuka hanya bagi etnis tertentu.				
32.	Kesempatan bekerja di sektor barang sebagai mitra terbuka hanya bagi sesama etnis tertentu.				
33.	Kesempatan bekerja di sektor jasa sebagai mitra terbuka hanya bagi sesama etnis tertentu.				

Variabel
Sosial
(X2)

No	Pernyataan ttg Adaptasi	SS	S	KS	TS
1.	Penyesuaian antar etnis terjadi, karena interaksi telah terjadi sejak lama (teroganisir berdasarkan nilai dan norma sosial).				
2.	Etnis Cina telah diterima masyarakat sejak lama dan telah menyesuaikan diri dengan nilai dan norma masyarakat setempat.				
3.	Etnis Cina telah ditolak masyarakat sejak lama, karena ketidak-mampuannya menyesuaikan diri dengan nilai dan norma masyarakat setempat.				
4.	Semua etnis yang ada merupakan bagian dari struktur sosial masyarakat setempat.				
5.	Etnis Cina masih dianggap sebagai unsur luar dari struktur sosial masyarakat setempat.				
6.	Masyarakat setempat didominasi oleh asal usul keturunan yang sama.				
7.	Beberapa anggota masyarakat setempat merupakan hasil perkawinan antar etnis.				
8.	Beberapa anggota masyarakat setempat merupakan hasil perkawinan antara etnis setempat dengan etnis Cina.				
9.	Kemampuan masyarakat untuk menyesuaikan diri dengan kehidupan sosial setempat, lebih didasarkan atas kemampuan pribadi dalam bersosialisasi.				
10.	Kemampuan etnis Cina menyesuaikan diri dengan kehidupan sosial setempat, lebih didasarkan atas kemampuan pribadinya dalam bersosialisasi.				
11.	Masyarakat setempat selalu menjaga interaksi dan mendukung nilai-nilai dan norma sosial yang telah lama melembaga.				
12.	Masyarakat dari etnis Cina selalu menjaga interaksi dan mendukung nilai-nilai dan norma sosial setempat yang telah lama melembaga.				

13.	Semua anggota masyarakat yang ada selalu berperilaku berdasarkan nilai-nilai dan norma sosial setempat.				
14.	Etnis Cina selalu selalu berperilaku berdasarkan nilai-nilai dan norma sosial setempat—termasuk dalam berbahasa dengan masyarakat setempat.				
15.	Semua anggota masyarakat berpeluang mendapatkan pengaruh dan menduduki kekuasaan—jabatan sosial formal/informal dan non formal—berdasarkan nilai-nilai dan norma sosial setempat.				
16.	Etnis Cina berpeluang mendapatkan pengaruh dan menduduki kekuasaan—jabatan sosial formal/informal dan non formal—berdasarkan nilai-nilai dan norma sosial setempat.				
17.	Semua anggota masyarakat wajib tunduk dan patuh terhadap nilai-nilai dan norma sosial/budaya setempat.				
18.	Etnis Cina wajib tunduk dan patuh terhadap nilai-nilai dan norma sosial/budaya setempat.				
19.	Semua anggota masyarakat telah melebur dengan kebudayaan setempat.				
20.	Etnis Cina telah melebur dengan kebudayaan setempat (etnis Cina termasuk masyarakat setempat).				
21.	Setiap individu telah memiliki kesadaran pribadi untuk tunduk dan taat dengan nilai-nilai dan norma sosial/budaya setempat.				
22.	Setiap individu dari etnis Cina telah memiliki kesadaran pribadi untuk tunduk dan taat dengan nilai-nilai dan norma sosial/budaya setempat.				
23.	Terdapat anggota masyarakat yang telah mengalami perkawinan antar etnis dan tetap menjunjung tinggi nilai dan norma sosial/budaya setempat.				
24.	Terdapat anggota masyarakat dari etnis Cina yang telah melakukan perkawinan dengan etnis lain dan tetap menjunjung tinggi nilai dan norma sosial/budaya setempat.				
25.	Kehidupan sosial antar etnis selalu direncanakan, diatur dan dikendalikan oleh pemuka atau tokoh masyarakat setempat.				

26.	Kehidupan sosial etnis Cina dengan etnis lainnya selalu direncanakan, diatur dan dikendalikan oleh pemuka atau tokoh masyarakat setempat.				
27.	Kehidupan politik masyarakat selalu ditentukan atau berdasarkan nilai dan norma sosial/budaya setempat.				
28.	Kehidupan politik masyarakat etnis Cina selalu ditentukan atau berdasarkan nilai dan norma sosial/budaya setempat.				
29.	Penerimaan individu atau kelompok pendatang untuk menjadi masyarakat setempat, selalu ditentukan atau berdasarkan nilai dan norma sosial/budaya setempat.				
30.	Penerimaan individu atau kelompok etnis Cina untuk menjadi masyarakat setempat, selalu ditentukan atau berdasarkan nilai dan norma sosial/budaya setempat.				
31.	Masyarakat selalu berinteraksi dengan kebudayaan yang berbeda-beda, tetapi dalam kehidupan kesehariannya masing-masing masih berpegang teguh pada kebudayaannya sendiri.				
32.	Masyarakat etnis Cina meskipun selalu berinteraksi dengan kebudayaan lain, tetapi tetap berpegang teguh pada kebudayaannya sendiri.				
33.	Masyarakat selalu mengalami pergeseran perilaku dan pola hidup ketika berinteraksi dengan kebudayaan lain.				
34.	Masyarakat etnis Cina selalu berpegang teguh kepada perilaku kecinaan dan pola hidup yang diwariskan leluhur meskipun telah berinteraksi dengan kebudayaan lain.				
35.	Masyarakat selalu berhati-hati berinteraksi dengan etnis lain (berbeda kebudayaan), karena setiap etnis memiliki nilai dan norma berbeda.				
36.	Masyarakat etnis Cina selalu berhati-hati dengan etnis lainnya, terutama etnis setempat—umumnya Muslim—karena memiliki banyak perbedaan mendasar nilai dan norma hidup.				
37.	Akulturasi yang dibangun masyarakat selalu berorientasi tujuan tertentu—seperti syiar/misi agama, atau kepentingan lainnya yang bersifat, sosial, ekonomi, bahkan politik (Jika ada kepentingan lainnya, seperti:).				

38.	Akulturasi yang dibangun masyarakat dari etnis Cina selalu lebih berorientasi pada kepentingan ekonomis dan politik (Jika ada kepentingan lainnya, seperti:).				
39.	Masyarakat dalam interaksinya selalu berdialog dengan bahasa Indonesia, atau bahasa daerah setempat yang ada unsur Keindonesiannya.				
40.	Masyarakat dari etnis Cina dalam interaksinya selalu berdialog dengan bahasa Indonesia dengan etnis lain, dan menggunakan bahasa Cina manakala berinteraksi dengan sesama etnis Cina.				
41.	Masih terdapat kelompok masyarakat yang terpinggirkan dalam pergaulan antar etnis.				
42.	Masyarakat etnis Cina dalam interaksinya masih merasa terpinggirkan dalam pergaulan antar etnis.				
43.	Interaksi sosial yang terjadi selalu didasarkan atas kepentingan kelompok atau etnisnya.				
44.	Interaksi sosial etnis Cina dengan etnis lainnya selalu didasarkan atas kepentingan kelompok atau etnisnya.				
45.	Telah terjadi perkawinan antar etnis, dan perkawinan itu tidak mengaburkan identitas budaya masing-masing.				
46.	Telah terjadi perkawinan antar etnis, khususnya etnis Cina dengan etnis Melayu setempat, dan dari perkawinan itu tidak mengaburkan identitas budayanya masing-masing.				
47.	Terdapat asosiasi bersama bersifat kooperatif antar etnis (meliputi:).				
48.	Terdapat asosiasi bersama bersifat kooperatif antar etnis Cina dengan etnis setempat (meliputi:).				
49.	Terdapat asosiasi bersama antar etnis bersifat tidak berpihak pada kepentingan umum, tetapi hanya untuk kepentingan kelompoknya, atau kalangan tertentu saja (meliputi:).				
50.	Terdapat asosiasi antar etnis yang bersifat memusuhi etnis Cina atau etnis tertentu lainnya (meliputi:).				
51.	Terdapat asosiasi antar etnis yang dibentuk oleh mantan kriminal, tetapi tujuannya mulia untuk kepentingan umum (meliputi:).				

52.	Terdapat asosiasi antar etnis yang melibatkan etnis Cina, dan dibentuk oleh mantan kriminal, tetapi tujuannya mulia untuk kepentingan umum (meliputi:).				
53.	Terdapat asosiasi etnis yang hanya memenuhi kepentingan etnisnya saja (meliputi:).				
54.	Terdapat asosiasi etnis setempat dan etnis Cina yang sifatnya untuk silaturahmi (meliputi:).				
55.	Terdapat asosiasi etnis setempat dan etnis Cina yang sifatnya mengatur atau memenuhi kebutuhan primer (meliputi:).				
56.	Terdapat persaingan dalam penguasaan sumberdaya antara etnis setempat dengan etnis Cina (meliputi:).				
57.	Terdapat persaingan yang bersifat konstruktif dalam penguasaan sumberdaya antara etnis setempat dengan etnis Cina yang sifatnya kerjasama (meliputi:).				
58.	Terdapat persaingan yang bersifat tersembunyi dalam penguasaan sumberdaya antara etnis setempat dengan etnis Cina yang sifatnya saling mengukuhkan eksistensi etnis masing-masing (meliputi:).				
59.	Terdapat persaingan yang bersifat kultural antara etnis setempat dengan etnis Cina, yang sifatnya saling mengukuhkan eksistensi etnis masing-masing (meliputi:).				
60.	Terdapat persaingan bersifat penegakkan nilai-nilai dan norma antara etnis setempat dengan etnis Cina, saling mengukuhkan eksistensi etnisnya masing-masing (meliputi:).				

Variabel
Politik (X3)

No	Pernyataan ttg Partai	SS	S	KS	TS
1.	Semua anggota masyarakat adalah warga Indonesia yang memahami demokrasi Pancasila.				
2.	Selaku anggota masyarakat yang paham demokrasi selalu menggunakan hak pilihnya dalam setiap Pemilu.				
3.	Diantara anggota masyarakat terdapat simpatisan dan kader Parpol.				
4.	Setiap masyarakat harus menghormati sikap dan pilihan publik—menjadi kader Parpol.				
5.	Masyarakat dalam menentukan pilihan politik tidak selalu berdasarkan afiliasi agama dan etnisitas.				
6.	Keberadaan Etnis Cina dapat menentukan pilihan politik masyarakat setempat.				
7.	Terdapat warga dari etnis Cina yang menjadi kader Parpol.				
8.	Masyarakat selalu mendukung jika ada warga dari etnis Cina yang tampil dalam kontestasi politik—sebagai wakil rakyat/pemerintahan.				
9.	Dukungan masyarakat kepada warga setempat dari etnis non-Cina yang tampil dalam konstestasi politik, karenja faktor ketokohan.				
10.	Dukungan masyarakat kepada warga dari etnis Cina yang tampil dalam konstestasi politik, dikarenakan faktor ketokohan.				
11.	Dukungan masyarakat kepada warga setempat dari untuk tampil dalam konstestasi politik, dikarenakan faktor kekayaan harta dan finansial.				
12.	Dukungan masyarakat kepada warga etnis Cina untuk tampil dalam konstestasi politik, dikarenakan faktor kekayaan harta dan finansial.				
13.	Dukungan masyarakat kepada warga non-Cina dalam konstestasi politik, karena faktor kharisma (perilaku baik, responsif maupun ketampanan.				
14.	Dukungan masyarakat kepada warga etnis Cina dalam konstestasi politik, dikarenakan faktor kharisma—baik perilakunya yang baik, responsif maupun ketampanan yang dimiliki.				

15.	Dukungan masyarakat kepada warga setempat untuk tampil dalam konstestasi politik, dikarenakan faktor warisan tradisi.				
16.	Dukungan masyarakat kepada warga dari etnis Cina yang tampil dalam konstestasi politik, dikarenakan faktor warisan tradisi.				
17.	Masyarakat dalam menentukan pemimpin maupun wakil rakyat selalu berdasarkan nilai-nilai luhur masyarakat.				
18.	Masyarakat dari etnis Cina dalam menentukan pemimpin/wakil rakyat berdasarkan nilai-nilai luhur masyarakat.				
19.	Masyarakat dalam menentukan pemimpin/wakil rakyat wajib tunduk pada norma atau aturan bersama.				
20.	Masyarakat dari etnis Cina dalam menentukan pemimpin maupun wakil rakyat wajib tunduk pada norma/aturan bersama—seperti ditentukan berdasarkan garis keturunan atau mendapat mandat dari tokoh masyarakat setempat.				
21.	Kepanutan masyarakat terhadap pemangku adat/tokoh masyarakat hingga keturunannya masih terbilang besar.				
22.	Kepanutan masyarakat dari etnis Cina terhadap pemangku adat/tokoh masyarakat hingga keturunannya masih terbilang besar.				
23.	Hingga kini masyarakat masih menghargai dan menjunjung tinggi kekuasaan yang bersifat formal—seperti; kepala desa, bupati, dsb.				
24.	Hingga kini masyarakat dari etnis Cina masih menghargai dan menjunjung tinggi kekuasaan yang bersifat formal—seperti; kepala desa, bupati, dsb.				
25.	Selain tokoh-tokoh formal, masyarakat juga masih menghargai dan menjunjung tinggi kekuasaan yang bersifat non formal—seperti; ketua adat, penggawa, kepala suku dan sebagainya.				
26.	Selain tokoh-tokoh formal, masyarakat dari etnis Cina juga masih menghargai dan menjunjung tinggi kekuasaan yang bersifat non formal—seperti; ketua adat, penggawa, kepala suku dan sebagainya.				

Variabel
Budaya
(X4)

No	Pernyataan ttg Materil	SS	S	KS	TS
1.	Semua anggota masyarakat hingga kini masih mempertahankan atau menggunakan perkakas rumah tangga, alat pertanian maupun nelayan, maupun pencarian lainnya berdasarkan ciri khas etnisnya.				
2.	Semua anggota dari etnis Cina hingga kini masih mempertahankan atau menggunakan perkakas rumah tangga, alat pertanian maupun nelayan, maupun pencarian lainnya berdasarkan ciri khas etnisnya.				
3.	Perhiasan—seperti; gelang, cincin maupun kalung—masih dianggap masyarakat sebagai sesuatu yang bernilai adat/tradisi, maupun prestise dalam status sosial maupun religiusnya.				
4.	Perhiasan—seperti; gelang, cincin maupun kalung—masih dianggap masyarakat dari etnis Cina sebagai sesuatu yang bernilai adat/tradisi, maupun prestise dalam status sosial maupun religiusnya.				
5.	Dikalangan masyarakat setempat masih terdapat senjata khas yang masih dipertahankan—seperti; tombak, keris, pedang, dan sebagainya.				
6.	Dikalangan masyarakat dari etnis Cina masih terdapat senjata khas yang masih dipertahankan—seperti; tombak, pedang, toya, dan sebagainya.				
7.	Hingga kini masih beredar dongeng/fabel yang masih dipertahankan sebagai tradisi masyarakat setempat (Dongeng tersebut berupa;).				
8.	Hingga kini masih beredar dongeng/fabel yang masih dipertahankan sebagai tradisi masyarakat etnis Cina (Dongeng tersebut berupa;)				
9.	Hingga kini masih beredar cerita rakyat yang masih dipertahankan sebagai tradisi masyarakat setempat (Cerita rakyat tersebut berupa;)				
10.	Hingga kini masih beredar cerita rakyat yang masih dipertahankan sebagai tradisi masyarakat etnis Cina (Cerita rakyat tersebut berupa;)				

11.	Hingga kini masih beredar dan bertahan kesenian tradisional sebagai tradisi masyarakat setempat (Dongeng tersebut berupa;)				
12.	Hingga kini masih beredar kesenian tradisional etnis Cina—masih dipertahankan sebagai tradisi masyarakat (Dongeng tersebut berupa;)				
13.	Masyarakat sangat mendukung dan mengharapkan agar generasinya dapat mengenyam pendidikan yang lebih tinggi (Jumlah anggota keluarga berpendidikan S1 ke atas:).				
14.	Masyarakat dari etnis Cina sangat mendukung dan mengharapkan agar generasinya dapat mengenyam pendidikan yang lebih tinggi (Jumlah anggota keluarga berpendidikan S1 ke atas:).				
15.	Masyarakat mendukung dan mengharapkan agar generasinya tamat pendidikan tingkat menengah (Jumlah anggota keluarga berpendidikan menengah/SLTA-sederajat:).				
16.	Masyarakat dari etnis Cina mendukung dan mengharapkan agar generasinya tamat pendidikan tingkat menengah (Jumlah anggota keluarga berpendidikan menengah/SLTA-sederajat:).				
17.	Masyarakat mendukung dan mengharapkan agar generasinya wajib tamat pendidikan dasar (Jumlah anggota keluarga berpendidikan dasar/SLTP-sederajat:).				
18.	Masyarakat dari etnis Cina mendukung dan mengharapkan agar generasinya wajib tamat pendidikan dasar (Jumlah anggota keluarga berpendidikan dasar/SLTP-sederajat:).				
19.	Masyarakat memiliki kepercayaan yang didasarkan atas pemahaman dan kepemilikan agama yang diyakininya.				
20.	Masyarakat etnis Cina memiliki kepercayaan yang didasarkan atas pemahaman dan kepemilikan agama yang diyakini juga ajaran leluhurnya.				
21.	Masyarakat memiliki cara pandang berdasarkan sistem kepercayaan dan ilmu pengetahuan yang dimilikinya.				

22.	Masyarakat etnis Cina memiliki cara pandang berdasarkan sistem kepercayaan dan budaya leluhurnya.				
23.	Masyarakat memiliki cara mengkonsumsi berdasarkan kebersamaan—gotong royong maupun sistem saprahan (seperti;).				
24.	Masyarakat etnis Cina memiliki cara mengkonsumsi berdasarkan atas sistem kepercayaan/budaya leluhurnya (seperti;).				
25.	Masyarakat memiliki cara berkomunikasi berdasarkan kebersamaan adab yang dijunjung secara turun temurun (Simbolnya... ..).				
26.	Masyarakat dari etnis Cina memiliki cara berkomunikasi berdasarkan adab yang dijunjung secara turun temurun (Simbolnya... ..).				
27.	Masyarakat selalu menjaga keteraturan, kebersihan lingkungan, pekarangan rumah/kesopanan dalam berpakaian (Hal tsb yang terlihat:).				
28.	Masyarakat etnis Cina menjaga keteraturan, kebersihan lingkungan, pekarangan rumah maupun kesopanan dalam berpakaian (Hal tsb yang terlihat:).				
29.	Masyarakat etnis Cina selalu memperhatikan penampilan, diantaranya adab berpakaian.				
30.	Masyarakat selalu menggunakan pakaian bernuansa muslim manakala menghadapi tamunya (Hal tsb yang terlihat:).				
31.	Masyarakat etnis Cina selalu menggunakan pakaian bernuansa kecinaan manakala menghadapi tamunya (terlihat:).				
32.	Masyarakat dalam berkomunikasi selalu berdialek Melayu manakala melakukan kontak sosialnya (Hal tsb yang terlihat:).				
33.	Masyarakat etnis Cina dalam berkomunikasi selalu berdialek Melayu manakala melakukan kontak sosialnya (Hal tsb yang terlihat:).				
34.	Masyarakat dalam berkomunikasi selalu berdialek Melayu dan bisa memikat lawan bicara (Hal tsb yang terlihat:).				
35.	Masyarakat etnis Cina dalam berkomunikasi selalu berdialek Cina dan bisa memikat lawan bicara dalam setiap kontak sosialnya (Hal tsb yang terlihat:).				

Variabel
Agama
(X5)

No	Pernyataan ttg Bentuk	SS	S	KS	TS
1.	Semua anggota masyarakat dalam kehidupannya selalu berdasarkan semangat keagamaan yang diyakininya (Bentuk dari semangat keyakinannya itu terlihat dari:).				
2.	Semua anggota masyarakat dari etnis Cina dalam kehidupannya selalu berdasarkan semangat keagamaan maupun kepercayaan yang diyakininya (Bentuk dari semangat keyakinannya itu terlihat dari:).				
3.	Bentuk ketaatan beragama masyarakat selalu ditunjukkan dengan ketaatan beribadah di Masjid—atau rumah ibadah lainnya berdasarkan kepemilikan agama yang diyakininya.				
4.	Bentuk ketaatan beragama masyarakat dari etnis Cina selalu ditunjukkan dengan ketaatan beribadah di Kelenteng—atau di rumah dengan tersedianya Pekong yang disimpan di salah satu ruang dalam/di luar rumahnya.				
5.	Kesalahan beragama masyarakat selalu sejalan dengan kepentingan negara yang mengakui keberagaman agama, tradisi dan adat istiadat.				
6.	Ketaatan beragama masyarakat dari etnis Cina selalu sejalan dengan kepentingan negara yang mengakui keberagaman agama, tradisi dan adat istiadat.				
7.	Tujuan hidup beragama dalam meraih kebahagiaan dunia dan akhirat, harus didasarkan kepentingan bersama, saling menghargai dan tidak mengganggu kepentingan masyarakat lainnya (Contohnya:).				
8.	Tujuan hidup beragama masyarakat dari etnis Cina dalam meraih kebahagiaan dunia dan kehidupan setelah mati, harus didasarkan kepentingan bersama, saling menghargai dan tidak mengganggu kepentingan masyarakat lainnya (Contohnya:).				
9.	Semua anggota masyarakat dalam kehidupan beragama selalu mendapatkan ketenangan batin, dan menjiwai ajaran agamanya dalam setiap perilakunya (Contoh penjiwaan keagamaannya itu terlihat dari:).				

10.	Semua anggota etnis Cina dalam kehidupan beragama selalu menjiwai ajaran agamanya dalam setiap perilakunya (Contoh penjiwaan keagamaannya itu terlihat dari:).				
11.	Praktek keagamaan secara kolektif dalam bentuk ibadah maupun ritual selalu dilaksanakan masyarakat (Contohnya:).				
12.	Praktek keagamaan secara kolektif dalam bentuk ibadah maupun ritual selalu dilaksanakan etnis Cina (Contohnya:).				
13.	Tujuan melaksanakan praktek keagamaan secara kolektif dalam bentuk ibadah maupun ritual yang dilaksanakan masyarakat bernilai dakwah dan tradisi (Contohnya:).				
14.	Tujuan melaksanakan praktek keagamaan secara kolektif dalam bentuk ibadah maupun ritual yang dilaksanakan masyarakat dari etnis Cina bernilai tradisi leluhur dan eksistensinya di masyarakat (Contohnya:).				
15.	Manfaat melaksanakan praktek keagamaan secara kolektif dalam bentuk ibadah maupun ritual yang dilaksanakan masyarakat dalam rangka mencapai ketakwaan terhadap Allah SWT (Contohnya:).				
16.	Manfaat melaksanakan praktek keagamaan secara kolektif dalam bentuk ibadah/ritual etnis Cina dalam rangka menjaga nilai-nilai leluhur dan kebaikan penganutnya (Contohnya:).				

Lampiran 2.

**DOKUMENTASI PHOTO
PENELITIAN**



Gambar 1:
Jalur Sungai Masuknya Etnis Cina di Kecamatan Sungai Raya,
Kabupaten Bengkayang – Kalimantan Barat.



Gambar 2:
Jalur Sungai Masuknya Etnis Cina di Wilayah Pantai Utara –
Kalimantan Barat.



Gambar 3:

Jalur Sungai Masuknya Etnis Cina di Kota Singkawang,
Kalimantan Barat.



Gambar 4:

Jalur Sungai Masuknya Etnis Cina di Kota Pemangkat dan Sambas,
Pertemuan Pantai Pemangkat dan Muara Sungai Sambas.



Gambar 5:

Kondisi Rumah Ibadah Etnis Cina di Kecamatan Sungai Raya, Kabupaten Bengkayang – Kalimantan Barat.



Gambar 6:

Kondisi Rumah Ibadah Etnis Cina di Kecamatan Pemangkat, Kabupaten Pemangkat – Kalimantan Barat.



Gambar 7:

Pembekalan dan Fasilitasi kepada Surveyor di Kabupaten Sambas.



Gambar 8:

Pembekalan dan Fasilitasi kepada Surveyor di Kabupaten Sambas.



Gambar 9:

Focus Discussion Group (FGD) bersama Akademisi dan Tokoh Masyarakat Kabupaten Sambas.



Gambar 10:

Kondisi Wawancara dan Pengisian Kuesioner Penelitian di Kabupaten Sambas.



Gambar 11:

Kondisi Wawancara dengan Kazim selaku Tokoh Masyarakat Sungai Raya, Kabupaten Bengkayang.



Gambar 12:

Kondisi Wawancara dengan Sekretaris Kantor Kementerian Agama di Kota Singkawang



Gambar 13:

Kondisi Wawancara dengan Bong Wei Khong selaku Ketua Masyarakat Adat Budaya Tionghoa (MABT) Kota Singkawang.



Gambar 14:

Kondisi Wawancara dengan Bambang Proyagi (M. Bilal) dari etnis Melayu Sekaligus Tokoh FPI Kota Singkawang.



Gambar 15:
Kondisi Wawancara dan Pengisian Kuesioner Penelitian
di Kabupaten Sambas.



Gambar 16:
Kondisi Wawancara dan Pengisian Kuesioner Penelitian
di Kabupaten Sambas.



Gambar 17:

Kondisi Wawancara dan Pengisian Kuesioner Penelitian
di Kabupaten Sambas.



Gambar 18:

Kondisi Wawancara dan Pengisian Kuesioner Penelitian
di Kabupaten Sambas.



Gambar 19:
Kondisi Kerja Rekapitulasi Data Responden dan
Inventarisasi Data Hasil-hasil Penelitian.



Gambar 20:
Kondisi Kota Singkawang Tempo Dulu.



Gambar 21:

Kondisi Wawancara dengan Erwin Saputra selaku Tokoh Masyarakat Pemangkat.



Gambar 22:

Kondisi Wawancara dengan Pengurus Rumah Ibadah etnis Cina di Kecamatan Pemangkat.



Gambar 23:

Focus Discussion Group (FGD) bersama Akademisi dan Tokoh Masyarakat Kabupaten Sambas.



Gambar 24:

Kondisi Salah Satu Ruang Ibadah etnis Cina di Kecamatan Pemangkat.